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abstract
LEARNING TO CONFESS: THE INQUISITION IN THE AGE OF REFORMS
FEBRUARY 2002
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Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Nicholas Xenos
While the English-speaking world explored the possibilities of liberalism, their
Catholic neighbors to the South continued to develop the political and social theories
developed by St. Thomas Aquinas. The principles and values of Thomism continued to
inform the organizing of empires and the distribution ofjustice. This work focuses on the
early modern reforms of Thomism, particularly the Jesuit influence, and how those
reforms were practiced within the Spanish Inquisition.
Relying on philosophical texts ot the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries as
well as inquisitorial archival materials, this work considers both the confessional
relationship and the process of reconciliation within a Thomistic framework. Rather than
a juggernaut ol death, as the Black Legend would suggest, or a vehicle ol discipline, as
Foucault argued, the handbooks used within the Holy Office suggest a commitment to the
corporate and corporeal principles of St. Thomas Aquinas. While not an apology for the
Inquisition, this research suggests that the Holy Office may offer a valuable alternative to
liberal jurisprudence, particularly in cases when social connections are more pertinent
than individual rights.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Why care about ThomisirO
1 he student new to philosophy is warned that the initial going will be rough. "It is
like stepping into the middle of a conversation that has been going on for centuries," is
how one philosophy professor explained it to its undergraduates at Haverford. Kant talks
to Hume who is talking to Descartes and on and on back through the ages. To enter into
the discussion is to find oneself face to face with a multitude of great thinkers all of whom
know each other on a first principle basis. Anyone who wants to join in the conversation
needs to know how to speak the language of the other philosophers in the room.
Political philosophy is no less conversational, no less engaged in pitching back and
forth through the centuries ideas on the purpose, function, and meaning of a public life.
However, the conversation with regard to political matters is, for the most part,
interrupted. Between the writings of classical thinkers, such as Plato, Aristotle, and
Cicero, and the writings ofmodem thinkers, such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke,
there lies a rich assembly ot political thinkers who, at least in recent centuries, have
leceived very little attention: the natural law theorists. Indeed, a look at the job openings
in political theory listed in the personnel service newsletter of the American Political
Science Association suggests that the middle ages and Catholic Reformation made no
contribution to our understanding of what it means to lead a political life. Departments
looking for someone to teach the history of political theory are looking for someone
trained in classical and/or early modem political thought. The history of political thought,
in other words, means Plato and Machiavelli, not St. Augustine, William of Ockham, or
St. Thomas Aquinas: early modem means means I lobbes and Loeke. no, Suarez or
Vitoria.
I here is an exception to this institutionalized oversight. The geneologically-
minded. pursing the origins of natural rights and private property, have begun to wander
into the dusty gothic halls of Thomism. Brian Tierney discovered a vociferous debate
between Ockhamists, Thomists, and canon law jurists in his thoughtful consideration of
the idea of natural right.' James Tally uncovered a family resemblance between the
sixteenth century Thomists and Locke's handling of property rights in the seventeenth
century, determining that there was much more of natural law thinking in Locke's theory
oi government than twentieth century scholars, committed to the idea of "possessive
individualism," realized.
1
Quentin Skinner and Richard Tuck have also increased our
understanding of the foundational role that natural law theory has played in the formation
of modern political thought. 3
I or the most part, however, the political philosophy of these Catholic writers has
largely been ignored. The Princeton Readings in Political Thought
A
for instance, which
claims to include essential texts since Plato" provides one hundred pages on the classical
authors, a mere twenty-five on the middle ages, and three hundred on modern political
thought, none ol whom espouse a C atholic position. Luther participates in the political
'Brian Tierney, The Idea ofNatural Rights (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995).
- James fully, "After the Macpherson thesis," An Approach to Political Philosophy:
Locke in Contexts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 71-95.
Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government 1572-1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993); Quentin Skinner, The Foundations ofModern Political Thought
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
3
Mitchell Cohen and Nicole Fermon, editors, Princeton Readings in Political Thought
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996).
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discussion, as does Calvin, bu, nowhere do we hear the "other side" of ,he argument, the
argument for the natural abi lilies and innate capacities ofman; the argument for corporate
good over individual rights.
I his professional oversight has created theoretical problems for scholars studying
ecclesiastical base communities in Latin America. Ethnographers hoping to explain the
values of the Popular Church, or other Catholic movements involved in social justice, are
faced with the unfortunate choice of either translating those liberationist efforts into
liberal discourse or, alternatively, losing professional legitimacy by speaking the language
ol the Roman Catholic Church.' Were the moral language ofThomism better recognized, a
more fitting option would be available to these researchers. 1 ’
I homism, which is also referenced as natural law theory, stresses the natural
abilities placed in man by God. The universe envisioned by St. Thomas Aquinas was a
rational and purposive universe and man's very nature was a part of that rational plan.
Ewery human being was sown with the necessary seeds to reach perfection. Every human
was equipped with the tools to distinguish between right and wrong, to participate in
reason. Grace, the divine powers oE Christ, did not operate against nature, as nominalists
were suggesting, but in perfect harmony with it.
The fundamental assumption of all Thomist thought is that grace does not destroy
nature but rather perfects it. Through grace and our natural intellectual powers, Aquinas
and his followers believed we might move up the Chain of Being, approaching the angelic
spheres. Although we would never have God's synoptic vision, we might come to
See Carol Ann Drogus, Women
,
Religion, and Social Change in Brazil 's Popular Church
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1997), 91.
1
For an example of an ethnography that was able to avoid the sterile polarity of
liberalism v. the Catholicism, see Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics ofMotherhood
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
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understand our place in the greater order of things. Inasmuch as movement up the
intellectual Chain of Being granted one a larger perspective, it entailed a greater political
and social awareness. The Thomist version of metaphysics, therefore, was not a practice
in escaping the world, but of seeing the world as part of a larger plan. Politics, as in the
Aristotelian framework, was an opportunity to practice one's natural abilities, to put
virtuous thoughts in action. The element of grace added a supernatural aspect to those
virtuous thoughts; mystery was an essential ingredient in one's perfection.
In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Thomists applied this very generous,
rational and supernatural understanding of our intellectual and social abilities against the
claims of nominalists who argued that the very nature of God's omnipotence was that he
could not be understood. According to the nominalists, any attempt to understand God's
will was blasphemy. All we could do was to love and to fear. Obedience was the virtuous
path, not reason. In the sixteenth century, nominalism found new meaning in the
Protestant split. Both Luther and Calvin turned their back on the rational and purposive
lramework ol natural law. Conscience — what Calvin referred to as "the Divine tribunal."
"appointed, as it were, to watch over man, to observe and examine all his secrets, that
nothing may remain enveloped in darkness" - replaced natural abilities. 7 What mattered,
according to the Protestants, was the recognition of God's incomprehensible will. God's
reason, his rationality and therefore predictability, was minimized. Grace was not
grounded in nature, as the Thomists argued, but was a thing completely outside the
natural world.
7
John Calvin, "God and Political Duty," in Princeton Reader, 201.
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Elsewhere, Howard J. Wiarda and 1 have argued that Thomism continues inform
the social and political values of Iberian and Latin American governance,' The
Aristotelian/Thomist assumption that man finds perfection through participating in a
larger, more perfect whole informs much of the authoritarian, corporatist. organic form of
polities that survives in Southern Europe and Latin America. Thomist principles - a
strong head, a corporate understanding of government, an organic relationship between the
various members of society - continue to inform political values and practices, even under
the guise ot so-called liberal democratic governments. Democracy in Southern Europe and
Latin America, we argue, is less about the protection of individual rights, the separation of
powers, and a government constrained by an active and independent civic society, and
more about a strong government that takes care of all of its member through a
coordination of powers.
I his work is a theoretical extension ot those earlier comparative works. Certainly
the argument put forth by Professor Wiarda and me, i.e. that St. Thomas is to Iberic-Latin
political development what Locke is to American political development, is assumed at the
outset. I strongly believe that our ideas shape our political choices, that Locke's ideas
framed the political discourse in the English-speaking world and that Aquinas' ideas
framed the political discourse in the Spanish-speaking world. My interest in this work is
to consider the origins and implications of these seemingly incompatible frameworks in
terms of jurisprudence.
s Howard J. Wiarda and Margaret MacLeish Mott, Catholic Roots and Democratic
Flowers: Political Systems ofSpain and Portugal (Westport, Ct.: Praeger Press, 2001);
Howard J. Wiarda and Margaret MacLeish Mott, editors. Politics and Social Change in
Latin America: Still a Distinct Tradition
?
(Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Publishing Co,
forthcoming).
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Despite nationalist claims to the contrary, both England and Spain engaged in a
similarly repressive jurisprudence. Yet, somehow, liberalism was able to keep its hands
clean from its violent and coercive founding while the Holy Office in Spain came to
lepresent institutionalized sadism. I will argue here that the central distinction between
inquisitorial justice and liberal justice is not the absence or presence of violence, as the
Black Legend would have it, but in how each system conceived of the citizenry and the
possibilities of society. This work, then, questions the notion that liberalism is the only
container for a universal jurisprudence and that its attributes - atomistic, voluntary,
rational, autonomous, and equal - are the sine qua non ofjustice.
Why study the Inquisition?
I became interested in alternative systems ofjustice after working as the Court
Advocate for a battered women's shelter in Southern Vermont. My position was funded
by the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which President Clinton passed as part of
the Crime Bill of 1994. In order to get those funds, my town had to demonstrate to the
Justice Department that we had developed a "coordinated response" to the problem of
domestic violence. Coordinated response meant that prosecutors worked with police
departments and battered women's shelters to fight the pernicious evil of domestic
violence. Working together meant being on the same conceptual page. We all agreed that
domestic violence included emotional and psychological abuse; we all were trained in the
niceties of recognizing controlling behavior; we all wanted to protect women and children
from abusive men; we all wanted to put the batterers in jail.
Since the judges were also part of this campaign against domestic violence, they
were more willing to issue a restraining order. A plaintiffjust needed to prove that she
was reasonably afraid of the defendant in order to get a civil order that had the power to
6
(1) remove the defendant from the family home; (2) deny him visitation of the children;
(3) order child support; and (4) restrict his movement within the community. Although
the rebel trom abuse order was generally only granted for a short period of time, six
months to a year, the holder of such an order was in a particularly good position should
she decide to look tor divorce. The defendant, on the other hand, might as well sign
everything over. An effort to prove his innocence could easily be read as stalking or
emotional abuse. Too much effort and he could end up in jail.
Although I was initially excited about this new order ofjustice, the proceedings
themselves made me increasingly anxious. I worried about due process. I wondered what
had happened to the presumption of innocence. I noticed how lawyers who attempted to
play by the old rules, such as rules of evidence, were overruled by this new VAWA breed
ofjudges. In fact, the lawyer's roles in these proceeding became less and less necessary as
judges pronounced Irom the bench that they could care less about legal formalities. What
really concerned them was getting to the truth, i.e. was she abused?
The anxieties I experienced watching Family Court reinvent itself as a Crusader
against Domestic Violence were liberal anxieties. All the procedures I had learned as a
paralegal, which predicated justice as fair procedure over justice as social policy, were no
longer relevant. When I questioned the means we were using to fight domestic violence, I
was labeled a heretic. In a sense, my accusers were right. According to the members of the
Windham County Domestic Violence Task Force, there was a greater social good than
procedural justice. That social good was described as "making the world safe for women
and children." When I complained that we were "creating an inquisition," the other
members of the Task Force responded, "if that's what it takes, so be it."
I went to graduate school in order to find out more about the Inquisition. Maybe
my concern about the changes in Family Court was a knee-jerk liberal response. Maybe a
7
different type ofjudicial system was necessaty tor domestic violence. Feminist legal
theory had already taught me that liberalism did no, always serve the needs ofwomen.
Most of the scenes of violence took place in the home. Many of the justifications of
abuse were phrased in terms of absolute control of one’s property. a perverted version
ot John Locke's theory of property, sexual intimacy seemed to entitle the batterer to
some hold on his girlfriend or spouse. Privacy and property rights in this framework did
not enhance anybody's public participation, as John Locke would have argued. Rather, it
turned the world into a stage of terror. With the blessings of liberal jurisprudence looking
less universal, perhaps its ignoble adversary, the Spanish Inquisition, might be less
harmtul than I had been led to believe.
1 he initial reading I did on the Inquisition only confirmed the Black Legend.
William Prescott, H. C. Lea, and Cecil Roth presented a tribunal fueled by cruel
fanaticism, whose dark-robed members took sadistic pleasure in the smell of burning
flesh- It was only when I came across Fernando Cervantes' work on the Dominican and
Jesuit inquisitors in New Spain that I began to see the Inquisition outside of the anti-
Hispanic, anti-Catholic propaganda of the Black Legend and more as a stage for early
modem Thomism. 9 Cervantes suggested that when the inquisitors followed a natural law
peispective, the relationship between inquisitor and the accused was didactic and
redemptive. When the inquisitors followed a nominalist perspective, the relationship
between the inquisitor and the accused was authoritarian and coercive. Studying the
methods and the judicial reasoning ol those inquisitors who subscribed to natural law
theory, i.e. the Dominican and Jesuit inquisitors, offered an opportunity to see what early
modem Thomism looked like in practice.
° Francisco Cervantes, The Devil in the New World (New Flaven: Yale University Press,
1994 ).
8
After reading some of the actual proceedings of the Holy Office, I began to think
th's eCC 'eSiaStical lribunal was not a* cruel as the Black Legend suggested. The inquisitors,
like the members of the Domestic Violence Task Force, were no. afraid to track down
elite members of the community because they had abused women and children. The
inquisitor, whether Thomist or nominalist, was just as likely to go after lewd and
lascivious priests as any radical feminist. In Colonial Mexico and Peru, the inquisitors
prosecuted landowners who raped Indians servants and conquistadors who took more
than one wife. It wasn't that the Holy Office was set up to destroy procedural justice:
rather the procedure was engineered in such a way as to bring about a higher social good:
to protect the weaker members of the community from evil. To be safe from evil religious
beliels is a hard social good to imagine in this day and age. Safety from evil behavior, and I
can only describe the stories I heard in Family Court as evil, is something we continue to
struggle with.
I hat the family was the locus ol tyranny would not have been news to the early
modern Spanish I homists. Based on the laws of dominium, the family unit lacked the
"moral power" of the more perfect society, i.e. the political unit. According to the
Thomists, the goal of the family was undeveloped or "imperfect"; it only wanted to
pieseive itsell and its property. A more perfect group, therefore, was a group that
wanted to preserve the entire society. Between the imperfect family and the perfect
society there was a multitude of intermediary groups: guilds, military orders, religious
orders, townships. All of these intermediary groups offered an opportunity to put
corporate virtue into action. The Inquisition, therefore, might be understood as part of a
system that wanted each member to move out of dominium and towards a more perfect
union. That effort was reflected in the language of reconciliation. At the auto de fe,
9
inqu.si.ors pronounced
.he reconciled as "reincorpora.ed into .he guild (grernio) and union
ot the sacred mother Catholic church."
The VAWA-funded jurisprudence I saw emerging in Family Court was equally
concerned with moving the parties out of a system of dominium and into a more socially-
minded grouping. After an initial experiment in putting all the batterers in jail, many of the
judges had come to realize that destroying the family unit, particularly at a time when
welfare benefits were being reduced, was not beneficial to anyone involved, especially the
children. The judges increasingly ordered anger management groups and parenting classes
in the hopes that both plaintiffs and defendants would leant other ways to deal with one
another. However, efforts to reconstitute the tyrannical family into the civic-minded unit
also produced liberal anxieties. Should the state really be taking on the role of parenting
the parents? Were the judges guilty of over-extending the reach of a liberal government?
Despite liberalism's limits within domestic situations, it continues to dominate the
legal discourse in criminal matters. In fifth amendment jurisprudence, the Inquisition
reliably stands in as the evil alternative to the more civilized liberal method. For instance.
Peter Brooks recent book Troubling C onfessions cautions that any weakening of the
rights codified in Miranda v. Arizona will lead us into inquisitorial hell. 10 Using a
Foucaultian framework as well as scenes from Dostoevsky and Rousseau, Brooks
illustrates the complexity ot the confessional relationship urging us to keep confession
out ot the courtroom. According to Brooks, justice demands that we maintain the sanctity
of the autonomous will. A legal process that penetrates that autonomy, i.e. an
inquisitorial system, is a corrupt legal process.
Peter Brooks, Troubling Confessions: Speaking Guilt in Literature and Law’ (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).
10
Indeed, by the terms of liberalism, the Inquisition is an unjust system. However
by the terms of natural law theory, the Inquisition was right on track. Scholars such as
Anthony J. Lisska, engaged in keeping natural law theory alive in these skeptical times
may not, at first, welcome the association." It's one thing to argue that natural law is the
basis tor international declarations on human rights and another thing entirely to suggest
that natural law was the guiding principle of inquisitorial jurisprudence. Yet I would argue
that inquisitorial practices articulate the generous possibilities inherent in natural law in a
manner overlooked by liberalism. Confession, a highly problematic practice in liberal
jurisprudence, takes on a very ditterent aspect when understood within the inquisitorial
framework.
Considering natural law within the context of the Inquisition keeps us cognizant of
its essential attributes, which I understand as corporate, corporeal, cosmological,
confessional, and hierarchical. When scholars diminish any of these attributes they
diminish the possibility of understanding a jurisprudence outside the limits of liberalism.
Efforts to minimize the hierarchical nature of natural law, tor instance, may make the
theory more palatable to modern democratic audiences but it reduces the true alternative
that natural law offers. 12 Rather than squeeze natural law into modem ideas ofjustice, we
might leam more from considering the values of natural law as a viable alternative to
liberal jurisprudence.
This project is set up as a series of essays, each one exploring the distinctions
between liberalism and natural law in the early modem era. I chose the form of the essay
" See Anthony J. Lisska, Aquinas's Theory ofNatural Law
>
(Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1996).
i: See Paul J. Weithman, Complementarity and equality in the political thought of Thomas
Aquinas," Theological Studies (June 1998), 277ff. for an argument against the use of
Aquinas as a source for liberal democracy.
“ a vehicle for this sludy because it is itself a creation of early modern reforms. Although
by persuasion a skeptic, Montaigne's method of listening to his own words suggests the
internal dialogues eentral to natural law and described by Jacques Maritain as
"consult) ing] and listening] to the inner melody that the vibrating strings of abiding
tendencies make present in the subject™’ The mechanisms of the essay also reinforces the
corporeal nature of natural law. The essay succeeds in as much as i, speaks to the senses,
persuading through possession, leading Cynthia Oziek to describe an essay as "a warm
body," not "a hidden principle or a thesis or a construct" but "a living voice.'"’
Although St. Thomas never explored the form of the essay, living almost three
hundred years before its creation, his epistemology supports such an endeavor. Like
Aristotle, Aquinas understood that all our generalities were understood through
particularities: the particularities of this sight in front of these eyes, this vision on this
day. Ralph Mclnerny summarizes this "settled and reiterated view” of St. Thomas: "any
knowledge we have of things immaterial is founded on and derived from our knowledge of
the material." 1 ' The general principles, or immaterial things, were reached through analogic
reasoning: as my hand is to my head, so am I to the monarch: as the pot is to the potter
so am I to God. I o unpack these simple analogies is to understand one's place in an all-
inclusive, purposive order. Like the essay, Aquinas' universe has a point that can only be
understood through both the imagination and the senses.
1
Jacques Maritain, Man and the Slate (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 100,
cited in Anthony J. Lisska, Aquinas 's Theory ofNatural Law: An Analytic Reconstruction
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, 28.
14
Cynthia Oziek, "Introduction: Portrait of the Essay as a Warm Body," The Best
American Essays 199B (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), xxi.
|s
Ralph Mclnerny, Ethica Thomistica.The Moral Philosophy ofThomas Aquinas
(Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 1997), 76.
12
The essay allows for language outside of the dictates of positivism. In as much as
American political science has become ruled by the principles of positivism, political
science methods tend to value the scientific and ahistorical over the interpretive and
historical. However, as Dorothy Ross has pointed out in The Origins ofAmerican Social
Science, scientific discourse, although claiming an ahistorical objectivity, served a
historical purpose. 16 Ross concludes that "American social science has consistently
constructed models of the world that embody the values and follow the logic of the
national ideology of American exceptionalism.'"’ Similarly in an early modem context.
nascent positivist tendencies constructed models of the world that embodied the values of
the Reformation. To subscribe to that anti-Catholic project seems inappropriate for
exploring 1 homas's argument. The essay, on the other hand, subscribes to the more
interpretive methods employed by Max Weber and John Bossy, where history and social
science converge.
Chapter 2 introduces the approach of understanding the principles of Thomas's
political philosophy in an inquisitorial context, ot considering the generous dictates of
natural law within a transparently violent setting. "Thomism in action” explores some of
the scriptural reasons tor employing force against unorthodox Christians and how the
inquisitors understood their role as both the distributors ot mercy and the prosecutors of
the One, True Faith.
Chapter 3 investigates the place of Thomism within an auto de fe. Using Pedro
Berruguete's fifteenth-century painting as a focus, "Hierarchy's Spiritual Charge"
considers the traditional hierarchy of grace, education, and force and how that tradition
1
Dorothy Ross, The Origins ofAmerican Social Science (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991).
17
Ross, 471
.
13
was brought into the early modem era through the Jesuit imagination. Berruguete's auto is
considered through the eyes of Lutherans, who see a conupted Church, and through the
eyes of Vitoria and Suarez, who see a well-ordered and rightly-proportioned society.
Chapter 4 looks at one reconciliation trial in Colonial Mexico. 1 chose this case for
close study because the defendant is from a convene family that was repeatedly
scrutinized by the Mexican Inquisition. Many members of the Carvajal family were burnt
at the stake. The prosecutions against them are often cited by historians wishing to
depict the intolerance of the Holy Office. Yet the trial of a fourteen-year-old girl of this
persecuted family reveals how the inquisitors understood their judicial purpose: not as
entorcers ot the anti-Semitic limpieza lie semgre statutes but engaged in Thomist
jurisprudence.
Chapter 5 focuses on the conception of the citizen within the Catholic and
Protestant worlds. As with the competing visions of the auto de fe, the understanding of
the self is radically different in the Catholic and Protestant context. "Substantial Change"
traces the development of the self in consciousness in Protestant thinking against the
competing claims of self in substance as understood by the Thomists.
Chapter 6 focuses on the dilemma ot prosecuting supernatural occurrences, i.e.
visions and internal movements. Because grace was both an extension and beyond human
reason, prosecutors of alumbrados and ilusos (people experiencing supernatural visions
and revelations) cultivated a jurisprudence that was both accepting and critical of
cosmological occurrences. The cases considered in "The Sin of Self-Assurance"
demonstrate how Aquinas' theory on prophesy was effectively used to distinguish
between the demonic and the divine while at the same time reducing the political challenge
of prophesy by reaffirming the corporate identity of the self.
14
The final chapter summarizes the argument found in all of the various chapters:
that Thomism provides a coherent vision ofjustice that may, in certain circumstances,
provide a valuable alternative to liberalism. While not promoting any social policy, per se
a closer reading of the Inquisition does provide a more accurate measure of the
brands ofjurisprudence within the Western tradition.
competing
A final note on translations. All the works of the Thomists were written in Latin,
a language I recognize but do not know. Whenever possible, I relied on English or Spanish
translations. All the archival material I used was written in Spanish. Unless otherwise
noted, all translations from Spanish sources are mine. Also, all biblical citations were
taken from the Revised Standard Version.
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CHAPTER II
THOMISM IN ACTION 1
n e tend to think of human knowledge as progressive; because
we know more and more
,
our parents and grandparents are
hack numbers. But a contrary theory is possible -
Robertson Davies, The Rebel Angels
Introduction
When Martin Luther dismissed the powers of the papacy, he not only initiated
the Great Schism in Christianity but he also delivered the final blow to an already fissured
Western thought, splitting the thing in two. With the establishment of Lutheranism, the
"two major theological traditions of the early modem period," 2 moved out of their
troubled marriage under the Roman C atholic Church and into separate quarters.
Nominalism, or Oekhamism, moved North leaving behind Intellectualism or Thomism in
the South.
In the thirteenth century, William ot Ockham argued for a separation between the
secular and the spiritual realms. His argument was based on the theory that God's will
was supreme to God's reason. The creation of the universe, therefore, was a product of
divine will, a momentary act that did not necessarily entail any intellectual reasoning on
God's part. The contingent nature of Ockham's model of creation, its lack of rational
ordering, meant that mere humans would always remain clueless as to the big picture.
1
Parts of this chapter appeared as "The Rule of Faith over Reason: The Role of the
Inquisition in Iberia and New Spain," The Journal ofChurch and State (Winter 1998),
57-82. 1 am indebted to Laura C. Stevenson for her invaluable comments in bringing that
article in line with the project of this book.
James fully. An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Context (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993, 202.
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God s will be done, according to the nominalists, meant that the best a human could do
was to pledge obedience and to tolerate ignorance of divine reason. As one medieval
scholar put it, nominalist theology had a "ceiling," the will of God.'
1 homism, the philosophical system based on the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas,
had reached a very different conclusion. Being a rational and purposive being, God had
created a rational and purposive world or. as James Tully puts it, "a product made in
accordance with a plan."* Humans parttcipated in that product through the light of reason,
which, although of a different order than God's reason, was of a similar kind. Thomists
spoke oi human nature as "implanted" and "instilled” with a natural power of
comprehension, l.e. natural law. God's will be done involved the powers of the intellect,
not just obedience. Before obeying a divine command, the human mind was engaged and
active, determining lor itself what the particulars of God's will might be in any given
circumstance.
In their battles against the heretics to the North, sixteenth-century Spanish Jesuits
and Dominicans drew on Aquinas' generous understandings of human nature. As far as
these Spanish Thomists were concerned, the source of Luther's error, like the error of his
nominalist predecessors, was his limited notion of human potential. The Jesuit Francisco
Suarez (1548 - 1617) insisted that "the fundamental error of the heretics" was that they
did not recognize that we are truly and intrinsically justified through an inherent justice
given by Christ" and that we are "subject to a true law at all times."' As far as the
Cited in Francisco Cervantes, Devil in the New World (New Haven; Yale University
Press, 1994), 22.
4
T ully, An Approach, 202.
5
Francisco Suarez, quoted in Quentin Skinner, The Foundations ofModern Political
Thought Volume 2: The Age ofReform (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978),
167.
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I homists were concerned, the Lutherans were disregarding the natural capacities of
mankind.
THe °ther S°UrCe of P°wer ,hat ths= Lutherans belittled was the power of the
Roman Catholic Church. Not only did the Lutherans, staying true to their Ockhamis,
tradition, deny the importance of the intellect in determining the ways of God but they
also denied the efficacy of the Church in reworking the substance of the human soul.
F ocusing on the corruption of bishops, the Lutherans denied the very possibility of
absolution and other sacramental functions that enhanced the powers of the human mind.
The Church may have trafficked too widely in the granting of indulgences but it also held
out the possibility of redemption. The spiritual powers invested in the Roman Catholic
C hurch included the ability to reinstill the light of reason after sin had reduced the
wattage.
Thomist rationality always included supernatural thought processes. It was not
just a matter of obeying the priest's orders, but of moving one's mind up the Chain of
Being, for the Lutherans, there was no Chain of Being, no possibility of mentally walking
up the ladder into the angelic spheres. Instead, the mind could only go so far. Beyond the
natural world, there was the unspeakable and unknowable world of God. God could only
be known in name alone, hence the term, nominalism.
Inasmuch as the modern era has favored the intellectual climate of the North, the
I homist arguments have rarely found a wide audience in English-speaking circles. Early
modem political thought generally begins with Machiavelli and Hobbes and runs straight
to Locke with little mention of the work of the Catholic branch of political philosophy
that flourished in the sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries. Indeed, according to many
English-speaking sources, Catholicism and political theory were mutually exclusive.
I homas Babington Macaulay ( 1 800-59) described Roman Catholicism as "a complete
18
subjection of reason to authority, a weak preference of form to substance, a childish
passion for mummies, an idolafrous veneration for the priestly character, and. above all a
mercilessintol rance."** John Adams, writing to his wife Abigail in 1 774. described a
Roman Catholic Mass he happened to come across in Philadelphia: "Here is everything
which can lay hold of the eye, ear. and imagination - everything which can charm and
bewitch the simple and ignorant. I wonder Luther ever broke the spell.”’ According to
these Protestant sources, Catholicism bewitched the mind rendering i, incapable of reason
Lewis Hanke first broke the spell of anti-Catholic historiography with his work
on Bartolome de las Casas and the Francisco de Vitoria's natural law arguments on behalf
of the Indians in the New World." Anthony Pagden added to Hanke's effort by describing
the political imagination" of the Dominicans involved in the Conquest of the New
World." Their works on sixteenth-century Thomists illuminated the rational basis of
Catholic political thought, particularly the natural law argument that reduced the rights of
the Spaniards and enhanced the rights of the Indians in the New World. The writings of
Vitoria and de las Casas revealed a compassionate, rational system of thought that, in
Hanke's words, "struggled for justice."
*’ Cited in Richard John Neuhaus, The Catholic Moment: The Paradox ofthe Church in the
Postmodern World
,
(San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987), 10.
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Cited in Neuhaus, 10.
* Lewis Hanke, The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest ofAmerica (Boston:
Little, Brown & Company, 1965).
Anthony Pagden, Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1990).
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Quentin Skinner. Richard Tuck, and James Tally have further enhanced the status
of the Thomists in their studies of the foundations of early modern political thought.'"
Rather than offering a condition for absolutism, as Macaulay's opprobrium suggests,
sixteenth-century Thomist arguments provided the basis for constitutionalism,
community consent, limited property rights, and international law. Indeed, these scholars
argue that Protestant early modem political thought can only be understood in the context
ot debates with their Catholic adversaries: particularly Francisco Suarez, Luis de Molina.
Domingo de Soto, and Juan de Mariana. Thanks to the extensive research of Skinner,
fully, and fuck, we now understand that modern democratic theory did not spring full-
grown from the Reformation's head but. on the contrary, was brought into being as part of
a mind-to-mind conflict between Protestants and Catholics. Indeed, Tally's research
suggests that when it came to property rights, John Locke was as influenced by Suarez as
anything Luther or Calvin said."
Understanding the I homist position offers more than just historical or
geneologieal explanations. T he arguments drafted by Thomists against what they saw as
Protestant absurdities - i.e. that man's natural state was individualistic, that the
government's role was purely coercive, and that the use of one's private property was
absolute - suggest a radically different way of going about things. According to the
I homists, an individual's perfection did not come from autonomy or the protection of
private property but Irom participation in a larger group. Surprisingly enough, one of the
institutions that worked to enhance that participation was the Inquisition.
See Richard I uck. Philosophy and Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993).
" See James fully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and his Adversaries
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
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Thomists such as Francisco de Vitoria and Bartolome de las Casas, who argued for
the rights of Indtans in the New World, ntake for appealing poster children. The human
rights concerns they voiced on behalf of all humans, whether Christian or pagan, resonate
in our twenty-firs, century ears. The Inquisition, on the other hand, appears a, firs,
glance to be a wretched place to consider the Thomists contribution to modern political
though,. The grisly image of an auto de fe. the suspicious character of an inquisitorial
tribunal, make questionable the very notion that the Spanish were struggling for justice.
I he question remains, however, given the strong anti-Catholic bias in Protestant
intellectual thought, how much of our understanding of the Spanish Inquisition is based
on historical accuracy and how much on Protestant propaganda?
The portrait ot the Holy Office painted by Protestant historians featured
intolerance, bigotry, sadism, and corruption. William H. Prescott referred to the
Inquisition as an "eye that never slumbered."' 2 The extensive work of historian Henry
Charles Lea, completed in the early part of the 20th century, reinforced any anti-Catholic,
anti-Hispanic tendencies." These works spawned a generation of historians who
perpetuated the representation of the Inquisition as Evil institutionalized. Given the
success of this Black Legend with regard to the Holy Office, why use its proceedings as
the site ot inquiry into the philosophical system of Spanish Thomists? Wittgenstein
offers a clue.
If one of the problems inherent in philosophical language games is the underlying
assumption that a general cohesive theory will explain what is in fact complex.
12
Cited in Edward Peters, Inquisition (New York: Free Press, 1988), 286.
" See Henry Charles Lea, A History ofthe Inquisition ofSpain, 4 vols, (New York:
Macmillan, 1906-8) as well as Lea’s The Inquisition in the Spanish Dependencies (New
York: Macmillan, 1908).
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overlapping, and contradictory, then the only hope of achieving real understanding is to
pay attention to details. 1 ' This means looking at a system of thought both in its more
sympathetic settings, as Hanke did with the missionaries involved in the Conquest, and in
its least sympathetic, i.e. the Holy Office. Not only do we see natural law theory in
action in the New Laws of Burgos, which used natural law reasoning to curtail the
practice of enslaving Indians, but we also see natural law theory in practice in the
persecution ot heretics in the post-Tridentine era.
The practices and predicaments of the inquisitors offer a field rich in Thomist
details. For instance, how did the inquisitors square protection of the Indians with the
eradication ot idolatry in the New World? What was the relationship between an innate
sense of justice and a cosmology peopled by demonic forces who might corrode that inner
sensibility? If the Thomists believed so much in the natural powers of the individual, why
did they burn some ot those individuals at the stake? The proceedings of the Inquisition
provide answers to these questions.
Rather than see the Holy Office as a perversion ofjustice, therefore, it might
better be understood as "an exemplary center," what Clifford Geertz describes as "an
image of divine order and a paradigm for social order." 15 The auto de fe, in particular,
provided an opportunity for the Thomists to make visible to the multitude what their
world view looked like in practice. The divinely-ordered universe was laid out in royal
splendor with the sinners on the bottom and the most blessed at the top. The
frontispiece, a fifteenth-century painting by Pedro Berruguete, illustrates the divine order
14 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E. M. Anscombe, nos.
65-97 (New York: Macmillan, 1958).
15
Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 36.
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a. its best: a sain, is presiding. St Dominic. Although the burning of heretics is troubling
to modern sensibilities, i, should no, be confused as the beginning and end of Themis,
justice. Rather Berruguete's painting offers a range of possibilities: The sinner might stoop
to the necessity of force „he soldiers) or rise to the powers of the intellect (the friar a, the
base of the stairs). The Thomists would argue that the natural tendency was to the latter.
Only the poor soul corrupted by evil would need the prodding tools of the soldiers.
The distinguishing feature of Thomism was its essential belief in the capacity of
the sinner to be reconciled. The heretic who came before a Thomist inquisitor was
assumed to have an innate sense ofjustice. Should a bi, of force be applied, i, was only to
make clear what the sinner had clearly forgotten. According to the Thomists, the coercive
powers ol the state gave force in the world (inJaw externa) to what was already known
in each person's conscience (inJaw interna)."' The use offeree did not corrupt the
mission, as Locke would argue in the next century in his Letter on Tolerance
,
but
provided incentive and instruction for the fallen. In this regard, the Thomists were
consistent with divine scripture. In the words of the Psalmist, God fashioned pain "to be
a lesson." In the words of Deuteronomy, God "strikes to heal." Augustine read these
passages and concluded that God brings "death upon us so that we should not die apart
Irom him."
17
The Thomists tempered Augustine's stoicism by expanding the emphasis
beyond the painlul lesson. Force might be necessary at times, however, what was most
important was the human capacity to learn and be healed. The Inquisition, inasmuch as it
followed Thomism, was part of that process.
Not all inquisitors were Thomists, however. Many of the original colonial
inquisitors were Franciscans and their proceedings largely followed nominalist guidelines.
1,1
Skinner, 149.
17
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Fernando Cervantes' extensive research on the Colonial Holy Office outlines the internal
struggles between the nominalist and Thomist perspectives. These thirteenth and
fourteenth century internal struggles became external stuggles in the sixteeth and
seventeenth centuries against the Protestants. Some of the arguments pitched against the
Lutherans in the sixteenth century were drawn from Thomist arguments pitched against
the nominalists in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The question of what was
superior, God's will or God's reason, was as much a part of the medieval and Catholic
reformation debate as it was a place of dissent between the Protestants and the Spanish
rhomists. Some of those internal disagreements are apparent in the different methods
employed by various schools of inquisitors. The three orders involved with the Holy
Office each understood Aquinas in a different way: the Franciscans, who followed a more
nominalist framework, looked for obedience over understanding; the Dominicans, who
subscribed to a more rational understanding looked for intellectual awareness; the Jesuits,
who added the affections into the intellectual mix, looked for spiritual movement.
The Higher Law of Inquisitorial Justice
The Inquisition was in the business of prosecuting heretics, those members of the
Hock who strayed from the orthodoxy of the Roman Catholic Church into some
unauthorized brand ot faith. A heretic, it should be noted, was not an infidel, someone
outside of the faith, such as a Jew, a Muslim, an Aztec. A heretic was a Christian whose
internal beliefs were inconsistent with Church doctrine: a Cathar, ajudaizante, a
Protestant; someone who presented himself as a Christian but, from the Church's
perspective, was engaging in speculative error to the risk of his own personal salvation
and that of his neighbors. Unlike petty criminals, who were charged with crimes against
the state, the heretic was charged with crimes against God. Within the hierarchy of laws
24
established by St. Thomas Aquinas, the law that the heretic violated
magnitude than those laws enforced by the civil courts.
was ot a far greater
Because the Inquisition was involved in spiritual concerns, its authority was
ranked high in the Thomist hierarchy of laws, beneath eternal law and an extension of
divine law. The highest order of law, one beyond the ken of mere humans, eternal law, is
the law created by God as he set about making a rational and purposive universe. Divine
law, which is subject to eternal law, is the law which God revealed to humans and is thus
of a supernatural order. The Church's authority and, by extension, the Holy Office's
jurisdiction, was founded on divine law, particularly Jesus' final order to Peter, "Feed my
sheep,"" the terms of which were enumerated in a passage from Matthew: the power to
bind and loose." Natural law, which is subject to both eternal law and divine law. is the
law that God "implants" in men "in order that they should be able to understand his
designs and intentions lor the world."" Human law, which is subject to all three higher
laws, is the posited law by which men rule themselves. Human law, as promulgated by
the king to his people, controlled much of the temporal sphere.
According to Aquinas, divine law was divided into two separate categories, the
Old Law ot Moses and the New Law of Christ. 21 In the transition from Judaism to
Christianity, the scrutiny ot the law moved beyond external actions, the fulfillment of the
Convenant, and into the activities of one's soul, the obligation of faith. No longer would
18 John 21 : 15. All biblical quotes are taken from the Revised Standard Version.
19
Matthew 16:19.
Skinner, Foundations
,
148. See also Suarez, De Legibus, I, iii, 7, in Selections from
Three Works ofFrancisco Suarez (Buffalo, NY: William S. Hein, 1995), 41.
21
St. Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, Qu. 91, art. 5, from A Treatise on Law (Washington, D.C.:
Regnery Press, 1996).
25
compliance be enough. Going ihrough the motions, i.e. keeping the Sabbath, no, sleeping
with your neighbor's wife, no longer fulfilled man's covenant with God. Under the terms
of the New Law, wha, mattered was the activity of the mind, the yearning of the heart,
the pull of the conseience. The Old Law "induced men to observe its commandments...
by the fear of punishment," wrote Aquinas. The New Law accomplished the same
objective by love, which is poured into our hearts by the grace of Christ."” Fear of
punishment was a less perfect vehicle for bringing the soul around than the more perfect
vehicle of grace. Still, love and grace were not always effective in saving society from the
corruption of heretics. Aquinas is most insistent in this regard: "If it is just for
counterfeiters or other criminals to be executed immediately by secular rulers, it is all the
more just lor heretics once they are convicted of heresy not only to be excommunicated
but to be put to death." 23
1 he methods of the Old Law, therefore, were never discarded but developed into
something more perfect. "[A]s perfect and imperfect in the same species, e.g. a boy and a
man, wrote Aquinas, in this way the Divine law is divided into Old and New." 24 The
essence of the Old Law, punishment and intimidation, remained in the New and was
perfected through love. Judgment was no longer distant and unconnected but intimate and
immediate. "If your right hand causes you to sin," said Jesus to his disciples in the
Sermon on the Mount, "cut it off and throw it away; it is better that you lose one of your
members than that your whole body go into hell." 25
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The paradox presented by a New Law that espoused both forgiveness and social
amputation was no. lost on any of the Church Doctors. Immediately after imposing a
death sentence for heretics, Aquinas reminds the reader that "[t]he Church... is merciful
and desires the conversion of those who are in error. Therefore she does not condemn
them immediately 'but after a firs, and second admonition.'"” Aquinas is citing a passage
from St. Paul's letter in which he advises Titus how to deal with a ''factious man."
"[Alfter admonishing him once or twice, have nothing more to do with him. knowing that
such a person is perverted and sinful; he is self-condemned."” In Paul's epistle, the
punishment of the sinner is postponed to the afterlife; the factious man is self-
condemned. By the time of Aquinas' writing in the mid-thirteenth century, postponing
judgment to God's final tribunal was not as acceptable as putting the confirmed heretic to
death.
St. Paul's recommendation to let God be the final arbiter was consistent with the
policies of the the early Church, an institution that saw itself more persecuted than
persecuting. Elphege Vancandard, a French Church historian, reports that "as late as the
middle of the fourth century and even later, all the Fathers and ecclesiastical writers who
discuss the question of toleration are opposed to the use of force." 28 The principle that
was to prevail for centuries was "Ecclesia abhorret a sanguine (The Church has a horror
of bloodshed)." As tar as the early Church Fathers were concerned, "faith must be
absolutely tree, and conscience a domain wherein violence must never enter."
Thomas in Sigmund, 63.
27
Titus 3:10.
-
s
E. Vancandard, The Inquisition: A Critical and Historical Study ofthe Coercive Power of
the Church
,
trans. by Bertrand L. Conway, C.S.P. (New York: Longmans, Green, and
Co., 1908), 7.
27
Nonetheless, when confronted with a particularly ami-social sec, even the most
tolerant theologtans had to formulate a middle ground. St Augustine, for instance, may
have declared abstractly that the death penalty was unjust in the case of heretics and
schismatics, ye, the Dona, is, reality prompted a different response. "They kill the souls
of men, and the State merely tortures their bodies; they cause eternal death, and then
complain when the State makes them suffer temporal death."” Self-condemnation, the
penalty articulated by St Paul, was no, enough of a judgment when other men's souls
were at risk. For no, only did the early Church understand itself as God's attorney
general, in which case the wrongdoer might just as well wait until the Final judgment Day
to pay for his sins, bu, i, also saw itself as engaged in cosmological battles, in which the
very survival of mankind was at risk.
The Spanish Thomists saw much of Ockham in the heresies of Luther and his
followers. According to Skinner, these Dominicans and Jesuits "deliberately turned away
from the form of scholasticism developed by Ockham and his disciples, perceiving it to be
too closely linked - especially in its skeptical analysis of man's reasoning powers - to the
heresies of the Lutherans. In that turning, the Spanish Thomists reemphasized the role
ol natural law in spiritual matters. Aquinas may have called for the execution of heretics
after a first and second admonition, but the Thomist Jesuits, such as Suarez, expanded on
the possibility of redemption by recommending execution only "after sufficient education
and ecclesiastical admonitions," 3 '
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In the sixteenth-century, this renewed sense of the importance of natural law
informed the relationships between the inquisitor and the accused. The emphasis on man's
innate sense ofjustice, however, should not be construed as implying any less emphasis
on divine law. just as natural law enhanced Ihe powers of the person, so divine law
enhanced the powers of the Church, a point the Thomists were most eager to defend
against Protestant challenges. The Decree concerning the canonical Scripture,.
promulgated by the Council of Trent in 1546, declared the Church to be, in Quentin
Skinner's words, a "visible and jurisdictional institution, the structure and traditions of
which are derived directly from the inspiration of the Holy Ghost."” The power granted
to the Church, and by extension the Holy Office, included both the power to direct and
the power to coerce in spiritual matters. In his Defence ofthe Catholic and Apostolic
Faith. Suarez argues against James I s oath of allegiance by citing scriptural authority for
the Church's coercive powers:
Feed my sheep, is not limited, and accordingly, since the term 'feed'
(pascendum) embraces even coercive power, which must necessarily reside
in every pastor, the said power is not restricted to the imposition of
censures, but rather remains to be shaped through prudence and equitable
justice into some [appropriate] form of punishment or coercion. For every
shepherd has power to coerce his sheep, not [simply] in some
predetermined manner, but in accordance with what may be suitable and
expedient for those sheep. 13
The many meanings that Suarez attaches to the word "feed" explains how the Inquisition
could use force and still be in compliance with holy scripture. The Church needed force
not just to move the sheep up the intellectual Chain of Being but also to keep the sheep
from being devoured by demonic wolves. Part of the purpose in God's rational universe
Skinner, Foundations
,
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" Francisco Suarez, A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith III, xxiii, 10 in
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,
692.
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was ,o rid the world of evil, an evil ,ha, had bedevilled the faithful since the beginning „f
‘ime. The Church needed both directive and coercive powers because the Church was
engaged in a battle ofenormous magnitude. The skirmish with the Lutherans, in other
word, was only the tip of the iceberg.
The Problem of thg Anomlyp^
Beginning as early as the Book of Daniel, the Israelites were warned about the
presence of an anti-Messiah.
In his place shall arise a contemptible person to whom royal majesty has
not been given; he shall come in without warning and obtain the kingdom
y flatteries. Armies shall be utterly swept away before him and broken
and the prince ot the covenant also. And from the time that an alliance is
made with him he shall act deceitfully; and he shall become strong with a
small people. 14
I he falseness of the Antichrist was an essential part of his nature. His coming to
power would be done "by flatteries;" he would be able to convince "small people" of his
legitimacy. 1 hs power and legitimacy would not be a measure of his own strength but of
the naivete of the people. The only hope the People of the Covenant had of enduring his
reign was to recognize him for what he was: a force of evil.
I he prophesies of the Old Testament were incorporated into the cosmology of
the early C hristian church. Hippolytus, a Greek who served as presbyter in Rome from
about 200 to 235 CE, wrote several exegetical tracts on the Antichrist explaining how the
"Antichrist will be a perverted imitation of Christ." Hippolytus listed five criteria that the
Antichrist would share with the Messiah: (1) he will be of Jewish origin; (2) he will send
out apostles; (3) he will bring together people who have been scattered abroad; (4) there
will be a sealing of his followers; (5) he will appear in the form of a man; and (6) there will
34
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be a building of a temple (in Christ's case the temple of his body in the resurrection; in
Antichrist's the raising of a new stone temple in Jerusalem)."” All the signs for Christ,
"the annointed one," were also the signs of the Antichrist, a condition that strikes a, the
problem of heresy. Heresy is, a, its etymological root, a poor choice; a mere imitation of
orthodoxy.
The appearance of the True Chris, indicated the beginning of thejudgment phase,
the second stage of the Apocalypse. In the struggle over the fate of the world, the Christ
would be killed by the Antichrist and the faithful, continuing to believe in the
righteousness of the Chosen one, would have to endure a specific number of days until
God rewarded them with eternal salvation, in the final stage of the Apocalypse,
.he phase
ot reward, all pretensions would be removed and the truth finally would be revealed.
f hose who followed the true Prophet would be saved and those who followed the false
Prophet would be eternally damned.
Christians, wanting to validate their chosen Messiah, pointed to tyrants such as
Antiochus and Nero as historical evidence that the end times had begun and that Jesus of
Nazareth was, in tact, the Son of Man, brought down to earth to wage battle with these
torces ot evil. Those Jews who did not immediately convert to Christianity were likened
to the small people' deceived in the Book of Daniel. In a shift that would have tragic
consequences tor Jews throughout history, the people of Israel went from being the
Chosen People to having their powers ofjudgment denied. But it was worse than that
statement implies. In tenns ot the Apocalypse, the Jews were viewed not just as
imperceptive or stubborn, but as having been coopted by the forces of evil.
Bernard McGinn, Anti-C hrist : Two Thousand Years of the Human Fascination with Evil
(New York: HarperCollins, 1994), 61.
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gical scholar Elaine Pagels has demonstrated how Matthew. Mark. Luke,
and John used the rhetorie of Satan to explain the eonduc, ofwha, she ealls "the intimate
enemy." In all four gospels, the scriptural authors depicted the Jewish leaders and the
Jewish mobs as being controlled, "however unwittingly," by Satan. Instead of laying the
blame for the persecution of Jesus a, the door of the Roman state, where from a historical
perspective it clearly belonged, the Gospel writers depicted Pontius Pilate as harmless
and the Scribes and Pharisees as possessed by the devil.
In history, Pontius Pilate used his Roman appointment to teirorize the colonized
Jewish people of Jerusalem. In the Synoptic Gospels, these historical cruelties are
omitted. Instead of framing Christ's death in temrs of political prosecution, the Gospel
writers explained his crucifixion in terms of the Jewish leaders' lack of faith. The Jews
were held accountable because they should have known better. As far as the writers of the
Gospels were concerned, the problem was not from without, it was from within. "The
figure of Satan." writes Pagels, "is not a hostile power assailing Israel from without, but
the course and representation of conflict within the community."36 The fear of an intimate
enemy did not end with the separation of Christians front the Israelites. The Christians
had their own intimate enemies, people who pretended orthodoxy but had "unwittingly"
entangled themselves with the forces of evil. The light of reason was not strong enough to
separate them from their error.
Man s innate sense ot justice, therefore, was challenged by supernatural actors.
Satan and his minions had the power to corrupt the inner workings of the mind, to
smudge the law written on men s hearts. An individual alone was not in a position to fight
these supernatural forces. Only the Church was granted sufficient power to rid the world
of evil. The divine and apostolic traditions - going to mass, taking the Eucharist,
" Pagels, The Origins ofSatan (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), 34.
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confessing fully ,o all one's sins - helped the faithful to remain spiritually fit s0 that they
could survive the apocalyse. This concern for apocalyptic matters may explain par, of the
Thomis, reaction to Luther's claim of sola scrips, that scripture alone would save a
person's soul. The Thomists declared that "as well as the written word of God we require
the unwritten word, that is. the divine and apostolic traditions™ To think that a person
alone with her bible could outwit the forces of evil
any time, could erupt into a state of war.
was to minimize a cosmology that, at
The Auto de Fe and the corpus mvs/irum
Historian Alejandro Caneque describes the public spectacle of the auto de fe as "a
performance that revealed the fate sinners would have to face when the Last Judgment
Day came." ’" Caneque’s research underscores the connection between the colonial
government and the powers of the Holy Office; by participating in the ritual the Viceroy
positioned himself clearly on the side of God's will. However, the highly ritualistic
performance ot the auto not only solidified colonial political powers, but it also made
visible the divine and apostolic powers of the Church. According to the Thomists, the
auto displayed the Church's power not over the political body but against the powers of
evil; a point not lost on the Catholic spectators.
As far as the Catholic was concerned, the Inquisition was performing a necessary
function by ridding the community of dangerous internal elements, either through
extermination or reconciliation. Those who were unwilling to recognize the justice of
Christ, even after sufficient education and ecclesiastical admonition, were cut off from the
’
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Alejandro Caneque, "Theater of Power: Writing and Representing the Auto de Fe in
Colonial Mexico," The Americas 52 (January 1996), 321-343, 343.
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community. Those who responded ,o the teachings of the Dominican and Jesuit
inquisitors were reeonst.tuted into a working member of the mystical body of believers
•he corpus mysUcum. A reconciliation, therefore, should no, be confused with a pardon
bu, was, instead, a reconfiguration of the citizen on the level of transubstantiation. In
terms of natural law, reconciiiation mean, having one's nature as well as one's place in the
corpus mysticum restored.
The firs, ecclesia outlined by St. Paul in his firs, letter to the Corinthians was a
corporate organic entity. The many "were made to drink of one Spirit- and in that
making were made into one. The phrase "were made" (or in Spanish, sc nos dio) might be
understood as an expression of natural law. I, might also be understood as scriptural
pemtission to coerce, a point not lost on the inquisitors. To make the heretic drink of the
Spirit ot Christ was to restore a natural order, to make the lost one part of the mystical
body.
The body metaphor also articulated a social order in which every segment of
society had its own type of perfection, its own contribution to the whole. Just as the ear
was not expected to see, but depended on the eye for that function, so the member of a
weaver’s guild was not expected to understand the nuances of theology but depended on
the Church tor instruction. The head of the body religious would do the thinking for all
the organs and limbs. The faithful would be taught the Pater Noster, the Ave Maria, and
the Credo, the divine and apostolic traditions of the Church, but they would not be given
translations into the vulgar tongue. It was enough that they fully participated in the
mystery of the sacraments. Confession, in particular, would perfect their imperfections.
Reason and thinking would be the burden of the scholars, the inquisitors, the
ecclesiastically-trained. They alone would bear the weight of interpretation. The faithful
”
1 Cor. 12: 13.
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would be free to live the life of pure faith, following the law that St. Pa
"written on their hearts." 40
uil had deseribed as
I his neatly compartmentalized solution was not without its problems. The fact
.ha, the masses' understanding of faith was based more on obedienee than reasoning put
them a, risk of corruption, of being lead astray by false prophets. As a social policy, i,
smacked of nominalism; participation might be based purely on obedienee and not on
reason. Bartolome de Las Casas, for instance. lamented the practice of baptism en masse.
He insisted that conversion required more than just going through some sacred motion but
demanded some intelligence as well. His views were shared by the Apostolic Inquisitor
Don Vasco de Qutroga, a Franciscan, who set up hospital-villages, based on Thomas
More's Utopia, which provided the Indians of the New World with religious instruction.
Not all inquisitors were as convinced of the population's ability to learn. Cecil
Roth describes an auto de fe in Andalusia, c. 1501, when 107 persons were burned alive
'on the charge of having listened (not necessarily with approval) to the addresses of a
certain Bachelor ot Divinity named Membreque, who was accused of attempting to
propagate the teachings ot Judaism." 4 - Having listened to a heretical priest, the
supplicants were found to be unredeemable. Roth does not mention any efforts to
reconcile the listeners back to the faith. The inquisitors in this Andalusian case were
obviously not guided by natural law reasoning. Rather, having found over one hundred
members who threatened the social body, they cut them off immediately.
4,1
Romans 2:15.
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Paulino Castaneda Delgado, Don Vasco Quirogaysu Information de Derecho (Madrid:
Ediciones Jose Porrua Turanzas, 1974).
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Inquisitorial proceeding that resulted in penances and other visible forms of
redemption suggest a different line of reasoning, no, of a purely disciplinary nature. The
penances performed at an auto de fe visibly changed the substance of a soul from heretic
to reconciled, more in keeping with Aristotle than Foucault. The elaborately staged
spectacle, with banners and platforms, scaffolding and velvet, illustrated the extent of the
Church's powers in remitting sins, in restoring a person's nature, in removing the bio, of
evil from her soul.
Originally, the Inquisition was purely an examining board. Created by Pope
Gregorio IX in 1233, the Dominican-led tribunal limited its powers to interrogations and
the ordering of spiritual penances. Yet pilgrimages and the saying of Ave Marias were not
enough to combat the growing forces of evil, particularly in the matter of witchcraft.
Innocent VIII, writing in 1482, decried the numbers of the Catholic faith, "many of both
sexes, unmindful of their own salvation and straying from the Catholic Faith, [who] have
abandoned themselves to devils, incubi and succubi..." Despite the good work of the
Dominicans, continued the Pope, an order "not ashamed to contend with the most
unblushing effrontery," these inquisitors were unable to enforce their rulings without legal
authority. In order to remove "all hindrances and obstacles by which the good work of the
Inquisitors may be let and tarded" as well as to "prevent the disease of heresy and other
turpitudes dillusing their poison to the destruction ofmany souls," Innocent VIII decreed
that the inquisitors "be empowered to proceed to the just correction, imprisonment, and
punishment of any persons, without let or hindrance in every way as if the provinces,
townships, dioceses, districts, territories, yea, even the person and their crimes in this
kind were named and particularly designated in Our letters. m43
"
I he Bull of Innocent VIII," in The Malleus Maleficarum ofHeinrich Kramer and
James Sprenger, trans. Rev. Montague Summers (New York: Dover, 1971), xliii-xlv.
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Although the inquisition was a court of law i, did no, follow the workings of the
was forfeited if the defendant was no, eonvieted. the aceuser in inquisitorial nratters was
no, held liable for an aecusation which did no, prove to be true. A civil ease had ,o be
disposed within thirty days of initiation. A case before the Inquisition could take years
before reaehing a final determination. The defendant in a civil trial was given the names
and statements of his accusers. There were no such discovery procedures in the
inquisitor s court. H. C. Lea explains;
To the conscientious judge, eager to destroy the foxes which ravaged the
vineyard o the Lord, the task of exploring the secret heart of man was no
easy one. We cannot wonder that he speedily emancipated himself from
e rammels ol recognized judicial procedure which, in preventing himfrom committing injustice, would have rendered his labours futile...
Omniscience alone was capable of solving with justice the problems which
were the daily routine of the inquisitor; human frailty, resolved to
accomplish a predetermined end, inevitably reached the practical
conclusion that the sacrifice of a hundred innocent men were better than
the escape of one guilty. 44
Although Lea's rhetoric suggests a certain willingness to convict the Holy Office
of its own predetermined end, the emphasis on human frailty and the willingness to
sacrifice a hundred innocent men certainly speaks to the record that Roth provided on the
Membreque caseA Yet neither Lea’s accusation nor the Membreque incident are
consistent with the demands of Thomism. Some inquisitors were certainly caught up in
44
H. C. Lea, A History ofthe Inquisition ofthe Middle Ages (New York: Macmillan 1 888)
100
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The accuracy ol Leas scholarship has been challenged by both Greenleaf and
Vacandaid. Vacandard writes, "Lea's judgment, despite evident signs of intellectual
honesty, is not to be trusted. Honest he may be, but impartial never. His pen too often
gives way to his prejudices and his hatred of the Catholic Church. His critical judgment is
sometimes gravely at fault" (vii).
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the flames of anti-converso hatred that swept through Spain in the fourteenth century and
early-fifteenth centuries.” But these judicial atrocities were not committed because of
rhomism but in clear violation of its principles, and Thomists did complain." Nor was
the inquisitor completely free from "the trammels of recognized judicial procedure." Not
only was his discretion subject to natural and divine laws, but the procedure itself was
highly regulated.
The proceeding began with the denunciamento. Church authorities were sensitive
to accusations ol political misconduct, of being used as a pawn between rival factions.
The inquisitors put every accuser and potential witness through careful and lengthy
questioning to determine whether any accusing party or potential witness might be
motivated by personal or political animosity. Evidence was then gathered by the
investigators and was studied by the calificadores. If the evidence warranted it, the
suspect (reo) was arrested and his property confiscated. He was then questioned without
being charged and without knowing the allegations against him. After a brief time in
prison, the charge was formulated and the indictment read. The reo would respond to the
charges with the assistance of an attorney, someone employed by the Holy Office. The
testimony of the witnesses was read without the benefit of their names.
If the reo did not confess to his sins, torture would be applied in order to induce a
confession. The use of torture was also regulated. It was only to last for an hour. It was
only to occur once for each charge. Any evidence which was gathered during the allowed
hour was only pennitted it the reo repeated it in court. According to ecclesiastical law,
(Ecc/esia abhorret a sanguine ) no blood was to be shed. The defendant was either put on
See Benzion Netanyahu, The Origins ofthe Inquisition in the Fifteenth Century (New
York: Random House, 1995).
47 See Henry Kamen, The Spanish Inquisition: A Historical Revision (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1997, 67-68.
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•he rack, submitted to water tortures, or had his hands and fee, bound and then was
dropped to within a few inches of,he floor. Generally the authorities preferred to
describe the torture instead of actually casing i, out. "There was always the adtnonition
to .ell the truth," reports Green,eaf, "and thereby avoid untold anguish.- The sentence
was read, usually a veiy severe one, which served as another shock in a series of shocks
set up to loosen the unrepentant's tongue. The actual
than the one originally stated. This combination
sentence was usually much lighter
ot severity and compassion allowed the
inquisitor to fulfill his paradoxical mission: to eradicate heresy while modeling the
Christian principle of forgiveness and grace. In this manner, i, was thought, both the
natural law of obedience and the natural law of reason would be engaged: by recognizing
the Church's supreme authority, the heretic's mind would be set free to reason.”
Even the prudent inquisitor, the faithful follower of official procedures and
scriptural authority was not guaranteed immunity from judicial oversight. The case of
l ather Zumarraga in colonial Mexico provides a salient counter-example to Roth's
Membreque account. The Membreque affair occurred on the heels of the expulsion of the
Jews when anti-converso sentiments were particularly high in pockets of Spain. By the
time of Zumarraga's case, some thirty years later, natural law reasoning was gaining the
upper hand, particularly when the case involved the execution of an Indian.
' s
Richard Greenleaf, Zumarraga and the Mexican Inquisition (Washington, D.C.:
Academy of American Franciscan History, 1961), 23.
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The Case ot F ather /.umnrmun
In his respectful biography of the Apostolic Inquisitor of Michoacan, Fray Juan
de Zunrarraga. Richard Greenleaf presents a substantially different story of the
inquisitor's powers than that presented by Lea.” The trial of Don Carlos
Chichimecatechuhua. in 1539, was, according to Greenleaf, "carried out without legal
irregularities'" and contormed to the standard procedures followed in Spain.” Even so.
when Fray Zumarraga burned the Indian cacique at the stake, he was found guilty of
"excess zeal," and, in 1543, his apostolic title was taken away. 53
This case presents almost all the issues that perplexed the colonial Holy Office:
jurisdictional difficulties, institutional legitimacy, anthropological puzzles, and the
problem ot idolatry. The defendant was an Indian at a time when Spanish theologians
were still trying to determine whether the Indian had the capacity to profess the faith.
This anthropological dispute had important bearing on the court's jurisdiction as only an
erring Catholic could be tried by the Inquisition. If an Indian could not profess the faith
then an Indian could not be subject to inquisitorial perfection. The case came some ten
years before the famous trial at Valladolid (1550-1551), between the Spanish humanist,
Juan Gines de Sepulveda and the Dominican Bartolome de las Casas, in which the two
great minds attempted to resolve the question of what was the nature of the Indian; and
even then the result was unclear. 54
'"Greenleaf, Zumarraga
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The case agains, Don Ca,os Chichimecatechuhua also took place in the twilight
era o, colon,al inquisitorial justice. At the time, an informal inquisition, se, up by the
Franciscans and other irregular Bishops, was prosecuting heretics under the Church's
jurisdiction. Without the formal, centralized institution in place, the procedures varied
wildly and irregularly with tnstances of prosecutorial abuse widely reported. Various
complaints were registered in Castile calling, in particular, for the censure of the
Franciscans. Eventually, these complaints prompted the Crown, in 1571
,
to establish the
Mexican Holy Office under the administration of the Dominican order. The Crown's
decision to put the Dominicans in charge underscores the rising legitimacy of Thomism.
Although he was a member of the Franciscan Order, an order noted for its cruelties
in inquisitorial proceedings. Fray Juan de Zumarraga was one of those missionaries who
believed that the Indian "was capable of the full cup of salvation.''” Inquisition records
reveal that Zumarraga was quite willing to prosecute Spanish landowners for mistreating
Indians. In 1537, Zumarraga tried Gonzalo Gomez, an encomendero, who was accused of
heresy for. among other things, working his "employees and his Indian charges on
Sundays and least days.”'" (A neighboring merchant also reported that he used crosses as
a drying rack for chili peppers.) For these crimes, he was commanded to appear on
Monday, 12 November 1537, at the altar rail of the Cathedral of Mexico City. Kneeling
and with a candle in his hand, he was ordered to recite five Ave Marias and five Pater
Nosters and the Rosary, "so that God would pardon his sins,” explains Greenleaf. "As a
penance he was to be confined in the llruapan monastery for a period of thirty days to
Greenleaf, Zumarraga
,
28.
Stephen Greenleaf, The Mexican Inquisition ofthe Sixteenth Century (Albuquerque,
N.M.: University of New Mexico Press, 1969), 51.
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he wouid be released tan*,, where he had been held since his arres, on
, June 1537
Zumarraga's prosecution of the local cacique might a,so be understood as a further
protecon of the Indians. Don Carlos Chichimecateehuhua told the men in his village to
disregard any orders from the pries, and to keep up the practice of concubinage. He told
the women in his viliage "to obey their husbands in a„ things and no, to comp,am when
the husbands took other women. He related to others that he slept with his niece Inez
whenever he desired.™ Besides temorizing his people, in repeated viola,ion of civil ,aw.
he also denounced the Church and the friars, claiming tha, Christianity was a false religion
and telling his people that, without blood sacrifices, the insatiable Aztec gods would feed
upon them all. "Few moments in history," writes Fernando Cervantes.
are filled with more bitter irony. The though, of a Franciscan friar, who
was also a humanist, conversant with the writings of Erasmus and author
o a treatise which spelled out Christian doctrine in simple language, acting
out the role of inquisitor general, engaged in a ruthless and frantic
persecution ot unfaithful Indian apostates which culminated in the burning
at the stake of a charismatic Indian leader, would have seemed like a verybad kind ot nightmare to the early missionaries. 59
Nonetheless, Cervantes concludes that given the continued and widespread practice of
idolatry - evidenced by the large numbers of young men "with their legs cut open or with
wounds in their ears and tongues inflicted with the purpose of providing human blood for
the idols"”' - there was "no alternative action.™ Yet even the obvious presence of evil did
7
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no. save Fray Zumarraga from censure. Ife was replaced by the Visitador Francisco Tello
do Sandoval, who was sen. from Spain to enforce
.he New Laws, .he Thomis, sla.u.es
whieh formally limited lire encomienda system."
The case of Fray Zumarraga suggests
.ha. within the I loly Office, natural law was
gaining legitimacy. No matter how troubling the cacique's behavior, Thomis. doctrine
required .ha, the Indian be treated with leniency and mercy. The nature of the Indian was
such l ha. he should not be subjected to the cruelty of the stake but rather to the lessons
ol the priest. Zumarraga's humanism might have also landed him in difficulty. According
to the I homists, Hrasmus, like Luther, was overly devoted to texts. The word, according
to the I homists, was not enough. It needed to be balanced by the traditions of the
Church, by the mysteries of the mass, the practice of confession and the receiving of
absolution. I he light ol reason was always enhanced by the nature of grace.
I Ins two-told understanding of human nature, part rational substance and part
supernatural form, requires an almost poetic effort to fully comprehend. For natural law
is not just the writing on the heart but the connection between human material and the
supernatural scribe. Suarez explained that "with respect to the natural law, it is the
teaching ol theology that man may be considered from the standpoints of a twofold
nature and dual light ol reason." Suarez goes on to explain the components of this twofold
nature:
I he first standpoint deals with pure nature, or the substance of the rational
soul, and consequently with the light of reason that is connatural to man.
I he second deals with the the nature ol grace infused into man from above,
and with the divine and supernatural light of faith whieh rules and guides
him in this life. 63
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Inasmuch as the Inquisition con,boned ,o these Thotnis, pri„eip,es its own work
was equally bifurcated.
,n other word, i, was as invo.ved in ,urning up the rational
Powers of the sou, as in delivering, through its spiritua, powers, an infusion of grace The
education, efforts of the tnquist.ors, examined in greater detai, in Chapters 3 and 5 were
atmed a, increasing ration,Uy by way of increasing the ability of the sou, to receive grace.
Bhnd obedience, the subjection of reason to authority, human frailty, all of these
characterizations of the ignorant masses before the tyrannical inquisitors miss the nature
of the enterprise, a, leas, in its Dominican and Jesuit inceptions. Evil might be .urking
around every comer, it might even be wearing the clothes of the orthodox, bu, that didn't
mean the human mind wasn't up to the task. According to the Thomists every person
before them was naturally endowed with a "form of law which dwells within the human
mind’ in order that the righteous may be distinguished from the evil.' 164 All that was
needed was to return the errant mind back to its natural harmony.
From a liberal perspective, this heavy-handed education smacks of intolerance, a
denial of one's individual conscience, and the early liberals were eager to disabuse the true
Christian of the need for so much mind-control. Yet just behind this notion of religious
tolerance, which from a twenty-first century perspective appears to be the sine qua non
of modernity, is the slightly troubling notion that we are severely limited in what we are
allowed to know. For if liberal tolerance is predicated on voluntarism, on a limiting of the
mind to this world, then what we may have gained in latitude we have lost in altitude. The
word became enough because the apocalypse began to seem less likely. But along with a
reduction of the Church's powers to fight off the forces of evil came a reduction in the
mind's ability to ascend up the Chain of Being.
Francisco Suarez, De Legibus ac Deo Legislators, 1 .3.9 in Selections From Three
Works ofFrancisco Suarez (Buffalo, NY: William S. Hein & Co., 1995), 42.
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CHAPTER III
HIERARCHY'S SPIRITUAL CHARGE
A picture held us captive. And we could ge, outside
.
fat it lay m our language and language seemed to
repeat it to us inexorably.
Ludwig Wittgenstein 1
The Picture lb a i H.-lH ,k. Lutheran,
Fr°m the perSPective of the «"° heretics, the elaborately staged spectacle of the
au,„ de fe hardly looked Christian. By the time Berruguete's fifteenth century vision had
become a sixteenth centuty reality, chances were good that the two men dressed in loin
cloths, waiting to become one with the flames, were Lutherans. The extravagant display
of political and ecclesiastical powers would have confirmed the Lutherans' worst
suspicions about the Roman Catholic Church. Rather than feel the presence of divine
judgment nipping at their heels, as the inquisitors intended, the confirmed and hapless
Protestants would have gleaned an entirely different lesson from the whole affair. As far
as the Lutherans were concerned, the auto was not an example of Catholic justice but a
perversion of the Christian faith.
As was the case with the penitent at the base of the stairs, these two Lutherans
would have been met by a priest hoping to persuade them of their errors. The Lutherans,
however, would hardly have been impressed with the priest’s authority. "All of us who
are Christians, are priests by the same priesthood as Christ," wrote Martin Luther in De
ahroganda missa privata. "There is no scriptural testimony whatever in the New
I estament that any men should be distinguished from lay folk as priests by being
1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations
,
edited by G. E. M. Amscombe (New
York: Macmillan, 1958), r. 115.
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tonsured and anointed."" An OpenW to lhe Cbrisiian NMHty ofthe^^
Cdeeming lhe Reforn oflhe Chrislim £state wrhien m , 52fl Lmher clamed tha( Uk
community itself had the power to choose its own priest.'
If a little group of pious Christian laymen were taken captive and setdown in a wilderness, and had among them no pries, consecrated bv abishop and ,f there in the wilderness they were to agree in"g one ofhemselves, married or unmarried, and were to charge him with thetffice
a ST- Sa|ymg .maSS - absol™8 ®d preaching. such a man would hes truly a prtes, as though all bishops and popes had consecrated him*
Nor would a Lutheran have recognized the power of an auricular confession. According to
Luther, "it is unnecessary for this kind of sin to be brought before the church: the prelate
or priest as they pretentiously interpret the term.'" Rather, i, was better for each one to
conless privately his sins "by one brother to another." 6
As far as Luther was concerned, the state might use temporal powers to coerce its
citizens to good behavior but the Church had no right whatsoever to torment men's
- Martin Luther, De abroganda missa private, 9; cited in Francisco de Vitoria, "II On thePower o! the Church," in Political Writings, edited and translated by Anthony Pagden andJeremy Lawrance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 126.
Luther himself eventually refuted this earlier position after the peasant uprisings made
visible the subversive implieations of his challenge to the Church. My thanks to Laura C.
Stevenson for pointing this out. See also Quentin Skinner, The Foundations ofModern
Political Thought : Volume 2 The Age ofReformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1978), 75-81.
Martin Luther, "An Open Letter to the Christian Nobility ofthe German Nation
Concerning the Reform ofthe Christian Estate, 1520," Available at:
http://www.iclnet.org/pub/resourees/text/wittenberg/luther/web/nblty-03.html.
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consciences. In his diatribe
of confession:
against the humanist Erasmus. Luther rails against the practice
bound b, ,b, „» 0fO0j & «
h,ch are only the more provoked into hatred of both God and men/
The priest urging the confession at the base of the stairs was nothing but a "barbarous
SOU,
-murderer," who was "filing] the wor.d with blaspheming vain hypocrites solely in
order to restrain them a little from outward sin.™ All the Lutherans saw was the naked
power of the Spanish state buttressed by a hypocritical Church. They could no, see wha,
the ecclesiastical authorities had laid ou, in perfect splendor before them: the corpus
mysticum.
Inasmuch as the English-speaking world has digested Luther’s perspective, we
may also have trouble seeing any justice in the auto de fe. We may agree with Luther that
the effort of extracting a confession is just a ruse. The priest has no power to remit sins.
His sacramental actions are only a charade as he has no ability to grant mercy. Indeed, we
too might consider the priest’s actions as spiritual murder or, at least, the violation of
conscience. Inasmuch as we see a conscience being violated we have accepted Luther's
point of view. Yet there is another way of looking at the auto; one that operates within
the hierarchical and ordered universe set out by St. Thomas Aquinas.
Martin Luther, The Bondage ol the Will” in Erasmus-Luther: Discourse on Free Will.
trans. by Ernst L. Winter (New York: Continuum, 1999), 107.
8
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The Auto rip
Wh„e the burning of heretics had been going on in Europe for centuries, the
executions were, by and large, a private and informal affair. The development of the auto* te signaled a shift in policy. demonstrating more visibly the Church's power "to bind
and to ,oose." The product of Inquisitor Genera, Fernando de Va,dbs' imag,nation and
qU,te "kelyi
~ * * was invented "as a way of imposing the
presence of the Inquisition."* Henry Kamen cites the discover of Protestant heretics in
Spam m
.558, "and the wiihngness of the crown to assist in their punishment," as having
contributed to this magnificently staged production of the confessional state.'* The firs, of
dtese productions occurred in May of , 559 in Valladolid. Kamen comments that the
"presence and patronage of the royal court at the Valladolid autos of .559 immediately
gave the ceremony a prestige i, had no, previously possessed."" Kamen's presentation of
Ihe auto highlights its role in enhancing the Holy Office's institutional prestige. No longer
did the inquisitors conduct all their affairs in secret prisons and clandestine chambers as
had been the case in the pas,. Now their operations were central to the very activity of
government.
From a Thomist perspective, however, the institution's prestige was never in
question. Rather, this new auto only confirmed what Aquinas had argued in the thirteenth
century: that in spiritual matters the state should bow to the church. In his discussion on
kingship, Aquinas considers the separate jurisdictions of the spiritual and earthly
’ Henry Kamen, The Spanish Inquisition: A Historical Revision (New Haven- Yale
M90
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kingdoms. "So
.ha. spiri.ua, and earthly dungs may he kep. distmct,
.he m.nisUy of .his
kingdom is en.rus.ed no. ,o earthly kings bu, «o pries,s. and especially
,o ,he Highes,
Pries,, ,he successor of Peter, the Vicar of Chris,, the Roman Pontiff, ,„ whom all kings
over Christian peoples should be subject as ,o Chris, himself- The king might have
sovereignty m matters of the state but all parties recognized that the slate was only
perfect inasmuch as i, served the glory of God; a glory represented by the Pope as the
Vicar of Christ.
The respective positions of the Church and the state were analogous to the
respective positions of grace and force. The Church was able to dispense grace, to take
away the sins that had accumulated over a lifetime, to restore the natural inclinations to
their original goodness. The state took over when grace no longer worked, when the sinner
refused the spiritual cures, refused to accept the blessings of the One Apostolic Church.
When the Holy Office determined that the heretic was unrepentant and pertinacious, the
inquisitors "relaxed" the lost soul to the "secular branch," a euphemism for burning.
Protestants, such as John Locke, would later argue that the very presence of force
corrupted any possibility of grace. As far as the Church was concerned, however, the
hierarchy precluded any chance of corruption. Grace was on a higher level than force; each
power had its proper proportion, or in Aristotle's words, its "due order."
I he auto de te, therefore, did much more than remind the good Catholics of Castile
that they might, in Monty Python’s words, "expect the Spanish Inquisition." Every piece
of the performance, from the velvet canopy to the smell of burning flesh, revealed the
right relationship between the Church and the crown and, by analogy, between grace and
force. This proportionate relationship is reinforced in Berruguete's painting by the
i:
Aquinas, "On Kingship," in St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics, ed. by Paul E.
Sigmund (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988), 27-28.
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7 ^ Ae S0 'dierS m lh£ P"^ -He two swordsn .ca.ed
.He independence of ,e .wo powers of Church and s.a.e, ,He,r mutual
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-e immediately recogniZed ,He
y 6 ”,W° SWOrdS d0Ctrine’” WhiCh Levine deseriHes as fo„„w, ,He
7 .
P0Wer ' S SeP3rate t>0m
- bUt CleaHy "b"*~
-- church: temporal power is
judgment."' 3 A Lutheran, however, wouid no. have recogniZed this arrangement. As , N
188,5 eXP,a "’S
' LU ‘her deStr°yed "*he metaPh°r of ,he .wo swords: henceforth
.here
should be but one, wielded by a rightly advised and godly prince.""
A < .he .op of Luther's hierarchy was no, a grace-dispensing
supernatural actor bu,
a person w„h coercve powers. On a personal level, and this is the level on which
hberahsm tocuses, grace became a private transaction between an individual and God. On
a Political level, however, this shift has some troubling consequences: the head of the
Christian state was no longer a dispenser of grace bu, a wielder of force. In other words,
within Luther's political hierarchy, coercion was higher than grace. This unpalatable
implication, however, was somewhat disguised by the fungible character of the Lutheran
society. The head may now be a purely coercive actor bu, anyone could become the head,
a point that further infuriated the Thontists.
The Bit of Twisted c^ r t
r ,ure Held in t „dw,
1 he Dominican response to Lutheranism went well beyond the staging of autos de
te. In 1 532, the Dominican Fray Francisco de Vitoria (1480
-1552) used the annual
Daniel H Levine, Religion unci Politics in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1 98
1 ), 2 1
.
14
Figgis, cited in Skinner, 15.
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rcleclion at the University of Salamanca £a review of an important issue delivered during
to confront the new heresy. By claiming that a me
the year's lectures, as an opportunity
"'*
‘
Hi. Ihe »„
,ta
“
“»"“ »i»* iH, hems
"* *“ ~“ ***'»"«
not only went against the "wisdom of the aiW h.,tges but, even worse, they were offending the
aesthetic of God:
due order"^2 98^ ° ^9 to G ^ ° "'T
with the hierarchy ofmlla^d^ tT*1°**"
and administer all things, without any detriment to His crea^uL
0
^^act that would not have suited His wisdom and infinite providence rathersu ted Him to arrange that the earth should not present the ugly
'
spectacle of a heap of things lying about by chance, but instead should be
"272 b°dy °r buildi"S- with its tntcrconnected hmbs orP ts giving the whole a beauty worthy of its creator. 15
In Vitoria's mind, a society in which each Christian had the powers of a priest,
was "an ugly spectacle.” Without the organic and natural ordering of different powers for
different types of people, society would dissolve into "a heap of things lying about by
chance.” That some people, i.e. the Lutherans, accepted this random chaos as natural only
spoke to the depth of their corruption. Even when, in a final effort, the Holy Office laid
out the hierarchy in all its proportioned splendor, the corrupted Lutherans could not see
the interconnection of limbs and parts but only a bunch ofmen on bleachers, some of
whom carried books. They didn’t recognize what the authorities had laid out before them -
- the "due order," "the hierarchy of rulers and subjects, prelates and inferiors," identified
" Vitoria, "I Power of Church," 55.
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A
^
ia 'er 3 ChnSlla" N—
-
8'oss Dionysius the Pseudo-
reopague. According to Vitoria. the Protestant faith had corrupt their eyesight
In order that his students a, Saiatnanca ntigh, no, suffer the sante hiindness as the
governed by the higher spheres, "per the Wisdont of Aristotle," and jus, as the ,ower
angels should be govented by the higher angels, "per the wisdont of Dionysius the
Pseudo-Areopagite," so "this sante Wisdont... provided that His Church be governed by a
Inerarchy
,n whtch the various offices are distributed in order, so that sonte are the eyes,
some the hands, others the feet, and others again the remaining limbs, in due
proportion." 16 After refuting severai contrary theories, Vttoria emphatically concluded
-ha, there is in the Church some spiritual or ecclesiasticalpeer, distinct hy divine and
natural la,from civil and temporalpeer. "He defines this power as "the authority
rule the faithful in matters which concent religion, and to direct them towards life eternal."
or more specifically, "the potential power to bind and loose, a, the moment when the
righteous are accepted into the kingdom and the unworthy excluded." 1 ’
One year later, in 1 533, Vitoria returned to the topic of ecclesiastical power, this
tune calling his enemy by name. As a class, the proponents of the "heap" society were
"modernists" (neoterici), a tenn coined by Cicero as a term of sarcasm to mean "avan,
garde" and which Vitoria had used in previous lectures with equal disrespect for
nominalists. 1 " "Although every Catholic agrees that ecclesiastical power is vested in all
Christians." argued Vitoria, and not in individual Christians, the "modernists have taken i,
upon themselves in their arrogance to contradict the Church's universally accepted
10
Vitoria, "I Power of the Church," 55-56.
17
Vitoria, "I Power of the Church," 57.
18
Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance, in Vitoria, Political Writings
.
note 20, p. 126.
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Wi.lt the HU or,,,,
" tur teeth, go forth to spread dissent and faction - As in the previous year's
" CCl'°n
-
the dd CnSe °f the eCde“~ IS carried on, as a defense of the
corporate whole. I his time, however, the authority is primarily scriptural. Kather than
entire argument in Paulist scripture.
I irst, Paul says in Rom. 12' 4 -6 that tuQ , . ,
mystical body, composed of various organs and" lin b’s
•' or'
'
C ''
*
u
S°n
many members in one body, and a„ meLe^e
„otth™!^we, being many, are one body in Christ and everv „„ u 80
anodrer, having then gilts differing adding toZ
Vi-oria then moves on to the passage in Corinthians in which Paul shows the absurdity „f
a community whose members do no, recognize their own special graces as necessary to
the working ol the whole. Quoting from I Cor. 12: 14-20
IMhc loot shall say "Because I am not the hand. I am not of the body " is
II hea hig'Mf th' h l
<>dy?
"i
hC Wh°'e b°dy WCrC “ ** wltere we,c rin I e whole were hearing, where were the smelling? But nowtath God set the members every one of them in the body, as it hath
P eased him. And ,1 they were all one member, where were the body? Butnow arc they many members, yet but one body
.
21
I he hierarchy of powers, the coordination of gifts, the making ofmany members
into one, were not only beneficial to all involved but, more importantly, were pleasing to
Vitoria, II Power of the Church," 126.
Vitoria, "II Power of the Church," 127.
21
Ibid.
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corporate whole. Vitoria was incensed:
them is a priest!
'
’ PneSt)
’ because CTei> ™n-jack of
The attack on Lutheranism was to a large extent an attack on the modern notion of
As 1st .. V„,i,
"
.h. ....,.,1 of «. «*, ,,, A M|0„s AristoUe, ,h, Tho,„»
each person's perfects could only be attained within a social order. The epistemology of
thrs social order, however, should no, be confused with a totalitarian system. Ac,ui„as'
theory of individuation recognized that all universal truths were mediated by the
particular senses and, a, the same time, the individual imagination was constituted by the
common things of the world* The trick was learning to read those common things in the
way God intended. The Dominicans read God's aesthetic in the world Ihrough scripture
and reason: their Jesuit counterparts, on the other hand, took a far more imaginative
approach.
“ Vitoria, "II Power of the Church," 126.
Vitoria, "II Power of Church," 128.
See Anthony Kenny, "Intentionality: Aquinas and Wittgenstein," The Legacy of
Wittgenstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 61-76. See also Francisco Suarez,
Uarez on todtvtdmtion: Metaphysical Disputation V: Individual Unity and its Principle
*
(Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1982).
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1 he Jesu it lmaf.’in;iiinn
Although "not literally subservient" to the authority of Saint Thomas, as was the
case with the Dominicans, the Jesuits were deeply attuned Aquinas' ordered universe.”
Uke the Angelic Doctor, they believed that the natural capacities ofmankind were
inclined towards goodness. The Jesuits, however, brought a slightly different
interpretation Aquinas' writings. Whereas the Dominicans stressed the intellect above
all other faculties, the Jesuits developed a practice that engaged all the faculties of the soul
without any particular emphasis on one or the other.
The constituting document of Jesuit practices, the Spiritual Exercises, developed
by the founder of the Society of Jesus, St. Ignatius Loyola (1491-1556), promotes a
greater awareness of the heart and the imagination than the more rational methods used by
the scholastics. I he Rules for Discernment set forth in the Exercises call for the
engagement of powerful emotions
- grief, fear, horror, compunction, compassion,
contentment, admiration, gratitude, wonder, joy, and love. As John O'Malley explains,
”|t]he individual should feel bestirred 'by great feeling' - and at appropriate moments
moved even to tears."” The goal of all of this emotional expression was to learn to discern
Clod's will Irom that of the Devil. Members of Loyola’s first hand, such as Juan Alfonso
de Polanco, were convinced that the heart provided a "better light" for distinguishing
between good and evil than human reason. 27
" Carlos Norena, "Suarez and the Jesuits," American Catholic Philosophical Quarter
(Summer 1991), 267-86,271.
John W. O'Malley, The First Jesuits (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press
1993), 41.
7
Juan Alfonso de Polanco, quoted in O'Malley, 42.
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Along with the business of learning read the motions of the hear,, the Exercises
promote an active and disciplined imagination. In the firs, step of the Exercise
,
the
disciple of Loyola is instructed in the business of "composition of place” (composici6n de
lUgar>
'
m WHiCh ‘he mini
“PO" a corporeal substance, such as Jesus or Maty,
creates a "certain imaginary vision (secundum visiomm quandam imaginartamr of a
place, such as a mountain or a temple, within which Jesus and Mary can be found. By the
same token, when the mind "speculates upon incorporeal things, such as sin. the
composition of the place (loci comtructio) will be of such a manner that through the
imagination we may see our soul enclosed in this corruptible body, as in a prison, and the
man himself exiled in this valley of tears in the middle of beasts." 1' Sin, in other words,
would be better understood through the use of corporeal imagery than by name alone. As
the editors of the Historic! de la Iglesia explain:
There is in the Exercises" a very perceptive psychology. Ignacio
recognized that nothing would empower a man more than to engage all of
his faculties at once. Not only should he call upon understanding and will,
considered the most important faculties, but memory, imagination, and the
senses as well.
29
Like Aquinas, Loyola believed in the generosity of God's plan, an inherently
catholic plan that allowed for the salvation of all people. There was no "elect," no group
Ignacio de Loyola, "Spiritual Exercises," cited in Historia de la Iglesia
,
Trent (Valencia:
Edicep, 1976)348: [CJuando especulamos sobre una cosa incorporea, por ejemplo
sobi e el pecado, la composicion, del lugar (loci constructio) podrd ser de tal manera que
poi la imaginacion veatnos nuestra alma encerrada en este cuerpo corruptible como en
una prision y al hombre mismo desterrado en este valle de lagrimas en medio de las
bestias.
"
Historia de la Iglesia
,
XIX, 347: [H}ay en los "Ejercicios" una psicologia muy
penetrante. Ignacio no ignora que no se apodera uno del hombre mas que dirigiendose a
todas sus facultades a la vez. I a a llamar no solo al entendimiento y a la voluntad, que
considera ser lo mas importante, sino tambien a la memoria, a la imaginacion y a los
mismos sentidos.
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o' SPeC ' al fcW PredeS,ined f0r salva,i0
"- God had given each person sufficient
means for their sa,vation.» And whiie sonte ntay argue that the Jesuits strayed front
Aquinas' rational path, the sain, himself never denied the validity of the other means.
Early in the Summa Theo,ogiae. Aquinas speaks to the neeessity of the senses. On the
question of "whether Holy Scriptures should use metaphors,” Aquinas responds that "i,
is natural to man to attain intellectual truths through sensible things, because all our
kn°W,edge
Hi^er knowledge, i.e. spiritual knowledge, required
the senses in tandem with the imagination. "Hence in Holy Scripture spiritual truths arc
fittingly taught under the likeness of material things.” 12
This metaphoric acumen, i.e. the ability to see beyond what is actually there, may
help to explain rule thirteen of the Exercises which famously describes the nature of
obedience to the One True Faith: "We ought always to hold by the principle
.ha, the
white that 1 see. I would believe to be black, if the Hierarchical Church were so to rule."
I his statement of laith stieks in the craw of many non-Jesuit observers. Seen from the
perspective of freedom of thought, Loyola's dictate provides good grounds for
Macaulay's complaint with Catholicism: "the complete subjection of reason to authority
Seen Irom the perspective of the Regimini Mililmtis Ecclesiae, the official title of the
Society ol Jesus, this subjection of things natural to a more supernatural chain of
command makes good hierarchical sense. Higher truths, as Aquinas pointed out, operate
in terms of likenesses. What appears as white may only be a likeness of something else,
Historia de la Iglesia, XIX, 346.
’' St. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologiae, pt 1, qu. 1, art. 9, in Introduction to St.
Thomas Aquinas (New York: Modern Library College Editions, 1948), 16, emphasis
added.
' Ibid., emphasis added.
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something that .he Hierarchical Church, through supernatural powers, wil, he better able
.o perceive. In other words, rule thirteen does no, express the complete subjection of
reason to authority bu, the complete subjection of the natural to the supernatural.
1 here is also an historical explanation for Loyola's color-blind obedience one
sensitive to the difficulties of the times. Given the enthusiastic nature of the Spiral
Exercises, Loyola's complete sutrender to Church doctrine helped distinguish the Jesuits
Irom the ranks of the equally enthusiastic and highly questionable alumbrados. Loyola
was called before the Holy Office quite a number of times, once spending forty-two days
m an inquisitorial prison in Toledo, and generally because his practices seemed
dangerously close to illuminism. Although he was eventually cleared of all charges of
heresy, the authorities warned him to temper his activities and move them more in line
with the doctrine of the Church, a judgment Loyola welcomed." According to his memoir.
Loyola challenged his accusers, "whether this is true or not, determine it; if i, is not true
condemn it.'"' The early Jesuit was clearly interested in deepening the spiritual experience
already laid out by the Church, not in forging a different pathway in the manner of
Luther.
Loyola, like Vitoria, is operating under the assumption that corporate
understanding is greater than individual perception. Luther might praise an individual's
conscience over institutional authority, but Catholics remained firmly committed to the
notion that truth was more likely to be found in a larger unit than in a mere person,
whether or not that person was having a mystical experience. Even humanists, like
Erasmus, tavored "public authority ot the Church" rather than "what this or that man
33
O’Malley, 27.
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Loyola, cited in Marjorie O'Rourke Boyle, "Angel's Black and White: Loyola's Spiritual
Discernment in Historical Perspective," Theological Studies 44 (1983), 241-257, 255.
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produces concerning hls own„he authority ofa scholar a^^ ^
recognized inasmuch as it conned to ,He grea,er whole. If dre individual, teachi„g did
nor conform
.o .He gre,er whole, .„ .He ecCesiasdca, power ofa,, CHris.ians, in Vitoria,
words, then the Church had the riBht to condemn it.
Rather than excise the errant individual from the spiritual body of believers
however, the Jesuits genera„y took a more ,enie„t stance towards spiritual misfits,
perhaps because they themselves were often charged with having questionable spiritual
influences. Although, as O'Malley points out, the Jesuits "could no, contain their anger
toward 'heresiarchs' like Luther, they tried their bes, to excuse more lowly heretics as
persons misled.- Ralher lhan give up on the hereltc as beyond redemplion, the Jesuits
saw the heretic as a lost sheep, created in the image of God, and worthy of their ministry.
Since the explicit goal ofa Jesuit sermon was "to teach, to move, to please,"” the heretic
offered the possibility ofa great lesson, a great movement of the soul. This may explain
why the early Jesuits were reluctant to prosecute heretics with the full power of the Holy
Office, preferring "private reconciliation to a judicial procedure."”
The Jesuit practice with regard to the imagination - the ability to see something
incorporeal in terms of corporeality; to see something black for white - cultivated a
flexibility that worked on both a practical and intellectual level. On a practical level, the
Jesuits were famous for syncretism, for accommodating Church doctrine to local needs,
whether it was nudity in Brazil or the scholarly needs ofa convent. Having evangelized
throughout the world, the members of the Society of Jesus knew first hand that the
,S
Erasmus, Hyperaspistes, LB 10, 1299D, cited in Boyle, 250.
O'Malley, 76.
37
O'Malley, 96.
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O'Malley, 311.
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mySUCUm W°Uld n0 ' al™> S «* -me
. Members of the Campania wrote to
each other about the tapestry of nations they encountered;
"so diverse in dress and
behavior: some white and others black, some a, peace and others a, war. some weeping
and others laughing, some healthy and others sick, some being bom. others dying, and so
forth.
"
Jg
The Jesutts realized that the unity described by Vitoria might look different in
different parts of the world. Wha, mattered is that all these different parts moved together
towards God. Diversity, therefore, was not a sign of randomness or disorder, but the
multiple variations of a glorious whole.
On an intellectual level, this flexibility allowed them to consider the benefits of
both sides of the nominalist/intellectualist debate. The Jesuits were the first to "take
seriously," in Richard Tuck's words, nominalist objections to Thomism.40 The Jesuit
Francisco Suarez resolved the centuries old battle between Thomists and nominalists by
enhancing the affective nature of the will. According to Suarez, in a perfect world the
intellect is a superior faculty as it guides the will. However, given our fallen condition, the
will to love God may move us closer to the divine than actually knowing the reasons
why. Indeed, as far as Suarez is concerned, explains John L. Treloar, "every act found in
the sense appetites, such as love, desire, and hope, is also found in the will, except that it
is tound in a higher way because in the will these acts are spiritual as opposed to merely
natural. Treloar argues that Suarez moved Thomist prudence aside for moral virtues.
Spiritual E\e> cises, no. 106, cited in J. Matthew Ashley, "Ignacio Ellacuria and the
Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius Loyola." Theological Studies 61 (March, 2000), 4 of 12
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Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government 1572-1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993), 140.
41
John L. Treloar, S.J. "Moral Virtue and the Demise of Prudence in the Thought of
Francisco Suarez," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly ( 1991), 387-405, 390.
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Moral virtue, unlike intellectual virtue, recognizes the "relationship to the appetites and
their tendency toward the good." 42
Moral virtue, unlike intellectual virtue, also allowed more members of society to
part, c,pate. Richard Tuck suggests that the early Jesuits restored "some of the moral
language of the late Middle Ages." particularly the notion of "people's moral rights .
«
I he Jesuits did not require a scholastic education for salvation, although it helped.
Affections, inclinations, appetites and senses, the natural condition of man was enough
tor salvation. Love, desire, and hope, were not to be erased or channeled by some
intellectual schema, as the Dominicans might argue, but were to be fertilized by spiritual
ends. All persons, even the unlettered, were capable of moral virtue through the very
appetites that the more stoic Protestants were trying to erase.
I he Jesuit imagination would also have profound implications for Aquinas’ theory
of natural law. According to Suarez, "in so far as [natural law] relates to its substance, it is
one and the same among all men." Yet even though the substance of natural law was
uniform, men's understanding of natural law might not be the same in all cultures: "in so
far as concerns the knowledge of it, that law is not complete (so to speak) among all." 44
C ustom and society might have a distinct effect on human comprehension of natural law
but that didn t mean that the thing itself did not exist. Unlike his contemporary
Montaigne, to notice that "the crossing of a River is made a crime" did not illicit any
skepticism about the universality of natural law. 45 Nor did it serve as an excuse for
separating oneself from society. Whereas Montaigne concluded that "a wise man ought
42
Ibid
I uck. Philosophy and Government, 140, emphasis in original.
44
Suarez, De Legibus, 2.8.5, 220.
Michel de Montaigne, Essais, cited in Tuck, Philosophy and Government, 50.
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inwardly to retire his mind from the common presse, and hold the same liberty and power
to judge freely of all things." Suarez described a capacity that could only occur in public
life: facullas moralis. Maybe the understanding of law changed from one side of the
Pyrenees to the other, but that didn't deny the benefit of fully participating in either of
the two variations.
Suarez and the Power of Community Consent
Consent is often cited as the "foundation of a liberal democracy."46 In pre-liberal
times, consent was generally understood as more of an oath, a promise to obey the king.
Locke dramatically altered the notion of consent by imposing the obligation as much on
the government as on those being governed. As such, consent in the liberal tradition
followed the analog of contract, of a mutual obligation. The Thomist tradition, on the
other hand, developed its own understanding of consent, consistent with its Aristotelian
roots. Rather than following the contract analog which conceived of consent as a meeting
ol the minds, the sixteenth century Spanish 1 homists explained consent as a substantial
change that occurred in the political body.
In his classic treatise on international Law, De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore
,
Suarez
considers the source of political power and finds that it does not come from the divine
rights of the king, as British absolutists were insisting, nor from the minds of reasonable
individuals, as skeptics were suggesting, but from the process of forming a perfect
society. According to Suarez, political power only "manifests itself in human nature"
when "men gather together into one perfect community and are politically united."
Following in Vitoria's framework, Suarez argued that political power "resides not in
individual men separately considered, nor in the mass or multitude of them collected, as it
4,1
Oxford Companion to Philosophy, c.v. "consent."
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were, confusedly, in a disorderly manner, and without union of the members into one
body ^ It wasn't enough for a band of men to come together in the wilderness, as Luther
insisted, Instead, the multitude had to organize itself into Christ's body. This mean, that
some of the members would be the fee, and others would be the hands and one would be
the head. Political power, in other words, depended on order and hierarchy, which, in
Him. provided the basis for a moral unit, the corpus mysHcum.- "Once this body has
been constituted, however, the power in question exists in it, without delay and by the
lorce of natural reason; and consequently, it is correctly supposed that i, exists as a
characteristic property resulting from such a mystical body. If 49
Once the masses had formed themselves into a unified body, then, and only then,
could the community transfer its political power to a king or parliament. For. as Suarez
argued, political power "does not reside immutably therein, but may be taken from that
community - by its own consent or through some other jus, means - and transferred to
another [seat of authority]."'” The transfer of power was not a complete alienation of
power, as British absolutists would argue, as one could not alienate something that
originated in God. Just as a person could not take away her own life, so a political body
"Francisco Suarez, De Legibus ac Deo Legislator, 3.3.6 in Selections From Three
Works ofFrancisco Suarez (Buffalo, NY: William S. Hein & Co., 1995). 379-380.
In this analysis 1 diverge from John Finnis who concluded that Suarez's interpretation of
Aquinas ms resulted m a corruption of the latter and the beginning of a subjective
understanding of law. See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford- Oxford
University Press, 1 980), 206-207. See also Anthony J. Lisska. Aquinas' Theory of
Natural Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 996), 230-23 1
. Rather, Suarez's
commitment to a right-ordered world ensures that any discussion of right would assume
an objective framework.
Suarez, De Legibus 3.3.6, 380.
,0
Suarez, De Legibus 3.3.7, 380.
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could not alienate its political life’s power. Should the head fail in his mission to lead the
body closer to God, the body retained the power to remove him, a point that will be
taken up in more detail in Chapter 4. By the same token, Suarez did not subscribe to the
radical theories of popular sovereignty that Bartolus, building on Ockham, had put forth/'
The powers of the king were not subject to the powers of the community.
For, once the power has been transferred to the king, he is through that
power rendered superior even to the kingdom which bestowed it; since by
this bestowal the kingdom has subjected itself and has deprived itself of
its former liberty... Moreover, in accordance with the same reasoning, the
king cannot be deprived of this power, since he has acquired a true
ownership of it; unless perchance he lapses into tyranny, on which ground
the kingdom may wage a just war against him/2
Suarez's notion ol government by double consent, in which a group of individuals
consent to become a political community and then consent to be ruled, predates Locke’s
Two Tr^tises on Government by almost eighty years. Unlike Locke, who described
consent as an individual and instrumental activity - Suarez describes something on the
level of an Aristotelian substantial change. Through a process of metamorphosis,
disconnected parts came to understand themselves as part of a larger whole. The mystical
community had become a political community. Indeed, Suarez uses the terms
interchangeably: "the political or mystical community, constituted through a special
conjunction in the case of a group that is morally a unit." 53 Creating a political unit was to
s|
See Quentin Skinner's discussion of this passage in The Foundations ofModern Political
Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), Vol. 1, 183. Skinner puts more
emphasis, perhaps, than warranted on Suarez's alienation of power. The phrase is non est
delegatio sed quasi alienatio, a kind of alienation, not a complete alienation.
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imagining mcorporea. things, like society, in tenns of their sensible individual lives.
Cons,stem with the two swords doctrine, coercion and mercy play
complementary roles in the maintenance of the Suarezian perfect society. In a
metaphysical disputation on the role of the state with unbelievers. Suarez describes two
classes of people: those whose wills are moved "through persuasion, instruction or
kindness" and those who must be held to their duty "through punishment or coercion.""
In order to accommodate both types of learner, the perfect society needed both
instruction and force and we need only remember Berruguete's painting to know wha, that
looked like. Those who are "drawn to virtue and faith" were benefited by the persuasive
words of the pries, a, the bottom of the stairs; those who must be "recalled from vice and
unbelief had the soldiers in the pit to help them hold their duty.”
Suarez agreed with earlier Church doctrine when he declared that coercion "is no,
to be ascribed to any special power given by Christ." Given the nature of man's fallen
condition, Suarez suggested ".ha, the ordinal powers of the temporal prince would
suffice."'" Whereas the Lutherans would have seen the soldiers' participation in the auto
as (1 ) the murder of a soul and (2) the hypocrisy of the Church, Suarez would have
understood this show of force as proper to its position: low on the scale of things. The
base quality of the soldier's efforts was proportionate to the baser instincts of those who
required a bit of pressure to bring them around. The intent was not to extenninate.
although that did happen, but to hold the irresolute to their duty.
Francisco Suarez, Disputation XVIII: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers in
Selections
,
739.
" Suarez, Disputation XVIII, 739.
s
" Suarez, Disputation XVIII, 753.
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w.th the infusion of Jesuit common sense and practical passion, the hierarchical,
organic, corporate! system, including the Holy Office, began to allow for greater
diversity, even for different understandings of natural law. With the Jesuits involved, a
wider range of options were employed in bringing the heretic around. The Dominican a.
the base of the scaffold employed reason. A Jesuit might be out there with his guitar. The
Jesuits reminded their fellow Thomists that the purpose of any trial was to reconcile and
the means to effect that goal might be emotional. The following chapter looks at a trial in
Colonial Mexico with an eye to that influence.
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CHAPTER IV
A WILLFUL TURNING:
LEONOR DE CACERES AND THE MEXICAN INQUISITION 1
Not all inquisitorial proceeding ended in extermination. In the majority of cases,
the accused was ordered to fulfill some ceremonial activity (pay a fine, receive a number
oi lashes, retire to a religious community, repeat a number of Hail Marys, attend mass
barefoot and holding a candle, etc.) in order to be fully reconciled to the faith. The
thinking behind reconciliation does not appear to have been clouded with blood lust nor a
rabid devotion to the Catholic laith but a practice firmly grounded in Thomism. Not that
the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas were the only doctrines for dealing with heretics. As
mentioned in the first chapter, the Franciscans made a compelling case for the use of force
and authority under the provisions of nominalist reasoning. The case of one young
woman in Colonial Mexico, Leonor de Caceres, 2 a member of the prominent Carvajal
family, illustrates the tensions between the two competing doctrines of nominalism and
rhomism, of extending mercy or using force.
The Family and the Times
The Carvajal family, well-known to historians of Colonial Mexico, achieved its
enduring status largely through the records of the Mexican Holy Office. The governor.
Luis de Carvajal, after becoming embroiled in a boundary dispute with the Viceroy of
1 An earlier version of this essay, "Caceres and the Mexican Inquisition," appeared in The
Journal ofthe History ofIdeas (January 2001), 81-98.
: The proceso against Leonor de Caceres, hereafter referred to as LC, is located at the
Huntington Library, San Marino, California. Portions of this manuscript are reproducd by
permission of the Huntington.
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New Spain, was denounced as a Judaizer in 1 589.’ He was eventually cleared of the crime
of Judaiztng. of performing Jewish rituals while pretending to be Catholic, bu, was sen, to
pnson for one year for having concealed his judaizing relatives from the authorities. He
dted while serving ou, his prison sentence. Many of the res, of his family, whom he
brought over from Spain as par, of the privileges of his office, were condemned as
judaizantes pertmaz. persistent Judaizers. In the auto de fe of December 8. 1596. the
governor's sister, Francisca Nunez de Carvajal, and four of her adult children were, in the
language of the Holy Office, "relaxed to the secular arm for burning." Francisca's daughter.
Mariana, was spared the stake in 1596 because she was deemed to have lost her senses.
Once she regained them, she, too. was condemned as a persistent Judaizer and died in the
auto de fe of March 25, 1601.
From all accounts, the Carvajal family was used by the Holy Office as a warning
to the crypto-Jewish community of New Spain. Even Stephen Greenleaf, known for his
balanced accounts on the Mexican Inquisition, 4 describes the persecution of the Carvajals
as a "Counter Reformation tact," concluding that "the Holy Office wanted to use the
Carvajals as an example to the Jewish community of Mexico." 5 Yet more was at issue here
For biographies of Luis de Carvajal, el Mozo, the Governor's nephew, see Martin A.
Cohen, The Martyr: The Story ofa Secret Jew and the Mexican Inquisition in the Sixteenth
C entury. (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America: 5733-1973; and Seymour
B. Liebman, The Enlightened: The Writings ofLuis de Carvajal. el Mozo (Miami, FL:
University of Miami Press, 1967). Discussions of the Carvajal persecutions may also be
found in Richard A. Greenleaf, The Mexican Inquisition ofthe Sixteenth Century
(Albuquerque: University ofNew Mexico Press, 1969). 169ff.
4
In particular see his Zumdrraga and the Mexican Inquisition (Washington. D.C.:
Academy of American Franciscan History, 1961), 22-23.
Greenleaf, Mexican Inquisition. 171; and Richard E. Greenleaf, Inquisiciony sociedad en
el Mexico colonial (Madrid: Ediciones Jose Porrua Turanzas, S.A., 1985), 3: "El Santo
Ollcio quiso utilizar a los Carvajal como ejemplo para la comunidad judia de Mexico."
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tl>an just a display of the naked power. The questions the inquisitors posed and the
rhetoric they used suggest something beyond flexing a coercive muscle in front of the
crypto-Jewish population of Colonial Mexico.
Not all members of the Carvajal family perished in the flames of Counter
Reformation intolerance. One of Francisea's sons, a Dominican monk, was able to
maintain his commitment to his order even after being convicted of concealing his heretic
relatives from the authorities. A son-in-law, Antonio Diaz de Caceres, was reconciled
after paying what biographer Martin A. Cohen considered an "unusually light" penalty: a
public abjure de vehememia, and a fine of a thousand Castilian ducats. Cohen explains
this unusual pardon in terms of political intrigue. "Because he was a man of esteem and
had served the king on several occasions," wrote Cohen. Antonio was spared the lash.4
The case of Francisea's granddaughter (and Antonio's daughter), Leonor de
Caceres, highlights other inquisitorial motivations than allowed for in a purely political or
instrumental analysis. A child of nine at the time of the first auto de fe, Leonor was
reconciled along with her father in 1 60 1 . Rather than a "Counter Reformation tact," her
trial retlects some ot the Catholic reforms of the sixteenth century, a time when Thomist
natural law arguments for education and evangelization were on the ascendant.
These retorms of the sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries have been largely
over-looked by English-speaking scholars. Even the term employed by academic
historians. Counter Reformation, perpetuates the old myth. Counter Reformation
underscores intolerance and obscures the radical reforms of the times (for which reason
historian John O'Malley offers the more neutral term. Early Modern Catholicism)."’ In
actuality, sixteenth-century Catholicism was engaged in both unification and universality.
6 Cohen, 264.
7
John W. O'Malley, Trent and All That (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 29.
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in both strengthening the powers of the Vatican and encouraging the educational
experiments of the Jesuits.- The sixteenth century may be written in terms of Spanish
imperialism - as Anthony Pagden puts it, "one sustained attempt to concentrate power in
the hands of a single man” - but it was also a time when Spanish Jesuits, such as Juan de
Mariana, made democratic arguments for the deposing of Protestant tyrants (prompting
one Suareztan scholar to liken the "Jesuit thinkers in the political climate of the Counter-
Reformation" as representing "the radical left wing of the time." 10 ).
That the Inquisition was involved in shoring up the centralized powers of the
monarch is accepted without question. For instance. Governor Carvajal's initial
denunciation is generally explained in terms of political rivalry. Yet political intrigue does
not in itself explain his subsequent reconciliation." In order to understand the more
merciful side of the Carvajal family's encounter with the Holy Office, we need only
consider the authority of the Dominicans in the Mexican Inquisition after 1571.
1 he writings of Vitoria, Suarez, and other members of the Salamanca School
constituted nothing less than a new, albeit fleeting, social order. 12 Rather than proposing a
"counter-reform" measure, i.e. one built on absolute authority, these Spanish Thoniists
8 See John W. O'Malley, The First Jesuits (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996).
Anthony Pagden, Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1990), 3.
1,1 ReU° Wilenius, The Social and Political Theory ofFrancisco Suarez (Helsinki: Societas
Philosophica Fennica, 1963), 80.
" Liebman, 30.
See Luciano Perena, La Escuela de Salamanca: proceso a la Conquista de America
(Salamanca: Ediciones de la Caja de Ahorros y M. de P. de Salamanca, 1986): Bernice
Hamilton, Political Thought in Sixteenth-Century Spain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963);
James Brown Scott, The Catholic Conception ofInternational Law
>
(Washington, DC:
Georgetown University Press, 1934); Brian Tierney, The Idea ofNatural Rights (Atlanta:
Scholars Press, 1995).
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argued for a form of authority predicated on a political power that remained with the
people. In as much as the Dominican-led Holy Office accepted these natural law
arguments against Lutheranism and Calvinism it accepted the premise of wha, Suarez
called, "innate moral powers.'" 3
The Protestant heresies were not the only contributing factors to the natural law
debate. According to the Dominican Vitoria, those communities, such as the Caribbean
tribes, whose civil society was found to be lacking were not, therefore, to be considered
inhuman and fit only for slavery, as Juan Gines de Sepulveda argued, but rather in need of
a better education. 1 ' Indeed, the moral power that Suarez identified as the basis of popular
sovereignty was a power predicated on spiritual health. The Inquisition, therefore, might
be seen as the vehicle for building a citizenry of faith, capable of participating in the
modem effort of consent. While the Jesuits and Dominicans may have differed in their
interpretations of Aquinas' understanding of nature and grace, with the Jesuits focusing
more on practice than the doctrine-minded Dominicans, both religious associations
operated from the position that all men were capable of being educated towards a
commonly-recognizable good.
An emerging interest in education can be seen with regards to the treatment of
heretics. Aquinas, tollowing St. Paul, had argued for the death of the heretic who refused
to accept the One True Faith "alter a first and second admonition." 1 ' Suarez continued
this doctrine but with a slightly different twist. The unrepentant sinner, wrote Suarez,
n
Francisco Suarez, De Legibus
,
1.2.5 in Selections from Three Works ofFrancisco
Suarez (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 944), 30-3 1
.
14
Pagden, 20.
" St. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa ofTheologiae,\\-\\
,
Qu. 11, 3, edited by Timothy
McDermott (Allen, Texas: Christian Classics, 1989.
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would rightly be subject to poena mortis bu, only post sufficient instruct,onem, e,
admonitionem EcCesiae. '• For the Jesuits, sufficient instructionem Involved
aecomodationist practices and "inspiring an inner relish for spiritual things."" For the
Dominicans, sufficient instruction involved arguments that honored the natural capacities
of the human mind.
This is not to argue that in the Catholic reforms of the sixteenth century
, all the
old methods were displaced. Despite the long-held understanding tha, fear displaced the
workings of the will, torture was still considered a respectable tool of instruction. The
drawings included in Seymour B. Liebman's account of the Carvajal persecutions show
Mariana being garroted as the flames lick the hem of her skirts; one of the illustrations in
Cohen's account identifies a half-naked woman on the rack as her sister, Isabel. Members
”1 the CarvaJ ai fami|y were tortured per the customs of the day - for one hour at a time,
using methods that did not spill blood - in order to exact a truth that only pain was
thought to release.
As Edward Peters has pointed out in his historical analysis of the use of torture,
these ordeals were regulated depending on the status of the defendant and the nature of
the crime. 18 According to medieval Spanish law the category of persons who could not be
tortured was fairly broad and included pregnant women, jurists, gentlemen, and children
under the age of fourteen. The explanation for the exclusion of the wise and the noble was
because of the honor of knowledge or of nobility that they have in themselves." 19 If
accused of heresy, however, no claims to an internal honor could shield the elite from
Suarez, Opera Omnia
. Editio Nova
,
XII, tr.l, cited in Wilenius, 69.
1
O'Malley, First Jesuits, 78.
18
Edward Peters, Torture (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1996).
n
Siete Partidas, VII, 30, 1-4: "por honra de ciencia o de nobleza que tienen en si."
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torture. Both nobleman and jurist were subject to the "torments" of the Holy Office, a
position that earned over into the modern era. Catholic reforms did not question the
usefulness of torture in extracting a hidden truth. What was questioned and developed, at
least in the 1 homist tradition, was the human capacity to learn.
Tension s within the Colonial Holy Qffj t - t -
By 1601, when Leonor was brought before the Mexican Inquisition on charges of
Judaizing, the ecclesiastical tribunal was a well-regulated, Dominican-led institution,
established in New Spain in 1571, the Holy Office replaced the haphazard, informal, and
olten abusive prosecutions performed by parish priests and religious orders with the
highly-regulated, centralized machinery developed in Castile. 20 According to Greenleaf,
"petitions Hooded into Spain asking for the establishment of a Holy Office. ... Clerical
abuses ol power were the most prevalent complaint." 21 An example of one such abuse
occurred in 1 562 when members ot the Franciscan order questioned the faith of a tribe of
Yucatecan Indians so vehemently that one hundred and Hlty died "either during or as a
diiect result ot the interrogations." In his detailed analysis ofthe role of nominalism in
the Mexican campaigns against idolatry, Francisco Cervantes reports that, "at least
thirteen committed suicide rather than face the inquisitors. Eighteen disappeared; and
many were crippled for life, their shoulder muscles irreparably torn, their hands paralysed
'like hooks.'"
21
J)
See Greenleaf, Mexican Inquisition.
' Greenleaf, Zumarraga, 49 n. 51.
“ Francisco Cervantes, The Devil in the New World: The Impact ofDiabolism in New
Spain (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1994), 16.
21
Cervantes, 16.
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1 he wrath of the Franciscans may seem quite out of
their founder. St. Francis of Assisi, yet it conforms
step with the gentle nature of
to a problem inherent in nominalist
pedagogy which, according to Cervantes, "tended to become more a matter of
acquiescence based on faith, authority and tradition than a matter of assent based on
reason and argument.- We can see the nominalist emphasis on authority over reason
with the Franciscan bishop of Michoacan. Vasco de Quiroga, whom Pagden describes as
"a fierce opponent of Las Casas and a consistent apologist for the encomienda.
"
Quiroga used utopian rhetoric to organize the Indians into village hospitals under the
watchful eye of fellow Franciscans. Charity was extended not to enhance the rational
capacities of their flock but because their wards were considered naturally irrational and
therefore in need of a greater authority.
With the arrival of the Dominicans, the campaign against heresies shifted.” The
Dominicans' concerns about the Indian's capacity to understand the depths of
Christianity curtailed inquisitorial activity with regard to that population. The difficulties
encountered in holding converted Toltecs or Chichimecs to the demands of the faith had
led to a policy in which the Indians remained, according to Lewis Hanke. "generally
speaking, untouched by the Inquisition on account of their rudeza e incapacidad.
Questions about the limited capacity of the Indian's mind, in other words, protected them
from the protection" of the Holy Office. Protestant sailors, two-timing Conquistadores,
;4
Cervantes, 16.
:s
Pagden, 25.
for information on the various crimes prosecuted by the Mexican Holy Office, see Jose
Tonbio Medina, Historia del Tribunal del Santo Oficio de la Inquisicion en Mexico
(Mexico, D.F.: Miguel Angel Porrua, 1998).
Louis Hanke, The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest ofAmerica (Boston:
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74
and philandering priests, on the other hand, were assumed to have a firm enough grip on
Christianity to risk having it "perfected" by the Holy Office. To those whose capacity to
reason was clear, the Holy Office offered "protection" from what Lewis Hanke referred to
as "the disintegrating spirit of heresy." 28
Although the Inquisition's reputation might suggest that nothing gave the officers
oi the Holy Office more pleasure than rounding up the apostates and putting them to the
Hame, excessive measures were not consistent with the policies of a reforming
Catholicism. Historian Henry Kamen has unearthed substantial evidence of ecclesiastical
protests against the procedures employed by the Holy Office in Spain. Although the
Jesuit Juan de Mariana was willing to concede that, when it came to heresy, desperate
times required desperate measures, he nonetheless pushed for kinder methods. Citing the
Royal Secretary Hernando del Pulgar, "a person of acute and elegant genius," Mariana
argued that the inquisitors "will not produce such good Christians with their fire as
[exemplary Christian bishops] did with water." 29 Mariana and other sixteenth-century
theologians argued tor a reconciliation process that conformed to a universal natural law. a
law that recognized all rational people as capable of recognizing the Christian God. There
was, however, one group of rational people whose capacity to recognize a Christian God
was uncertain: the Jews.
Whereas Jesuits and Dominicans from the Salamanca School might argue that the
indigenous people of the New World were proto-Christians, i.e. that the pre-Columbian
civilizations "had providentially been prepared for Christianity, "the Jews were
28
Hanke, 41
.
29 Kamen, 69.
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understood to have "hardened their hearts" against Christianity.* i, wasn't a case of being
predisposed to Christianity as Bartolome de Las Casas described the New World Indians,
but a case of antipathy after the fact. After arguing that "Jews are by no means to be
compelled to believe" since "belief is a matter of will, but fear considerably diminishes the
freedom of will" Vitoria, citing the thirteenth-century jurist Gratian, suggests something
almost smacking of nominalism or. at least, predestination: "Concerning the Jews, the
holy council laid down that no one should use force to compel belief, since God is
merciful to those He wishes, and hardens the heart of those He wishes.” 3 ' Had the
Gratian predestination argument held the upper hand, none of the Carvajals should have
been pardoned, yet we can see how the Dominican shifted the emphasis of Gratian’s
decree. "There is no doubt that this opinion," commented Vitoria, "... means that threats
and terror should not be used to bring the Jews to the faith." Rather than accept the
diagnosis of the father of canon law, i.e. that God had hardened the Jew's heart, Vitoria
focused on Christian methods of persuasion.
The Church in the New World was continuously struggling between presenting
itself as a merciful institution and as a forceful instrument of salvation. 32 Some of the
merciful ihetoric served a larger purpose. Natural law arguments in defense of the New
World inhabitants served a larger international purpose which Pagden describes in
instrumental terms - "the refutation of Lutheran and later Calvinist theories of
Sabine MacCormack, The Heart has its Reasons'; Predicaments of Missionary'
Christianity in Early Colonial Peru," Hispanic American Historical Review, 65 (1985),
443-466, 450; for information on the Salamanca School, see Luciano Perena, La Escuela
de Salamanca: Proceso a la Conquista de America (Salamanca: Ediciones de la Caja de
Ahorros M. de P. de Salamanca, 1986).
Francisco de Vitoria, Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999)
272.
’ See MacCormack, "The Heart has its Reasons."
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sovereignty" ’ - but which had constitutive effects. The arguments made against the
divine rights of kings informed a mentality that favored Ihe natural civic powers of the
people, a mentality that spilled over to the converse population. From an instrumental
perspective, the Holy Office couldn’t afford to condemn every converso, as that would
have lent credibility to the Lutheran error, justification of faith by grace alone. Extending
mercy by reincorporating the repentant back into the faith would support the catholic
quality ot the Roman Catholic Church. Yet there was more going on here than an
instrumental analysis would reveal, more than just posturing in front of Protestant rivals.
Before Luther even put a nail through his ninety-five theses, St. Thomas Aquinas had
been concerned about the scandal that force would bring to the faith.
In speaking about the "children of Jews and Other Unbelievers," Aquinas
counseled against converting a child "before he has the use of reason.," which Aquinas
defines elsewhere as the age ol puberty. Once he does, "he can be induced to accept the
faith not by force but by persuasion." 34 Reconciliation, on the other hand, might involve
force. Once the spirit was solid in its foundation, i.e. had professed the faith, it might be
subjected to more brutal medicine. However, because the conversion process was
understood by many missionaries to be a lengthy process, not one moment of epiphany, 36
deciding when a person had moved out of the fragile conversion process was a difficult
33
Pagden, 18.
4
Aquinas, Summa ofTheologiae II-II, Qu. 10, pt. 12.
Aquinas Summa ofTheologiae II-II, Qu. 1 1 and 12.
36
For a discussion of thirteenth century ideas on the conversion process, see Karl F.
Morrison, Understanding Conversion (Charlottesville, Va.: University of Virginia Press,
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matter. In order to use force, they must ascertain that the defendant had actually
"professed the faith."
It is notable, given the coneerns voiced for Indians’ capacity to reason, that a
similar argument was not made against the prosecution of women. In 1 596, many of
Leonor's female relatives perished in the fires of an auto de fe. They were not spared the
harshest penalty because of any natural incapacidad. a position consistent with early
modem Catholic social thought. Women were included in Suarez’s understanding of
majority when considering the observance of customary laws. Although some jurists
wished to exclude all women, as well as men under the age of twenty-five, from civil
society, Suarez stated in no uncertain terms that "I cannot find any basis in law or any
justification in reason lor the exclusion of the last two groups." 37 Women’s equal
accountability was also reflected in the provisions for torture under the Siete Partidas:
only pregnant women were exempted from torture "for the reason that the creature she
has in her belly does not merit anything bad." !K Being a woman, unlike being an Indian,
was, in itself, no excuse for committing crimes against the faith. Only if their reason were
impaired were they pardoned for their heresies, as was the case with Leonor's aunt,
Mariana, in 1596.
As lar as the Colonial Church was concerned, the Carvajal women had committed
serious crimes against the faith. They admitted to willfully taking the host in their mouths
while praying to Moses and spitting at statues of Christian saints. According to St.
Suarez, De Legibus, VII, ix, 14. See Wilenius, 47 and Scott, 227: "Suarez proclaims
himsell as feminist in a day when feminism was hardly a dream, let alone a hope."
Siete Partidas, VII, 30, 1 -4: "por razon de la criatura que tiene en el vientre, que no
merece mal."
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Thomas, these heresies were of a socially dangerous nature, analogous to counterfeiting.**
The proceedings against young Leonor, however, raised the issue of accountability on the
part ol a child. Although she had just reached the age of reason by the time of her trial, it
was her childhood per se .ha, was under examination. According to Aquinas, the child of a
heretic, "before he has the use of reason,'* is under the care of his parents "as a kind of
sp, ritual womb.’”” For this reason, Aquinas argued against forcing a child to convert by
taking her away Irom her inlidel parents as that was against natural law. Aquinas's
reasoning, however, was not always followed by the Spanish inquisition, a fact that
Thomists did not ignore. In his critique of the Holy Office, the Jesuit Mariana wrote that
what was most disturbing in Ihe eyes of the Christian population "was that children paid
for the crimes of their parents.” 41
(iiven the contemporary complaints against the Holy Office, it was not only
Leonor who was on trial but the institution itself. The Dominicans in charge of the
machinery ol ecclesiastical justice needed to distinguish themselves from the prior clerical
abuses in the New World and the method they chose was heavily influenced by natural
law jurisprudence. The Dominican auto de fe, therefore, needed rational actors who
willingly turned towards the C hurch, not through fear or coercion but as a matter of
natural reason. I he earlier auto ol 1 596 was not particularly successful in this regard as
most of Leonor's relatives chose death over reconciliation. With the trial of young Leonor,
the New World Holy Office was in a position to prove itself more Christian than its
predecessors and even, perhaps, its European parent.
w
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Family Life in th,» r-„vaia i n 01Kt.hniri
Martin Cohen characterizes the crypto-Jewish religious practices of Leonor's
extended family as "artfully improvised liturgy that bore only occasional resemblance to
that of traditional Judaism."*' The services were conducted in Latin, with only a
scattering of Hebrew words. Often quasi-Jewish practices became infused with Catholic
meaning, as in the case of taking the unleavened bread of the Passover service in much the
same way as a supplicant took the Eucharist. In the proceeding against Isabel de Carvajal.
an aunt ol l.eonor, one witness confessed that the family celebrated the Pascua del
Cordero, the Jewish Passover by eating unleavened tortillas.*’ As the assembled ale the
proscribed food, they spoke of the law of Moses "as the good law in which men would be
saved and that the Christians were being misled" (que los cristianos andaban errados).«
"Like their Catholic neighbors," writes Cohen, "the New Christian Judaizers trusted in
resurrection, retribution, and revelation; unlike their Jewish co-religionists, they had.no
idea of Oral Law, mitzvah, halakhah. chain of tradition, or other concepts integral to
rabbinic Judaism."*' Seymour Liebman describes Luis the Younger's religious zeal in tenns
ot the emotionalism of "early Christian martyrs and mystics. He did not hold to the
current, more prevalent attitude of Judaism which makes this faith a 'this world'
religion."46
42
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Although on unsure ground with respect to rabbinic Judaism, the judaizing
members of the Carvajal family were very certain as to the evils of Catholicism. Some of
their anti-Catholic efforts were private matters - spitting at saints or turning the
household statues to face the wall; praying to Moses while taking the Eucharist - and
some ol their efforts were more of a proselytizing nature. Isabel attempted to convert her
uncle, the Ciovernor, back to Judaism by asking him to read the hand of God in his current
political and economic troubles. "Because you are not observing the Law of Moses,
nothing is going your way. You have no material wealth in this world, and you will have
no salvation in the world to come. If you believe your religion and die in it, you will go
straight to hell." 47
Yet not all members ol the Carvajal family were dissatisfied with Catholicism and
it appears that those who were faithful were able to convince the inquisitors of the
veracity of their faith. Leonor’s father, Antonio, was ultimately reconciled to the faith and
her uncle, Caspar, was able to remain in the Dominican Order. These acts of
reconciliation suggest that the relative weight of Thomistic reasoning and of racially-based
bigotry expressed by the limpieza de sangre statutes48 had shifted somewhat by the
sixteenth century, at least in the minds of the Dominican inquisitors. According to
I homist natural law, faith was not a condition of blood but a matter of will. Limpieza
statutes, passed in the fifteenth century, suggested that the soul of a person with Jewish
ancestry could not be trusted to distinguish right from wrong, echoing the predestination
argument posited by Gratian. St. Thomas, on the other hand, had argued that all souls, as
47 Cohen, 82.
18
See R. N. Swanson, Religion and Devotion in Europe, c. 1215 - c. 1515 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 290-291.
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long as they are healthy, have a "natural knowledge"” of the good. Although limpieza
statutes were in effect during the Conquest, they were not regularly enforced, as
evidenced by the ease with which the Governor brought many of his erypto-jewish
relatives to Mexico.
It was not just xenophobic Old Christians who were concerned about the effects
of blood on one’s will. Both Leonor's parents saw her as predetermined by her blood, her
mala CaSta Her father exPressed his frustration at Leonor's attachment to her Judaizing
mother in terms of "bad blood." One story that cycled through the witnesses concerned a
day in which Antonio, ted up with the judaizing in his home, took Leonor out of the
house with the intent ot finding her another home. Confused as to why she was being
banished from her mother, the child began crying in the street. Antonio shouted, "Be quiet
you piece ot bad blood!" (Calla buena pieza de mala casta). Leonor continued crying and
her father, frustrated, retraced his steps. Calling his wife a "bad woman" (mala hembra),
he left Leonor at the door and went about his business. 50
Not only did Antonio and his wife, Catalina, argue incessantly about Leonor's
upbringing, but Catalina was censured by her own mother, Francisca. Leonor told the
inquisitors that her grandmother would often intervene on Leonor's behalf, scolding
Catalina for making the child fast so often and for beating her when she failed to recite her
prayers properly." Although the standard practice in crypto-Jewish Iberia had been to
keep the children ignorant of their Jewish heritage until they reached maturity, Catalina
Aquinas, Summa ofTheologiae I 84,3; cited in Anthony Kenny, Aquinas On Mind
(New York: Routledge, 1993), 91.
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insisted that her young daughter be included in the Mosaic rituals .» Leonor's aunts.
Mariana and Ana. told the inquisitors of a time when Leonor was a baby and Catalina
denied her the breast on a fas, day. They confirmed that Leonor was „ed to a chair and
whipped until she memorized the prayers correctly “ Leonor herself remembered a time
when her mother became so exasperated with her that she called her a "dog of bad blood"
(perm de mulct casta) and then forced into her mouth a burning hot egg with ground
pepper; punishment for saying the word, "Jesus." 54
The inquisitors were very interested in evidence of the child's punishment for her
C hnS"an lcanm8s - Was the child naturally drawn to Jesus in accordance with Thomistic
principles? Did this not show a being capable of perceiving on her own the merits of
t atholicism? When asked how she came to know this word, she told them she had learned
about Jesus from the maids in her mother's house and that most of her Christian education
came Irom her lather who had taught her the Ave Maria, the Credo, and other Christian
prayers.
Because Antonio was himself a prisoner of the Holy Office during the time of
Leonor's trial his teachings were regarded with suspicion. Were his lessons given in pure
faith'? Or was he merely trying to protect himself and his family from the probing of the
Holy Office? Determining whether a person was merely complying with the letter of the
law, a charge St. Paul leveled at the Jews, or with the law's spirit was an essential part of
the inquisitor's task. Torture was one method of fulfilling that task and Antonio
” Rene Levine Melammed, "Women in (Post- 1492) Spanish Crypto-Jewish Society,"
Judaism 41 (Spring 92), 156-168.
LC,Mariana's Testimony, June 15, 1600; and Ana's Testimony, October 7, 1600 and
January 2, 1601.
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withstood every son of torture available.” By surviving these grisly methods, Antonio
proved himself a good Christian. Cohen remarks that normally the inquisitors would have
"declared him an impenitent and condemned him to relaxation to the secular arm,” yet that
argument does not recognize some of the reforms of the sixteenth century. Had the
inquisitors been guided purely by limpieza reasoning then Cohen's argument would be
valid. Instead, we might understand Antonio's reconciliation as the application of natural
The Education ot Leonor de Caceres
It was not unusual for members of the household to testify against each other, as
much ol the activity in question took place within the home. In Leonor's divided
household, many of the few remaining relatives were hostile witnesses. Both of her aunts.
Manana and Ana, provided information to the inquisitors about Leonor’s Judaizing.
emphasizing the heretical aspect to her upbringing. The one member of Leonor's
household who might have provided favorable testimony, her father, was also a prisoner
ot the Holy Office. Nor was she benefited by her second informal Christian tutor, the
Black slave, Anna de los Reyes, who worked in the Catholic home where Leonor lived
after her mother's arrest in 1595.
Leonor initially refers to Anna as a "blessed Negress" (negra beata) for it was she
who warned Leonor that the Jewish prayers she had learned as a child would create
serious troubles for her. After learning the fifteen mysteries of the rosary, she mentioned
to Anna that she had learned different prayers in her mother's house. When she began to
recite them, the slave, who was fifty-six at the time of Leonor's trial, cried out, "Ay,
child! Don't tell me these things for hearing them makes my flesh tremble." Anna tells the
55 Cohen, 263-264.
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inquisitors that Leonor was confused by her response. "Isn't this good?” she asked
naively. Anna responded vehemently, "It is so bad that if the Holy Office knew about i,
they would bum you alive" (te quemarm en vivas llamas). Anna then reports that she
told Leonor to confess all of this to her mistress, Ximona Espindola. or to Ximona's
sister, dona Maria. Leonor responded that she was too ashamed to do so. "What is more
shaming," retorted Anna, "to be burned alive (en cuerpos vivos) or to tell the Sehoras
what you just told me?" 56
I his interchange was of great interest to the inquisitors as the threat of burning
reduced Leonor's credibility. In an earlier audience, Leonor had explained, "I believed the
law of Moses was the good law until I learned differently from Anna de los Reyes." 57 But
what did Anna teach her? That Jesus was the true Messiah or that she ought to comply
with the Holy Oltice if she wished to escape the fate of her relatives? In a subsequent
questioning, Leonor told the Inquisitor don Alonso de Peralta that she "separated herself'
from the law of Moses because of Anna's warning that "it wasn't good and that the Holy
Office would punish her" for what her mother had taught her. In one of his interminable
questions, Peralta focused on the child's capacity to discern the truth. "How is it that
having been taught with such care by your mother and others to the extent that you were
unable to recognize the lessens of your father in the law of our savior Jesus Christ, but
only followed the words and beliefs of your mother, and taking for good the law of
Moses and thinking to save yourself in it from the time of five years old until one year
after you were brought to the house of Agustin de Espindola, being the age of ten years
old, that you would have wanted to separate yourself from this belief without
v
’ LC, Testimony of Anna de los Reyes, Feb. 19, 1601.
LC, Audience of Leonor de Caceres, December 14, 1600.
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fundamentals, doctrine. nor any lessons in our evangelical law except for what Anna de
los Reyes told you?" 58
Perhaps the tone of the inquisitor made his purpose clear. In any event. Leonor
quickiy realized that she could not base her faith on the words of a Black slave whose
lessons, understandably, were tinged with coercion. "In reality, - responded Leonor
astutely, "the truth is that I had already separated from tha, belief by the time that dark
(nwrena) Anna de los Reyes talked to me. I was moved to do so because I had heard
some sermons in which they discussed and taught the law of our savior Jesus Christ." She
also referred to some lessons received from a dona Simona who told her that the law of
Jesus was the good law in which men would be saved and who taught her prayers in order
to save her soul. Leonor also stated that she would not follow her parents and relatives
because she saw the bad that had come to them (lo mal que avian parade). "For all of this
I was persuaded that the law of our redeemer and savior is the good law in which one is
saved, even someone in error as I had been."” The inquisitor was still suspicious. If she
had truly accepted Jesus why hadn't she come to the Holy Office and told them of her
heretical upbringing? Unfortunately, the page which holds her response is missing from
the folio.
The above interchange illustrates the dilemma faced by someone wishing for
reconciliation. Somehow, Leonor had to prove that she was not conforming through
compliance but through spiritual passion, that her faith was more than skin deep, that,
contrary to Gratian sentiments, it was not controlled by blood. Her father was able to
convince the inquisitors ot the purity ol his taith after undergoing severe torture,
fortunately, Leonor was able to convince her examiners by demonstrating her familiarity
sx
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With Christian doctrine. The inquisitors remarked on how well she delivered the Pater
Noster, Ave Maria, Credo, Salve Regina and the Ten Commandments.*1 Her recitation
indicated a spirit in touch with God's grace. Under Thomistic prineiples, her performance
suggested a nature capable of recognizing the goodness of God.
For her next round of questioning, Leonor had the counsel of a guardian. By this
time, the full extent of the accusations were known. The fiscal inquisitor, doctor Martos
de Bohorques, had filed ten counts against her: (1) that she enjoyed the privileges and
benefits of a Christian and yet followed the dead law of Moses; (2) that with persistent
will and error in understanding she continued waiting for the Mosaic messiah; (3) that she
mocked Jesus (por cosa de burla), confessed directly to God, only confessed to the
priests "in compliance" (por cumplimiento), did not believe that the blessed host
contained the real body of Christ, and participated in gatherings in which the Saints were
spat at, (4) that she observed all the rites and ceremonies of the dead law of Moses and
held Saturday as the holy day in which God rested after the work of creating the world;
(5) that in honor of the Jewish Sabbath, she put on clean shirts on Friday evenings and
clean sheets on the beds, and participated in rituals that honored the Jewish law and that
praised it for being the salvation of mankind; (6) that she celebrated Yom Kippur; (7) that
she followed Kosher dietary restrictions; (8) that she celebrated Passover; (9) that she
refused to confess these heresies to her confessors because she was ashamed, and. in
particular, that she did not contess the many times in which she took the sacrament in
torm only (por cumplimiento) and not as an expression of faith (por no ser sentida); and
(10) that she refused to speak the entire truth to the inquisitors although repeatedly
advised to do so, and kept quiet about the accomplices and guilty parties involved in
60
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maintaining the law of Moses. Leonor de Caceres. he concluded, was "a heretic, a
Judaizer, and an apostate and should be relaxed to the secular arm in order to publicly
castigate her and to make her punishment a lesson to others." 6 '
Although the fourteen-year-old may have trembled to hear this, her guardian,
himself an employee of the Holy Office, understood the pattern of the proceedings. The
l.rst sentencing was always extremely harsh, with the hope that the defendant would be
shocked into giving more information; not out of force or compliance, but because the
shock of the judgment, like the shock of seeing the instruments of torture, would dislodge
any internal obstacles to the truth. Whether fear honed in her reasoning powers or no, is
hard to conclude; yet having heard the counts, Leonor with the help of her guardian came
up with the most compelling argument in her favor. Pointing to Count 9, which included
allegations that she had adhered to Mosaic law throughout her childhood, she offered a
more rational explanation for her abandonment of Judaism. "If the law that her mother,
grandmother, and aunts had followed was good," she told the inquisitors, "God would
have favored them and liberated them from their trials of the flesh."62 Next she referred to
the wisdom she discovered in a book, the Flos Sanctorum" that she read many times and
that convinced her to convert to Christianity. For the first time, Leonor presented reason,
not fear, as the principal motivation in her turning towards Catholicism. 64
I wo days later, she was asked to explain herself again. She reminded the
inquisitors that she was a young girl, still at her mother's breast when she was
LC, Audience of Martos de Bohorques, February 21, 1601.
LC, Response to criminal charges. Chap. 9.
Mentioned as well in Cohen, 68: "The Saints Anthology" by Alfonso de Villegas and
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indoctrinated in the law of Moses. "It wasn't until the Holy Office began its
denouncements that I came to realize my errors. 1 didn't confess to my confessors out of
shame, tear, and ignorance." She strategically pointed out that when she believed in the
law of Moses she was at an age legally incapable of fraud (fue en edadque conform, a
derecho estar no enteramente capaz dc dolo). "Now that 1 am of more years and being
more advised, I am deeply repentant (muy de corazon arrepentida).
"
In a final coup de
grace, Leonor explained that she abandoned the Jewish faith by the "grace of God," by the
things" she had heard in sermons, from Christian people, and from books." 65 No longer
acting out ol tear, Leonor was positioning herself in line with Thomistic doctrine:
understanding God through reason and because her nature recognized Him as good.
On February 25, the inquisitors handed her the testimony of her remaining aunts,
Manana and Ana, as well as that of a family friend, Diego Diez Nieto. Since much of this
testimony concerned events in her childhood, Leonor was able to embellish on her
helpless position as a child among heretics.66 Both of the aunts referred to instances in
which Catalina beat her child. Leonor added to these recollections a quarrel between her
mother and grandmother in which francisca told Catalina not to be so harsh with the
child. It was alter hearing Ana's testimony that Leonor revealed that her mother had burnt
her mouth with a hot egg. If force reduced the validity of faith, then Leonor took great
pains to show how much force was involved in her Jewish upbringing. She countered the
testimony ol Diego Diaz Nieto, who remembered Catalina bragging about Leonor's
proficiency at memorizing the psalms, with a memory of a time when Catalina
complained to Francisca that "she was with much pain because Leonor did not take very
,,s
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well the prayers of the law of Moses and so she was forced to be severe.« For every
story that described her as the model Judaizer, Leonor had a counter-story that
emphasized her natural reluctance at accepting the Jewish faith.
Not everything Leonor said worked in her favor. She remembered a time when her
parents argued because Antonio wanted to join a procession without his sword. "He said
that he wouldn't carry a sword because, seeing as how his wife was a prisoner of the 1 loly
Ottice [under house arrest], he didn't want the Christians to think he wanted to kill them
because he was following the law of Moses like his wife." 68 If Leonor had wanted to
position her father as truly Christian, and therefore a reliable teacher of the One True
faith, then reporting that he worried what the neighbors thought was not helpful
evidence. His external actions, walking unarmed in a Christian procession, may have
conlormed to a Tridentine doctrine ofjustification of faith through works; yet, if that
procession were done in compliance and not in faith, then her father's participation in the
event was doubly damnable. On the other hand, describing the fights between her parents
countered a possible limpieza claim against her. If both parents had been crypto-Jews,
then her blood might be doubly damned.
The Reconciliation
The Vote came on March 7, 1601, the day of St. Thomas Aquinas, and it appears
the saint s reasoning guided the inquisitors' hands. Instead of the persistent Judaizer and
apostate whom Bohorques had described, the Inquisitors don Alonso de Peralta, Gutierre
Bernardo de C uivos, and Doctor don Juan de Cervantes spoke to a person capable of
complete conversion. I hey called tor Leonor to publicly recant her sins and to be
07 LC, Response to Diego's Testimony, February 25, 1601.
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reconciled to the faith. In order that "she may be instructed in the matters of our Catholic
faith," the inquisitors ordered her placed in a good Catholic home. Education, not
extermination, was the merciful response to the child's heresies. 69
In the final telling of Leonor's story, the inquisitors outlined the depth of Leonor's
misconduct. Although baptized and confirmed in the Catholic faith, she participated in
Mosaic rituals. Although regularly taking communion at mass, she fasted during Yom
Kippur. These actions, in and of themselves, were not as grave as her errors of
understanding, which, in turn, were not as serious as moments where she expressed her
will. Believing that she would be saved through the law of Moses was an error of
understanding. Waiting for the Jewish Messiah demonstrated an "obstinacy of will"
(pei tinacia de la voluntad). That she went to confession but did not confess to the
ongoing crimes in her house also pointed to an obstinate will. The fiscal inquisitor was
correct to recommend a death sentence as her crimes were not just superficial actions.
which would have made her participation on the level of compliance, but reached to the
depths ot her soul. Nonetheless, the inquisitors pardoned her errors because of her status
as a child. "From her mother's breasts, she has been indoctrinated in the law of Moses,
such that, had she not been denounced before the Holy Office, she would have proceeded
to follow this law in ignorance." 70 They agreed with Leonor’s final defense that at the time
ol these acts she was too young to be deceitful, she did not have la capaz de dolo. In
other words, the inquisitors found that Leonor's crimes against the faith had taken place
before she had free will. Aquinas had argued that "when children start to use their own
w LC, Voto, March 7, 1601.
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tree will [i.e. at puberty] they begin to belong to themselves, and then can be brought to
believe." 71 To hold children accountable before that time, was contrary to "natural justice."
In the sentence, the inquisitors began by considering their powers. They reminded
their audience that, under law, they had the right to excommunicate anyone found guilty
of heresy and apostasy. Yet theirs was not purely a coercive power but a merciful power:
[C jonsidering that God does not want the death of the sinner but her conversion with
pure heart and unfeigned faith to our sacred Catholicism, and that she has confessed in
entirety and not hidden anything from us, and wanting to use mercy with her, we should
advise and do advise reconciliation." In a corporatist performative utterance, the
inquisitors ”unite[d] her and reincorporate[d] her into the guild (gremio) and union of the
sacred mother Catholic church." 72
As part of the auto. Leonor read her Abjuration, the text of which is included in
her proceso. "I come before you, apostolic inquisitors, who are against heresy, depravity,
and apostasy in the City of Mexico and provinces of New Spain." Touching a crucifix,
she acknowledged that the Holy Office's legitimacy came directly from Christ. She
promised to comply with any future requests and penalties of the Holy Office. Should
she relapse into judaizing, she would expect to receive the full penalty of the law. Her
public movement towards the Church was choreographed as the willful and rational
recognition of the divinity of Christ. Leonor had proven to the multitude that the
Dominican-led Holy Office was indeed the proper instrument of God's mercy; a mercy
also extended to her father.
If the primary purpose of this trial had been to send a strong message to the
crypto-Jewish population of Mexico, then Leonor would have been sent to the stake. But
1
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she wasn't,
.nstead, the inqutsitors followed natural law reasoning. The crimes of her
childhood were absolved because she was. in Aquinas words' still a par, of her mother's
"spiritual womb." The public reconciliation of a young ctypto-Jew offered a way for the
Inquisition to remind the colonial society of its fierce pastoral concerns without falling
into the scandal of force. The language of this auto de fe expressed the place of reason and
nature within the process of conversion. If all the judaizing heretics were burnt at the
stake, then fear of immolation would be the driving force of conversion. For Leonor to
demonstrate, publicly and rationally, the blessings bestowed upon her by the almighty
Church spoke both to the Catholic imagination of the watching crowd - who understood
the effects of receiving the sacrament with a pure hear, - and to the powers of the Holy
Olttce which, through God's grace, was able to change a heretic into a member of the
corpus mysticum.
Authority, faith, and tradition made for powerful spectacles but alone they did
not create a solid polity. Working with human nature, on the other hand, not only made it
possible for Catholicism to present itself to the world as a better brand ofjustice but also
created a world in which people could become better through sufficient™ mstrudiomm
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CHAPTER V
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE
God pul the seminal reasons ofthings into the
elements and other created causes.
St. Augustine, De Trinitate 3, 7-‘)
I laving faithfully performed the rituals of the auto de fe, the substance of Leonor's
soul had changed. Having performed her penance and having fully confessed her sins, she
was purged of disease and could now trust her judgment in spiritual matters. Her
reconciliation had not altered her thoughts, rather it had corrected her way of thinking. A
better metaphor for this process might be realignment. Just as a chiropractor snaps the
spine back into place, so the inquisitors restored Leonor's soul to its natural harmony.
I ler nature was back on track. I ler tongue could now reliably taste sweetness.
Reconciliation was predicated on two assumptions: that the substance of the
sinner could be changed and that the agent ol that change was supernatural. Sanctifying
grace, the highest form of grace in Aquinas' spiritual hierarchy, was the necessary
ingredient that moved a penitent from sin to virtue. Reason and will could only go so far.
In order to be reconciled to the one true faith, the sinner's substance needed to accept an
infusion ol external grace. Confession prepared the substance of the self for the infusion
of grace. In the early modern era, the Inquisition authorized the infusion.
Seminal Reason in l hings
Confession, reconciliation, abjuration, all these mechanics of the corpus mysticum,
were predicated on an understanding of, in James Lully's words, the self as located in
substance. We can see what that looked like in the prototype of the confession,
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Augustine's work by the same title. According to the Bishop of Hippo, the very
substance of man, which included both the body and mind, was sprinkled with "seminal
reasons." In order to find the truth, one needed only look for these divine principles
already contained within. Education, then, entailed a process of recollection, of finding
something that we already knew. For Plato, this entailed the process of recollection
through reason as explained in Meno. For a Catholic, this entailed recollection through
confession.
Much of Augustine's Confessions is a critique of a purely philosophical
understanding of God. Referring to neo-Platonist texts. Augustine commented on the
absence of spiritual powers. "Those pages do not contain the face of this devotion, tears
of confession, your sacrifice, a troubled spirit (Ps. 50: 19), a contrite and humble spirit
the salvation of your people, the espoused city (Rev. 21: 5), the guarantee of your Holy
Spirit (2 Cor. 5: 5), the cup of our redemption." 1 Although Platonism freed Augustine
from the superstitious beliefs of the Manichees, it could not bring him to God. The ascent
to wisdom that Socrates articulated through reason could not bring one to pure happiness
without a complete surrender of the will. What Plato offered was a presumption of truth:
confession offered the real thing:
I would learn to discern and distinguish the difference between
presumption and confession, between those who see what the goal is but
not how to get there and those who see the way which leads to the home
of bliss, not merely as an end to be perceived but as a realm to live in. 2
Confession was not the end of the road but the beginning of a new way of being.
It is good to make confession to you. Lord, and to say 'Have mercy on me; heal my soul.
1
St. Augustine, Confessions translated by Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University
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lor I have sinned against yon' (Ps. 40:5; 91:2)."’ The confession revealed Augustine's role
in his unhappiness, his responsibility in the theft of a pear, his desire for sex without
family responsibilities. By holding himself accountable for his actions, he opened himself
up to the possibility of grace, a grace that was predicated on the submission of the will.
Augustine warns those who would avoid the humbling act of confession: ”1 was
not brought down to that hell of error where no one confesses to you (Ps. 6:60). because
people suppose that evil is something that you suffer rather than an act by humanity."*
1 his emphasis on agency is a crucial aspect of the confession. Indeed, the act of
confession assumes a world where action matters, where humans are both moved and
movers, a point emphasized by St. Thomas some one thousand years later: "Things
which are in the soul by their essence are known through experimental knowledge," wrote
St. Thomas, "in so far as through his acts man has experience of his inward principles."
5
Augustine s confession, then, is an action that brings him experience of his inward
principles. In wondering how to seek for God, he considers the powers of memory; how
the mind can remember and also forget and how that explains the sensation of recognizing
the truth. He reflects on his experience of being a student of philosophy, learning axioms.
Tor when I learnt them I did not believe what someone else was telling me, but within
myself I recognized them and assented to their truth." The experience of recognition
indicates that the truth is already known: "The answer must be that [these truths] were
already in the memory, but so remote and pushed into the background, as if in most secret
St. Augustine, Confessions
,
IV: iii, 54.
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caverns, that unless they were dug out by someone drawing attention to them, perhaps I
could not have thought of them.'" To remember, then, is to explore the caverns of the
mind, to recollect the truths. These truths, however, are of a slippery nature. "Yet if for
quite short periods of time I cease to recollect them, then again they sink below the
surface and slip away into remote recesses, so that they have to be thought out as if they
were quite new, drawn again from the same store." 8
Confession is a thinking out of what is buried deep beneath the surface; not just
truth but also happiness. "My question is whether the happy life is in the memory. For
we would not love it if we did not know what it is."
9
The question is rhetorical and
didactic. It is only by becoming a question to ourselves that we take up the head lamp and
go looking tor what we always knew. For happiness, according to Augustine, is known to
everyone, regardless of what language they speak. "If they could be asked if they want to
be happy, without hesitation [the Greeks and Romans] would answer with one voice that
they so wish." 1 " The realm of happiness, it turns out, transcends individuality and even
language. It is held in the subsoil beneath nations, universal to the human condition.
What makes the "secret caverns" metaphor so striking is the relationship it
presumes between soul and self. The soul contains more than the self at first recognizes.
There must be an active exploration of one's actions and mental capacities in order to
reveal something that was always known. Yet this activity of introspection cannot be
completed by the self alone, a point central to Catholic doctrine. According to Aquinas,
man cannot be restored by himself, but requires the light of grace to be poured upon him
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anew, as if the soul were infused into a dead body for its resurrection."" The language
suggests an ethereal infusion. Medievals generally understood this phenomenon in terms
of corporeal imagery as illustrated by the following mosaic (Figure 5.1) of the creation of
Adam found in the Chureh of San Marco in Venice. As the details of the mosaic suggest,
the soul
.s constituted, not by the actual organs of senses (which would require matter),
but by the powers associated with those organs, i.e. sense-perception. The "homunculos
shown in the Venitian mosaic has all the senses of the human being without the business
of matter. To be intused with grace, therefore, was to have one's senses animated.
Figure 5.1 Mosaic of the creation of Adam 1
:
These divine infusions not only animated the senses they also animated the intellect and
the will, which Aquinas referred to as "the interior senses." Because these interior senses
could always be "bent to one side or another," humans needed the continuous perfection
" Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, Qu. 109, art. 7, in Introduction to St. Thomas
Aquinas
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of grace. "We must come at length to this," Aquinas concluded, "man's free choice is
moved by an extrinsic principle, which is above the human mind, namely God."”That
extrinsic principle is grace, which is delivered to us through the intellect. "The intelligible
Sun, Who is God. shines within us. Hence the natural light bestowed upon the soul is
God's illumination, whereby we are illumined to see what pertains to natural
knowledge..." 1 * The mind was not a mere container of ideas but a substance seeded with
natural knowledge which only required the infusion of supernatural light to follow its
natural course. What is important to our discussion is that intelligence and grace might
have supernatural sources, but the experience of those powers was natural.
Goini’ Underground
Both Augustine and Aquinas describe a highly personal and interior activity. As
discussed in chapter two, that activity only made sense if it conformed with the public
authority, i.e. the Church. Yet the Church wasn't the only representative of a greater
corporate whole. The emphasis on nature, on natural law, gave the land itself a higher
authority. Spanish subjects, displeased with the policies of their kings, often went
underground in order to find the seminal truths hidden in the subsoil of the peninsula. Just
as the confessor explored the caverns of her soul for the seminal truth so the Spaniard
might explore the caverns of his country for natural justice. In both cases, the process
assumed that nature was superior to the confused justifications of the will. In the early
modem era, the Jesuit emphasis on reading the divine word in the concrete, or imagining
15
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the incorporeal in the corporeal,
dissidents.
may have added to the legitimacy of these speluncar
I he cave has held a privileged place in Spanish national identity ever since the
beginning of the Reconquista. When the Moors flooded the Iberian peninsula across the
Straits of Gibraltar in the early part of the eighth-century, the Christian Visigothie kings,
unorganized, ineffectual, and, as legend has it, purely interested in protecting their own
skins, did little to stop the Islamie interlopers. Only the truly devout, such as Pelayo and
Ins supporters, relused to give up the fight, faking refuge in the eaves of the Cantabrian
mountains, they transformed themselves into a Catholic fighting machine that, bit by bit.
reclaimed the peninsula.
Sixteenth-century prophets, who saw Spain at risk from yet another infidel
penetration, this time from across the Northern Atlantic, continued the Pelayo tradition,
.lust as the Visigothie kings were dissolute, self-centered, and ineffectual so, claimed the
street prophets of Madrid, was Philip II. Miguel de Piedrola Beamonte, known as the
Soldier-Prophet, took to the streets of Madrid in 1578. declaring himself to be in the
tradition ol the biblical piophcts Llijah and Malachi. 1 Like other millennial prophets
around Europe, Piedrola, believed that the apocalypse would begin in 1588. In
preparation for this fearsome event, Piedrola and his supporters prepared a cave, called
Lspelunva. from whence the laithlul would launch a second Reconquista. "Like a later-day
Pelayo," writes historian Richard L. Kagan, Piedrola promised to "organize Spain's
deliverance from her enemies and establish a new Spain....""’
See Richard L. Kagan, Lucrecia's Dreams (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1990), 95 - 101.
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Some twenty years after Piedrola's trial, another street prophet, the twenty-one
year old Lucrecia de Leon, was brought before the Inquisition on charges of having
seditious dreams that "attempted to dishonor the King Our Majesty and his ministers and
government. As in the case ol Piedrola and Pelayo, Lucrecia's dreams included a cave as
part ol the rebuilt of Spain. In the envisioned apocalypse, Spain's spiritual capital.
Toledo, would be spared destruction - "thanks to the timely intervention of an army
concealed in caves along the Tagus River"" - while the corrupt political capital, Madrid,
would fall. Although her dreams were clearly of a seditious nature, it appears that
Thomist principles informed some of the inquisitors' judgment. Kagan's research suggests
that some of the inquisitors understood Lucrecia's dreams as conforming to a higher law.
She had, after all, dreamt ol the loss of the Armada six months prior to the event. Rather
than punish her lor plotting the downfall of the king, she received the Inquisition's most
lenient sentence, abjuration de levi. 19
Along with nationalist myths and natural law, the very architecture of Spanish
worship reinforced the understanding of nature as infused with divine wisdom. Besides
the hundreds of shrines and hermitages tucked into remote corners of Spain, many a
formal church or monastery was built around the entrance of a particular cave,
incorporating the natural crypt into the architectural plan of the nave. The Ermita de la
Virgen de la Pena, shown below (Figure 5.2), carved out of a hillside just outside of
Burgos, illustrates the fused relationship between the natural and supernatural worlds. A
twelfth-century Romanesque virgin is venerated inside the earth's surface. The simple
exterior, a product ot man's artifice, merely signals the more sacred and more natural site.
17
Kagan, 146.
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Figure 5.2 Ermita de la Virgen de la Pena2H
I he supremacy ol natural law over human law, substance over reasons,
constrained the activities ot Catholic elites. The promulgator of a mere human law knew
that he might be overruled on the grounds of a more natural perspective as evidenced by
Philip II s concerns about Piedrola and Lucrecia. Philip II was able to maintain his
legitimacy over the street-prophets through the ministrations of the Holy Office, the
agents ot divine law. Protestant kings, who both were denied and, in turn, denigrated the
imprimaturs ot divine law, were in even greater jeopardy of having their authority
overruled. What is interesting for purposes of our discussion is how the Protestant
monarchs tound other means tor establishing their legitimacy and how the understanding
of the location of the self shifted in that effort.
11
Ermita de la Virgen de la Pena. Source of photograph: Millan Bravo Lozano, A Practical
Guide for Pilgrims: The Road to Santiago (Sahagun: Centro Estudios Camino Santiago,
1996), 114.
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The Political Oath
It wasn't just Spanish kings who feared that a more natural form ofjustice might
usurp their power. Protestant kings, wandering off the tether from Rome, were
increasingly made aware by their unhappy Catholic subjects that natural law permitted
regicide should the king fail to preserve society’s health. The response from the British
monarchs was both brutal and inquisitorial. Henry VIII created an inquisitorial
commission under Cromwell to eradicate any papists, the most famous eradication being
that ol Sir Ihomas More. 21 What is somewhat confusing during this period is that the
Enghsh carried out the very policies that made them revile Spain all the while claiming to
be different. Like the various characters in Robert Bolt's dramatization of the trial of Sir
I homas More, A Man for All Seasons, one was supposed to take comfort in the fact that
"After all, we're not in Spain."
With the ascent ot Elizabeth, both Catholics and Puritans became suspect
members of the state. Members ol Parliament, many of whom were Puritans, were hauled
before the High Commission and asked to take the oath. Objections to this invasive
policy came in the form of comparisons to Spain. After reading the articles to which
Puritans were sworn to answer under the oath ex officio, the Lord Treasurer, Lord William
Cecil Burghley, complained to the Archbishop of Canterbury that "I think the Inquisitors
of Spain use not so many questions to comprehend and to trap their preyes." 22 Robert
Beale, a member of the House of Commons, complained that the oath ex officio was a
product of the "Inquisition in Spayne and Rome." 23
1
See Leonard W. Levy, "The Oath Ex Officio" in Origins ofthe Fifth Amendment: the
Right Against Self-incrimination (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1968), 43-82.
22
Cited in Levy, 136.
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Robert Beale exemplifies the Puritan response to the business of taking the oath.
In condemning the High Commission, he claimed that princes and magistrates had no
authority to make laws "in things indifferent, to bynde men to the observation thereof." 24
The part of men being bound was the conscience and to prescribe rules for men's
consciences in things indifferent was, in Beale's words, "a doctrine fit for Antichriste."
(That Beale himself was, in Levy's words, an "arch-persecutor of Catholics" suggests that
the only consciences which merited this protection were Puritanical in operation.)
According to Beale, "the Lord hath reserved the conscience of man to be settled by him
self in his good time, as he thinketh meete in these indifferent thinges." 25
Beale's rhetoric illustrates an individualism that may have conformed to Luther but
not to the public authority and corporate sensibility operating in the South. The rhetoric
of the conscience presumed a mind capable of figuring things out on its own. Inquisitors,
operating in the South, continued to subscribe to the Thomist idea that the mind might
not always be in touch with seminal truths. "Heretics," wrote Aquinas, "intend to assent
to C hrist but make a wrong choice of what to assent to, choosing what their own mind
proposes rather than what C hrist handed down."' As far as the inquisitors were
concerned, the cure to a mind out of whack was confession and reconciliation. As far as
the Puritans were concerned, the mind was "settled by God him self." A mind out of
whack, however, did not merit any cure as that was a mind without conscience, i.e.
Catholic.
24
Levy, Origins ofthe Fifth, 140.
Levy, Origins ofthe Fifth , 141
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St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-II, Qu. 1 1, trans. by Timothy McDermott
(Allen, Texas: Christian Classics 1989), 342.
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Hie Defense of the ( ntholic I’.iith
With the ascent ofJames I to the British throne, an e 1 tort was made to reconcile
some ol the political diiferences between the Catholic South and the British Isles. In
1604, James 1 signed a treaty with Philip III agreeing to "a peace that may last forever"
and an end to hostilities. 27 It proclaimed a liberty of commerce and the opening up of
trade routes throughout Europe. Rather than adopt the belligerent and costly polices of
his zealous lather, Philip 111 took a more pragmatic approach. However, Philip Ill's
Paciflst policies did not go over well in Spain. The national conscience was, according to
Luciano Perena, agitated." Spain, it turned out, was equally repulsed by the idea of being
like England. The intelligentsia invoked "the defense of the faith and the imperial tradition
ol Spain." After being petitioned by the Madrid Cortes, the Pope published his
disapproval of the treaty. 28
By 1605, James had his own reasons for giving up on a policy of peace. After the
Gunpowder Plot was exposed, in which a group of "Catholic gentlemen" were discovered
to be plotting to blow up both James and his Parliament, James responded with both
foice and, more importantly to our discussion, the demand for another oath. 29 The oath to
be administered to recusants, promulgated in 1606, required each Catholic to "truly and
sincerely acknowledge, profess, testify and declare in my conscience" that James was the
Luciano Perena, "Posicion oficial de Espana," in Francisco Suarez: De Juramento
FidelHatis, Estudio Preliminar Concienciay Politica. (Madrid: Consejo Superior de
Investigaciones Cientifieas, 1979), 61
.
8
Pereno, "Posicion oficial," 68.
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Johann P. Sommerville, "Introduction" in King James VI and I, Political Writings
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), xvi.
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"lawful and rightful king of this realm... »» If that were the extent of the oath, then there
was no violation of natural and divine laws as political obedience to a non-Catholic king
was encouraged by Church doctrine. "Since the law of grace does not abrogate human law
based on reason," wrote Aquinas, "being believers does not as such exempt us from the
already established authority of disbelievers." 1 ' However, the extent of the oath went
beyond obedience to a temporal power to abjuring the powers of the Church. The third
part of the oath contained, from a Catholic's point of view, an impossible speech act:
I do further swear that I do from my heart abhor, detest and abjure, as
impious and heretical, this damnable doctrine and position, that princes
which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope may be deposed or
murdered by their subjects or any other whatsoever: and I do believe and
in my conscience am resolved that neither the Pope nor any person
whatsoever hath power to absolve me ol this oath or any part thereof 32
By placing the individual conscience above the Pope, the British king had gone too
The Spanish intelligentsia s agitation was confirmed: one could not broker bargains
with heretics. Even the temporal lure of trade routes could not sweeten the bitter reality
that the king was asking his Catholic subjects to abjure the apostolic powers of Rome.
1 he response, however, was not military (as the Irish and Scottish Catholics might have
wished) but deeply philosophical. The first response was from Cardinal Bellarmine who
wrote, in 1607, to the English Catholic priest, George Blackwell, remonstrating with him
tor having taken the oath. Bellarmine's published letter may have been publicly burned
but its ideas, as well as two Papal breves
,
prompted James to write and anonymously
James I, "An Act for the bettered discovering and repressing Popish Recusants. To be
administered to any recusant under penalty ofpraemunire." in Bernice Hamilton, Political
Thought in Sixteenth Century Spain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 67-68.
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publish, in 1 608, Triplici nodo, triplex cuneus. Or An Apologiefor the Oath ofAllegiance.
Claiming that desperate times required desperate measures, James hoped to extricate
himself from the Vatican threat on his political authority.
In arguing tor the oath before Parliament, James had declared that "according to
natural law it is exceedingly just that the subjects may be obligated by strong ties of love
for their king and their country to take an oath, even though no positive law may exist
that requires this and orders it with such coercive penalties." 33 In Triplici nodo, James
makes it clear that all he wanted was his people's "naturall allegiance," and to detennine
who had "retained in their hearts the print of their naturall duetie to their Soueraigne," and
who was "being carried away with the like fanatiacall zeale that the Powder-Traitors."
Those people who refused to take the oath on the grounds of "diuersitie of religion" were
just making a pretext for all kinde of treasons, and rebellions against their Soueraigne." 34
Unfortunately, James goes on, the Pope has been bedevilled by the fanatics’
pretense:
I he diuel could not have deuised a more malicious trick for interrupting
this so calme and clement a course, then fell out by the sending hither, and
publishing A Breue ol the Popes, countermanding all them of his
profession to take this Oath; Thereby sowing new seeds of ielousie
betweene me and my Popish subiects. 35
From a Thomist perspective, the oath was a grave disruption of the hierarchy of
laws. By placing natural law above divine law, James had committed a grievous
intellectual error and was now an even more likely candidate for regicide. Although
Aquinas had argued that the believer still owed the disbelieving sovereign her obedience,
Tuciano Perena, "Proceso de politizacion Europea," in Francisco Suarez: De Juramento
Fidelitatis, Concienciay Politico, 19.
’ 4 James I and VI, "Triplici Nodo,"in Political Writings, 86.
35
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he added that the Church "does have God's authority to take authority away from
disbelievers, since their disbelief makes them unworthy to exercise power over
belieVerS ' Sometimes
' Aquinas, the Church exercises its authority, "sometimes
not." In this case, the Thomists were ready to exercise.
In 1 6 1 3. Suarez presented the official Catholic position against James'ss oath.
This heavily-documented treatise. Difensio Fidei Catholicae, et Apostolicae, adversus
Anglicunae Seclae Errores, laid out the limits on temporal powers and the supremacy of
divine and natural law over the actions of kings. When it comes to civil authority, wrote
Suarez, the king's power is supreme. Indeed, argued Suarez, it is in the Church's best
interest to have no direct dealings with temporal matters as that would "have proved to be
a grave impediment.”" To be in charge of both spiritual and temporal matters was. in
Suarezs mind, excessive, practically speaking, for human strength and human capacity,
and is entirely contrary to reason and custom." 38
Having laid out the the limits of the Church with respect to temporal matters.
Suarez then demonstrated how the Pope's jurisdiction differs from that of the king; a
retelling ol the two swords doctrine with an emphasis on the indirect powers of the
Church. One ol those indirect powers was the power to coerce. Using much the same
scriptural authority as was used to legitimate the Holy Office (the power to bind and
loose, for instance), Suarez reasoned that the Church's coercive power even extends to
heads ot state lor they, too, might easily scorn the spiritual penalties and do grave injury
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae
,
II-II, Qu. 10, McDermott translation, 341.
Suarez, A Defense ofthe C atholic and Apostolic Faith 3.5.18 in Selections from Three
Works ofFrancisco Suarez
,
trans. by Gwladys L. Williams, Ammi Brown, and John
Waldron, with certain revisions by Henry Davis, S.J. (Buffalo, NY: William S. Hein,
1995), 679.
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.0 themselves and to others."" Indeed, the Pope was obligated use his coereive powers
against kings, "even to the pom, of deposing them from their thrones, if there be a valid
cause."
40
Fmally, Suarez honed in on the gravity of the injury caused by James's oath.
Referring to the abjuration contained in the third par, of the oath. Suarez wrote that "three
points must be taken into consideration:
first, the doctrine [of regicide] itself; secondly, the right by which this
[portion ot the] oath is exacted of the subjects; and thirdly the extent of
the inconsistency between the words in question and those in which the
king promises to show that the said oath exacts nothing beyond due civil
obedience. 41
Rather than completely dismiss regicide as against natural law, as James
desperately wished, Suarez delineated with judicial precision the grounds upon which a
tyrant may be lawfully slain. Kings may be killed on grounds of vengeance and just
punishment for having injured their subjects' spiritual health and for having threatened the
health of society. Citing Gregory, Suarez insisted that "Princely transgressions are graver
than those of other persons, and therefore, the punishments inflicted upon princes by
their pastors should be likewise more grave."42 Yet even if those reasons should disappear
the C hurch has the obligation to save Christian subjects from a heretical ruler, "on the
ground that they are in evident peril of moral destruction." The source of this statement is
39
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the above-referenced passage from Aquinas on the rights of believers under disbelieving
sovereigns. 43
Having set forth the conditions for tyrannicide, Suarez then proceeded to examine
the king's right in exacting this particular oath. "By what authority," asked Suarez, "does
the King of England compel his subjects to swear that a certain proposition is heretical.
when it has not been so condemned by the Catholic Church?'” In a rare show of sarcasm,
Suarez mused that "it is very strange that [James] should repeatedly disparage the papal
power of defining points of faith, while he himself dares to arrogate this same power to
himself; for though he does not make this claim in so many words, he professes to do so
by his acts. By asking his Catholic subjects to "abjure, as impious and heretical" the
doctrine of regicide, James had crossed over the line from a legitimate temporal concern to
dabbling in the affairs of the spirit. Indeed, wrote Suarez, "the king is guilty of further
inconsistency, inasmuch as he boasts in another passage of this Apologie for the Oath of
Allegiance that he himself does not, after the fashion of the Popes, fabricate new articles
ot faith."
4
' Suarez concluded that,
the profession ot the said oath of allegiance ... is tantamount to an
acknowledgement ot the royal authority and power both to condemn propositions
as heretical at the king's own pleasure, and to lay down rules for the faithful, on
his own authority, as to what they should believe as proper to the faith and what
they should denounce as heretical. 47
For the king to exact such an oath "is an abuse and usurpation of spiritual power." For
43
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those who take the oath, it "is virtually equivalent to a profession of false faith.” 48 James’s
error was two-fold: he had encroached upon the spiritual sphere of the Church all the
while claiming to follow natural law.
Since Henry VIII, the English monarchs were struggling for legitimacy. Without
the imprimaturs of the Pope, Henry, Elizabeth, and now James, needed to find some
anchor outside their word to enhance their authority, to put them in right relationship not
just with their subjects but with God. Conscience was a useful term in this matter, as it
bypassed the powers of the Pope. Yet the private nature of conscience brought its own
dilemma. An oath might make public and certain what was essentially private and
uncertain. However, in forcing his subjects to call heretical what the Roman Catholic
Church had found to be just - i.e. the right of Catholic subjects to inflict a just
punishment on their tyrannical ruler - King James was looking less like a political actor
and more like a dispenser of divine law. Although James's apologies suggest that he
wanted nothing more than to conform to natural law and leave the Church out of his
affairs, the terms of the oath revealed him as a shadow pope, dispensing divine decrees
Suarez's treatise explained why Spain was nothing like England. The Thomist
hierarchy was still in place in Spanish politics, the Church still held an indirect power
over the king. What does not come up in this particular defense, but was a central feature
of the Suarez treatise De Legibus, was the communal source of the king's authority, the
facultas moralis. That power, discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2, like the power of
mercy after a confession, had a transformative effect on the substance of the community,
changing it from an aggregate of individuals to a unified whole, the perfect society. When
England distanced itself from the Roman Catholic Church, it also distanced itself from
48
Ibid, 724.
that possibility.
Ihomas Hobbes and the Kingdom of Darkness
There were good reasons for Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) to characterize the
Catholic Church as the "Kingdom of Darkness" and to describe its religion as "Spiritual
Darkness from Misinterpretation of Scripture.'"’ Political authority was a thing of the
past in Hobbes's England as Protestants and Catholics, Presbyters and Puritans reduced
civil society to what Hobbes called a state of nature. Inasmuch as Suarez and other
Thomists undermined the authority of the monarch, they had contributed, in Hobbes's
mind, to the civil wars, the dissolution of the monarchy, and the condition of chaos. It is
perhaps lor this reason that Hobbes, more than his predecessors, widened the focus of his
attack on the Church beyond the sacramental powers, such as the dispensing of
indulgences and the remission of sins, to include Aristotle's metaphysics and the "school
men’s" philosophy.
Early on in the Leviathan
,
Hobbes speaks of "evil men, under pretext that God
can do anything," who cultivate "superstitious fear of spirits." Not only do the schools
turn a blind eye to this predatory behavior, they actually are involved in "nourishing such
doctrine." Some of the nourishment Hobbes complains of is the Thomist understanding
that nature is infused by grace. Hobbes is troubled that the schools teach "that good
thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man by God, and evil thoughts by the Devil, or that
good thoughts are poured (infused) into a man by God, and evil ones by the Devil. 50 In his
discussion on speech, he declares that "the words in-poured virtue
,
in-blown virtue, are
Aq Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan, edited by E. Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing,
1994), 4.44.
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as absurd and senseless and insignificant as a round quadrangle Reason, tor Hobbes, is
"but reckoning { that is. adding and subtracting) of the consequences of general names
agreed upon for the marking and signifying of our thoughts; I say marking then, when we
reckon by ourselves, and signifying, when we demonstrate or approve our reckonings to
other men."' ; Reason is the activity that goes on inside the mind. Any talk of the
substance of the mind and its capacity to be infused with virtue is pure foolishness.
As far as Hobbes is concerned, metaphysics is but a pretense to disguise the
devious intentions of the Roman Catholic Church "to maintain its possession of spiritual
sovereignty." There are other methods by which the "Kingdom of Darkness” maintains its
diabolic hold over the state: the infallibility of the Pope, the subjection of bishops, the
sacrament of marriage, the canonization of saints and the declaring of martyrs,
transubstantiation, penance, absolution, purgatory, indulgences, external works,
demonology, and exorcism. Not surprisingly, auricular confession is included in the list of
pretenses for it is by hearing confessions of the political elite that the priests "obtain, for
the assurance of their power, better intelligence of the designs of princes and great
persons in the civil state." 53
Confession and transubstantiation, however, are dangerous only in terms of
snaring men’s confidences. An even more dangerous activity is the philosophical basis for
these diabolical activities, the sciences of Aristotle which legitimize the above-listed
errors. All "the frivolous distinctions, barbarous terms, and obscure language of the
Schoolmen," writes Hobbes, "serve them to keep these errors from being detected, and to
51
Hobbes, Leviathan, 1.4.21.
52
Hobbes, Leviathan, 1.5.2.
53
Hobbes, Leviathan
,
4.47.6.
113
make men mistake the ignisfatum of vain philosophy for the light of the Gospel." What
Hobbes does not mention is that the ignisfatuus of scholasticism was dangerous not
because it obscured scripture, as he suggests, but because it questioned the absolute
powers of the monarch.
As far as Hobbes is concerned, the only thing we can know for sure is geometry;
"the only science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind." 55 The other
sciences are, in Hobbes's mind "erroneous doctrine" as they are based on "the authority of
books" and not from meditation. "For words are wise men's counters, they do but reckon
by them; but they are the money of fools, that value them by the authority of an
Aristotle, a C icero, or a Thomas, or any other doctor whatsoever, if but a man. 56 Hobbes
is clearly operating in the nominalist tradition: "the name of God is used, not to make us
conceive him (tor he is Incomprehensible, and his greatness and power are inconceivable),
but that we may honour him." Hobbes's contribution to the medieval nominalist
position is a rendering ot the corpus mysticum now with a royal head.
We cannot be certain about St. Dominic's authority at the auto de fe but we can be
certain about a king for which "there is nothing on earth to be compared with him." 58
Order will be restored, insists Hobbes, as long as we stick to geometry and stay away
trom metaphysics; as long as England has a king who is made "so as not to be afraid." 59 A
strong sovereign is essential because "a commonwealth without sovereign power is but a
54
Hobbes, Leviathan, 4.47.16.
55
Hobbes, Leviathan, 1.4.12.
56
Hobbes, Leviathan, 1 .4.13.
” Hobbes, Leviathan, 1 .3. 12.
58 Hobbes, Leviathan, 2.28.27.
59
Ibid.
114
word wilhoul substance, and cannot stand."*" As Bruno Latour observed, Hobbes
"wanted to rediscover Catholic unity while at the same time closing off any access to
divine transcendence." 61
Figure 5.3 Frontispiece from 1651 edition of Hobbes's Leviathan
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61 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1993), 19.
The Leviathan provided a Protestant solution to the problem of how to maintain
order and hierarchy without being subject to the Roman Catholic Church. As Latour's
observation suggests, Hobbes "rediscovered" the ordered and corporate society eulogized
by Vitoria. Latour's term, "divine transcendence" recognizes the political liability when
"factions may invoke a higher Entity - Nature or God - which the Sovereign does not
fully control.’
"
62
Yet that is only part of the picture. Although the head of the frontispiece
commands a royal officeholder, the other members of the body politic are
indistinguishable from one another. 63 The fungible, discrete quality of the various
individuals suggest a social equality that conforms to our modem sense of democracy.
However, the absence of hierarchy denies the possibility of Suarez'sfacultas moralis. In
Hobbes's world not only was an individual denied the possibility of an infusion of grace,
which might challenge the king's authority, but the aggregate of individuals could never be
transformed into a corporate and hierarchical whole, which could also challenge the king's
authority. Rather, in Hobbes's world, the person of the king became the Actor through
which society, the authors, might wield a bit of social power.
Interestingly enough, the Actor himself might speak in supernatural terms but
everyone would know that it was just king talk. "For if a man pretend to me that God
hath spoken to him supernaturally and immediately, and I make doubt of it, I cannot
easily perceive what argument he can produce to oblige me to believe it." 64 Hobbes would
only accept a supernatural argument from the lips of his sovereign "who may oblige me to
62
Latour, Never Been Modern, 1 8.
63 An observation I owe to Nicholas Xenos.
64 Hobbes, Leviathan, 3.32.5.
116
obedience (so as not by act or word to declare I believe him not), but not to think any
otherwise than my reason persuades me). 65
John Locke and the Business of Tolerant
By the time of John Loeke (1632 - 1704), the absolutist response was slowly
being replaced by one constituted purely by conscience. Absolutism smacked of a
coercive hierarchy and coercion was, in Locke's mind, contrary to Christianity. Written in
1685, the same year that Charles unleashed "the most severe persecution of the
Restoration period,"'' the Letter Concerning Toleration begins with an "appeal to the
Consciences ol those that persecute, torment, destroy, and kill other Men upon pretense
ol Religion, whether they do it out of Friendship and Kindness towards them, or no." 67
This is not Christianity, argued Locke, it is a dissimilitude practiced by the powerful.
For if it be out of a Principle of Charity, as they pretend, and Love to
Men's Souls, that they deprive them of their estates, maim them with
corporal Punishments, starve and torment them in noisom Prisons, and in
the end even take away their Lives; I say if all this be done meerly to make
Men Christians, and procure their Salvation, Why then do they suffer
\\ boredom, fraud, malice, and such like enormities, which (according to
the Apostle) manifestly rellish of Heathenish Corruption, to predominate
so much and abound amongst their Flocks and People?68
As with Hobbes, Locke insinuates that these coercive methods are serving other
ends than those of Christianity. Otherwise, wrote Locke, "they would tread in the Steps,
and follow the perfect Example of that Prince of Peace, who sent out his Soldiers to the
* Ibid
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subduing of nations, and gathering them into his Church, not armed with the Sword, or
other Instruments of Force, but prepared with the Gospel of Peace, and with the
Exemplary Holiness of their Conversation.
-The true Christian, according to Locke was
not violent but tolerant. "The Toleration of those that differ from others in Matters of
Religion," argued Locke, "is so agreeable to the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and to the genuine
Reason ol Mankind, that it seems monstrous for men to be so blind, as not to perceive
the Necessity and Advantage of it, in so clear a Light."™ (All this rhetoric about tolerance,
however, should not be contused with an open admissions policy. Locke did not extend
tolerance to Roman Catholics nor to any extreme charismatic sects, neither of which were
reasonable; nor to atheists, who were not Christian. Only religions that were "agreeable to
the Gospel of Jesus Christ and the Genuine Reason of Mankind" should be tolerated.)
Not all Protestant proponents of religious tolerance took such an absolute stand
against the use ol force. Jonas Proast, of All Souls' College, challenged Locke's
anonymously-published epistle in a tract published in Oxford in 1690 on the grounds that
coercion may be necessary at times. "Proast did not advocate such severities as torture or
extermination," writes J. W.Gough in his introduction to the Letter on Toleration
, "but.
citing Proast, moderate force, and such penalties as would ordinarily suffice 'to prevail
with men of common discretion, and not desperately perverse and obstinate to weigh
matters of religion carefully and impartially'." 71 A modicum of force, a bit of penalty
might aid in the process of weighing and considering. In Proast's mind, those who required
69
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were not worth the effort of
torture, the "desperately perverse and obstinant,"
persuasion.
Neither Proast nor Locke worried about the corrupting influences of an intimate
enemy. Indeed, when J. W. Gough suggests in his introduction that Proast "might have
added reason for using force
... not so much to convert heretics as to prevent them
corrupting other people" he has missed what James Tully has called the Protestant
"radical departure." According to Tully, "Locke located the identity of the person or self
solely in consciousness, and not in substance, thus making his most radical departure
from his predecessors.” 72 The predecessors Tully refers to were intellectual predecessors,
most of whom were Thomists from whom Locke drew heavily in articulating his
understanding ot property rights. 7 ' In terms of national predecessors, however. Locke
was not radically departing but logically extending what Luther had begun: the
righteousness of the sovereign, inviolate self.
Independence and autonomy figure strongly in Locke's depiction of the true
Christian. The reasonable man in search of God,
voluntarily joins the society in which he believes he has found that
Profession and Worship which is truly acceptable to God. The hopes
ot Salvation, as it was the only cause of his entrance into that
Communion, so it can be the only reason of his stay there. For if
afterwards he discover any thing either erroneous in the Doctrine, or
incongruous in the Worship of that Society to which he has join'd
himself. Why should it not be as free for him to go out as it was to
enter?
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In Locke's atomistic society, where reasonable Christians shopped around for the best
tonn of worship, there was no need for a spiritual authority. Indeed, according to Locke,
the Care ... of every man's Soul belongs unto himself, and is to be left unto himself." 75
I he reasonable person would listen to his conscience. That alone would lead him to
proper judgment.
Not everyone, however, was capable of participating in the business ofjudgment.
Some members of the congregation needed a bit of retooling before they could reliably
decide that the worship before them was "not erroneous." In An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding
,
Locke points to irrational factors, such as habit, laziness, and the
prevailing passions which regularly impede the thought process. 76 In truly reprobate
cases, i.e. the indigent poor, Locke recommended that the state should intervene and
create better habits, through incarceration in a workhouse. In cases where the irrational
person was not a burden to society, i.e., a member of the landed gentry. Providence alone
would eventually condemn him. Providence, therefore, played an extremely important
role in Locke's society. Indeed, it was the coercive force. Without the fear of divine
punishment, there would be little reason for the citizen to postpone immediate
gratification and choose a more civic-minded good.
Both the Anglican executions and the liberal workhouse provided the masses with
an education in what to avoid. Both were efforts at reforming the population from
7S
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,
35.
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John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, IV.20.12. Edited by A.S.
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heretical habits: whether religious dissent or laziness. The liberals would tolerate anyone
as long as their minds were reasonable; the Anglicans could tolerate anyone as long as
they swore to obey the Church of England. Yet neither of these Protestant alternatives
tolerated the possibility of supernatural grace. As a result, there was little possibility that
a man could actually be transformed. For Locke, the people who made those claims were
too enthusiastic" and hence were unreasonable.
The Suspension of Gravity
The Catholic expectation of substantial change went beyond the transformation of
a multitude of actors into a cohesive and organic body. Just as the thin wafer was reliably
transformed into the body of Christ, so the mere mortal might be transformed into
something beyond the confines of reason and even the laws of nature. The installation of
supernatural grace was understood to have transformative powers beyond mere human
comprehension. With the infusion of supernatural grace, anything was possible. It might
change a dullard into a don and lift a praying body five palms off the floor as was the case
with Francisco Suarez. According to the records, Padre Suarez was infused repeatedly,
causing substantial changes to both his mind and body.
It is not unusual, in a Jesuit narration, to hear about the young Francisco's
encounter with the Virgin. Carlos Norena, for instance, includes in his brief biography of
"Suarez and the Jesuits" the supernatural event that changed the novice's life. Soon after
the young Francisco was admitted to the University of Salamanca "the Virgin Mary
miraculously expanded the novice's IQ." 78 Norena is drawing on the standard biographies
7S
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ot Suarez, one by R. De Scorraille and a later one by Joseph Fichter ” and is merely
reporting an accepted belief within the Society of Jesus." All reports do indicate that
within a matter of twenty-four hours. Suarez was transformed from a simpleton to a
scholar. Initially rejected as a mediocre candidate, Suarez went from needing a tutor for
every subject to asking questions beyond the ken of his professors. Whether or not the
Virgin actually passed through his intellect is hardly material to our discussion. What
matters is that, within a Thomist framework, intellectual brilliance may find its source
outside ot that individual's efforts, a point that will be considered in more detail in the
following chapter with regard to prophesy.
A posthumous effort to have Suarez canonized, written in 1617, reveals other
supernatural occurrences.- The eye-witness, Brother Geronimo, describes two occasions
in which he observed "demonstrations of sanctity." In the first instance, Suarez is
described as operating outside of social convention; in the second, he is following laws
that defy nature. Having been sent to deliver a timely message, Geronimo tried, without
success, to rouse the Padre by calling him by name and making noise with his feet. When
Suarez did not appear at his door, the porter entered the antechamber. Still no response.
Now somewhat annoyed, he stepped into the inner chamber where, he writes.
7
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clearly saw Padre Francisco Xuarez who was kneeling with his handstsed and his head uncovered in front of the Crucifix. And seeing that hedidn t move I approached him and pulled on the sleeve of his robe threet,mes w“'m maki"8 any movement nor responding to me but
remained as li stunned (como pasmado).*2
The second time Brother Geronimo is called to deliver a message to Suarez, the
Padre again fads to respond. This time, however, upon entering the antechamber, he
notices a light of great (grandissima) clarity coming from behind the curtain that separates
the two chambers. He lifts the curtain and enters the room where a brilliant light is coming
trom the vicinity of the Crucifix. Geronimo is immediately blinded by the light which he
describes "as when the rays of the sun reverberate through a window pane." 83 Although
he reports that he was unable to stay in the room without being blinded by the light.
Geronmo catches a glimpse of Father Suarez, once again kneeling before the crucifix,
hands lilted and his head uncovered. This time, however, the Padre's body is some five
palms in height above the floor. Geromino quickly exits the chamber but before he is able
to leave he reports that he felt "outside of myself (estuve como,fuera de mi) and stunned
(de pasmado) and that his hair stood up straight like the bristles on a brush (como las
cerdas de una escobiUa)T After quarter of an hour, Suarez emerges from his chamber,
and Geronimo is able to relay the message that brought him there in the first place. When
asked why he hadn't called, Geronimo lets the Father know that he had tried to call him
and had even entered the chamber. "When the Father heard that I had gone inside his
room, he took me by the arm, placed his hands on me, and with eyes filled with tears
s
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asked me not to say anything about it."“ Geronimo asks for permission to talk with his
Confessor, a permission that "was freely given since the Father was [the Confessor's]
Confessor."
Having made his statement in proper fashion complete with signature, the
amanuensis notes that "the Brother also said that the gleam from the Crucifix filled the
face and the breast of the said Father Francisco Xuarez." It appears that Geronimo was
also questioned as to the accuracy of the height of Suarez’s levitation for the good Brother
adds a statement that the stand upon which the Crucifix rested was a bit more than five
palms and thus he was able to measure the distance between Suarez and the floor. The
final note describes the ivory Crucifix, which was given to Suarez by Condesa de Santa
Gadea, and which lay in a box of black wood on black velvet. A copy of this Breve was
sent to Pope Paul V who, evidently, declined to interpret the brilliance and levitation as
worthy of sainthood. Although surely a disappointment to the Society of Jesus, Suarez's
standing as a respectable scholar was certainly served by keeping Brother Geronimo’s
testimony under wraps. Given the intellectual climate of the time, Suarez's reputation as a
jurist, acknowledged by Grotius and Spinoza, might have been reduced had the world
known of his tendency to levitate.
Aquinas would tell us that Suarez was in the process of moving from sin to virtue,
a process that entailed more than reason, more than we can fully understand. Hobbes
would tell us that the porter's vision was "absurd and senseless and insignificant." Had his
monarch told him this wondrous tale, he would have believed it purely as a matter of
obedience, even as his reason told him otherwise. By the time of Locke, the supernatural
experience was no longer part of the discussion. A king contemplating supernatural
powers was not competent for the job as that was a king who had subjected his kingdom
85
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to another's authority, thereby "dethron[ing] himself and pulping] himself in a slate of
war."
86
In losing the supernatural, however, English-speakers also lost the possibilities for
substantial change. Because reason cannot grasp the powers of grace, grace itself was
banished trom public life, the sphere of reason. Nor could it take up residence in one's
inner conscience, as that was only an autonomous space in as much as it was reasonable.
The historical and political reasons for this shift in perception have been touched on in
this chapter, i.e. the need to forestall challenges based on a higher authority than the king,
for Hobbes, or than reason, for Locke. Yet the irony in this shift should not go unnoticed,
for in so doing, Protestant politics assumed that the citizen was capable of substantial
change: of being changed from a creature of substance to a creature of consciousness.
K<
’ See John Locke, The Two Treatises ofGovernment, edited by Peter Laslett (Cambridge:
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CHAPTER VI
THE SIN OF SELF-ASSURANCE 1
Persons who I see are timid, who I think proceed with
great circumspection so that things can be done here
below in conformity with reason
are oppressive to me and make me cry to God and His
saints, who undertook things that now frighten us.
St. Teresa
2
I rom Hobbes' perspective, Thomist supernatural jurisprudence merely dressed
up what was essentially a coercive and political ritual. In theory, the hierarchy of laws
might allow for supernatural challenges. In practice, the Spanish theocracy was clearly in
control. This instrumental perspective would assume that many of the self-proclaimed
prophets were tound to be misguided or fake. The only surprise might be the length of
time it took the inquisitors to reach that obvious conclusion. Yet that perspective ignores
the times when the Inquisition did not favor the formal and old over the mysterious and
new. While at times the Holy Office reduced the credibility of political challenges, as
Richard Kagan reported with Lucrecia de Leon,’ at other times, a rigorous dialogue with
the inquisitors had the effect of authorizing a new method of piety as was the case with
Santa Theresa and other visionaries. Ignacio de Loyola's success with his interrogators,
for instance, reminds us that not all visions were reduced to private delirium nor were all
1
This chapter was shaped in large part through discussions with Andrew W. Keitt. His
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visionaries deemed to be pawns of the devil. By subjecting his “way of proceeding" to
the rigors ot the Holy Office, his spiritual experience was transformed into an accepted
social practice.
A Foucaultian perspective, on the other hand, would question the very notion of
success with regard to the Inquisition. From this perspective, Loyola’s Exercises were
but the final product of a mind made compliant through the manipulation of discourse.
According to Foucault, the constituent unit of the inquisitorial proceeding, the confession,
reduced any dissent, indeed any agency on the part of the accused. “[TJhe development
ol confessional techniques, the declining importance of accusatory procedures in criminal
justice... the setting up of tribunals of Inquisition,” writes Foucault, “all this helped to
give confession a central role in the order ot civil and religious powers.”4 In presenting his
emotional brand ol piety before the Holy Office, Loyola was not reforming the
institution but reinforcing its powers. Not an agent of change, Loyola was merely, in
Foucault’s words, “a confessing animal.” Whereas the Thomists would have seen
confession as way of perfecting both a person’s natural inclinations and the hierarchical
relationships within the C’hurch, Foucault understood confession as a process of creating
tasty subjects for “the bloodiest of powers,” their delectability enhanced by their very
discreteness. “The truthful confession was inscribed at the heart of the procedures of
individualization by power,” 5 concludes Foucault, not, as the Church conceived it, by
social relations.
Foucault's dark picture of confession does convey the terror of losing one's tender
self to a blood-thirsty power, yet the quality of his terror, psychological rather than
sociological, individual rather than communal, positions his anxiety outside of the
1
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I homist reality. Within that older framework, confession was not a violation of the self
but a salve to one s isolation. It anticipated penance, which, in turn, promised
reincorporation. Patricia Hampl writes that “[p]enance was not a psychological but a
sociological act.”' Penance was “intended to heal a different wound - not the break
between a person and individual consciousness (or a personal past), but that between the
self and the community, which for the ancient, was the core of existence.”7 The medicine
ol penance was only oliered on the heels of a confession. The powerful answer to the
tender need to belong may have included dominance but it also promised forgiveness.
Discipline, on the other hand, indicates that the members of society have assumed
the responsibility of governing themselves according to established rules of civility. A
civil society hardly needs an Inquisition, as each member is understood to be interrogating
herself. This atomistic society never got very far in Spain. It was contrary to the order
championed by Vitoria, at cross purposes with the affective practices of the Jesuits, and
irreconcilable with the confessional practices demanded by the Inquisition. John Bossy
lies the Spanish singular lack of interest in prosecuting witches to the presence of the
I
Holy Office which, in his words, maintained “a traditional practice of penance, a
traditional notion of sin, and innocence of disciplina. ”8 Bossy’s insight does highlight the
tension between traditional Christianity, and its emphasis on charity, with the reformed
notion of discipline, and its emphasis on civility. At the core of the traditional notion of
sin was the sin of thinking alone.
"Patricia Hampl, ’’Penance,” in Signatures ofGrace: Catholic Writers on the Sacraments,
edited by Thomas Grady and Paul Huston (New York: Plume, 2000), 47.
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Clearly the inquisitors were operating within a different framework than an
instrumental or even the more nuanced disciplinary framework allows for. If the
Inquisition was purely a coercive and political institution, then it could not recognize a
power greater than itself, i.e. the prophetic; if the Inquisition was a purely disciplinary
institution it would, by definition, need to enhance individualism as it invoked its
authority. The inquisitors, however, were never worried about destroying the
autonomous self. On the contrary, they saw their mission as saving the lost soul from the
inner loneliness' that Max Weber associated with the coming of Protestantism.
Reintegration occurred when the suspect stopped thinking by her own lights and started
filtering her experience through the more perfect corporate mind. When considered within
Bossy’s distinction between traditional governance and what he calls, discipline, the cases
and handbooks considered in this chapter fall clearly within the former.
Juduinu the Prophet
I hat the Spanish tradition continued to recognize the possibility of levitation and
supernatural visitations should not suggest any political naivete on its part. Hobbes’s
concern about protecting the power of the monarch from so-called higher sources was not
unknown to his Catholic counterparts. Unlike England, however, which greatly reduced
the powers of the ecclesiastical courts in favor of the state-controlled High Commission,
political theorists in Spain were still engaged in a jurisprudence that stretched beyond
human law. The street prophets might have their dreams and visions, but their
ecclesiastical interrogators had St. Thomas.
Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit ofCapitalism (London: Routledge,
1992 ), 104 .
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Prophesy, according to St. Thomas, is an intellectual experience with a
supernatural component. Although prophesy, by definition, is beyond the capacity of
natural reason, it is not beyond the intelligibility of the human mind. In his explanation of
the process of receiving divine messages, Aquinas begins with a summary of Aristotelian
metaphysics, of how the mind makes abstractions of real things perceived by the senses:
In knowing something we first take in its representation,
and by means ot that we judge it. Now a thing is represented first to our
senses, then to our imagination, and finally to our receptive mind, which
takes in the thing's specie as abstracted by the light of our agent mind from
our images. Our imagination contains forms taken in from things we have
sensed, and transformations of these induced either by some bodily agency
(as when we dream or hallucinate), or by our own reason putting together
images to help us understand something. But our power to judge comes
from the light of our mind. 10
A prophetic mind operates in much the same way as a normal mind, but with two
important differences. On the one hand, prophecy “instills a more powerful mental light
to judge by," and on the other hand “it provides the mind with further species
representing things."" In other words, both the judgment of the mind and the perception
of the senses are enhanced. The latter resembles the effect of having a teacher in as much
as a "teacher represents things to his students with words." The former, on the other
hand, is beyond the human classroom as the teacher “cannot like God instill light from
within." According to Aquinas, “this instilling of light is the most important element in
prophecy since knowledge is only complete when we can judge." 12
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With,,, the Thomist framework, prophesy is an intellectual experience, distinct
front a person's will. In explaining why prophets need not he virtuous people, Aquinas
wmes that "[pjrophesy is in the mind, and the mind’s activity precedes the will's which
charity perfects." That prophesy affects the intellect and not the will is not surprising
given the I homist preference for the intellect. Thai this allows for persons of
questionable virtue to receive God's wisdom, however. seems somewhat counter-intuitive
unless we consider the larger corporate picture. Aquinas reminds us that prophesy
“serves the church, and is not for the benefit of the individual prophet's unity of heart.”
I oo much attention on the individual person is too little attention on the system as a
whole. For that reason, “prophesy doesn't depend on any roots of moral goodness.” By
the same token, however, "morally wicked feelings and behavior can hinder it; for a
prophet s mind must be lilted up wholly to the contemplation of spiritual things, and
strong passions and inordinate concern tor external things are obstacles to that.” 13
Charismatic graces, of which prophesy is the highest, do not require any “previous
disposition” on the part of the receiver and, explains Stanley Burgess, "may even be given
to a person in the state of mortal sin.” 14
I he relationship between virtue and prophesy may seem counter-intuitive to a
modern understanding that would put grace as a reward for good behavior. 15 From a
Catholic perspective, however, grace is not part of a contractual arrangement with God
but a benefit to the entire community. Given the organic nature of society, what one was
blessed to know, the others would soon find out.
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1 he diminished importance of the individual recipient extended to that person's
gender. “1 he grace ot prophesy enlightens the mind," writes Aquinas, “and knows no
ditterence ot male or female. Yet, gender did restrict a person's ability to directly teach
the wisdom received through a prophetic experience. Aquinas worried that women should
not publicly teach what God had revealed to them; “partly lest men's sexual desires be
aroused; and partly since women generally haven't the fullness of wisdom required for
public instruction.' 17 Rather, she should inform her confessor of the visions and let him
take on the matter ot public instruction. From a feminist perspective, this arrangement
grates on the modern nerves. However, it is important to realize that both male and female
prophets were only valid as instruments of the Church, not as interpreters of God. Men
who took their visions directly to the street, who did not include their confessors in the
spiritual equation, did not fare well with the Holy Office.
Given the mysterious nature of prophesy, it is not unusual that Aquinas speaks in
metaphors, particularly the metaphor of light. “Bodily eyes need physical light to reveal
things," writes Aquinas, “and the mind needs a mental light." When the human mind is
called upon to think of things beyond human reason, “it needs light beyond the natural
light ot reason to make it knowable." This supernatural light, however, is only a passing
light. “Clearly," concludes Aquinas, “prophecy is not a lasting disposition in the
prophet." Rather, “prophetic knowledge relies on God’s light in which all things are
visible, human and divine, bodily and spiritual, so that anything whatever can be the
subject of prophetic revelation." 18 Prophesy held the potential of bringing in a new,
unforeseen order contrary to the demands of convention.
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-I1. Qu. 175, Art. 2, 450.
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Aquinas recognized that prophecy was not only of uncertain origin; it was also of
uncertain reception. Sometimes God conveys divine knowledge through “a mysterious
inner stimulus which human minds undergo without even knowing it. ” The problem with
this method of divine revelation is clear: “[W]hen prophets know something by hidden
stimulus they sometimes can't decide whether they thought of it on their own or because
God prompted them.
'
/;
The infusion of grace, then, was neither predicated on individual
merit nor was the recipient necessarily cognizant of the spiritual gift.
Cases involving suspected false prophesy demanded a Thomist response if for no
other reason than that Thomism provided a method to think beyond mere human
understanding. Unlike nominalism, which denied the possibility of thinking about
supernatural matters, Thomism assumed that divine law, even prophesy, might be
intelligible, if not through reason, then through analogy. Thomism gave the inquisitor
permission to engage with the divine. The intellect, writes the twentieth century Thomist
scholar, Jacques Maritain, "consults and listens to the inner melody that the vibrating
strings of abiding tendencies make present in the subject.”20 What reason couldn't resolve,
the inner tuning fork would recognize.
The Calificador
Not all employees of the Holy Office were capable of reading correctly the
supernatural signs. Only a subset of the Holy Office, the calificadores, were prepared to
take up the challenge. Trained in both scholasticism and mysticism, the calificador was
I
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able to weigh and consider the matter before him in the light of the writings of St. Thomas
and the experience of other acknowledged mystics. Unfortunately, not all inquisitors
submitted their findings for califlcacion, a point which contemporary critics found deeply
troubling. One anonymous sixteenth century author used a utopian fable, Regimiento de
Pnncipes, to couch his critique. A theologian, argues the protagonist, would not be as
hostile to conversos as were the less informed canonists. A theologian would recognize
that all were equal be I ore God and that those weak or tender in their faith needed more
love and not, as the canonists seemed to think, to have their property confiscated and
their children orphaned." The concerns portrayed in the Regimiento de Prmcipes were
icilected in instructional manuals distributed among the various inquisitorial tribunals
across the Spanish territories. For instance, a 1561 handbook for employees of the Holy
Oilice declared in the opening paragraph that inquisitors must consult “theologians, men
of letters and conscience, in order to determine the quality of the various propositions
under review.” 22
Determining the quality of the various propositions entailed determining both the
source of the message as well as the motive of the messenger. This latter endeavor was
made more complicated by the piety of the times. Misleading from a political point of
view, as it implies the absence of reform, the term Counter-Reformation does describe a
particular aesthetic: an aesthetic that revered the sensual. By the time of Charles V,
Christ's suffering on the cross and Mary's emotional pain were not badly proportioned
statues but exquisitely painted explorations of human suffering. In the sixteenth century,
1
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the nun was no longer married to a Gothic abstraction but the magnificent and deeply
human Ecce Homo (Figure 6.1) depicted in sensual detail by Tiziano Vecelli (Titian). As
wives ot Christ, nuns were expected to experience certain feelings in the presence of their
divine husband. Intimate tete-a-tetes with the Savior and unexplainable inner movements
conformed to this passionate aesthetic. The rhetoric of St. Thomas, with its metaphors
of supernatural infusions and inner movements, also sustained a certain level of sacred
sensuality. In any event, highly expressive piety was not understood as a loss of the
senses, as Locke would later describe religious enthusiasm, but as a body whose internal
strings were being loudly plucked. In other words, a body worth paying attention to.
Figure 6.1 Tiziano Vecelli, Ecce Homo23
Although Aquinas may have formally separated the prophet from the prophecy,
Spanish society conjoined the two, attributing the power of the vision to the person who
saw it. Just as a withered finger was understood to hold the virtue of a deceased saint, so
the visionary held the vision within her blood and bones. This reconfiguration of the
person through supernatural powers allowed for a social fluidity that organic laws and
21
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limpieza de sangre statutes failed to contain. When it came to prophets, the strict social
hierarchy was surprisingly permeable; particularly for women." A peasant or converse,
blessed with divine visions, might find a place in the court in Madrid, or Toledo; or at
least develop an impressive list of patrons. Priests and patrons, convinced of the worth of
the passionate message, promoted their new-found instrument as reliable. The Holy
Ollice, theretore, was not just engaged in prosecuting false prophets but in curtailing the
propagation of highly fertile sects.
Negotiating their way through these spiritual and sociological land mines was no
simple matter. The calificadores had to maintain the authority of the Church doctors
while recognizing the mysterious nature of it all. The evidence from the various cases was
filtered through long Latin passages lifted from both Thomists, such as Aquinas and
Suarez, and nominalists, such as Bonaventura and Jean Gerson. Gerson (1363-1429)
plays a particularly important role in the prosecution of alumbrados. His two treatises
De distinctione verarum visinum a falsis and De probatione spirituum
,
influential in the
canonization ot St. Bridget, provided a useful guide to determining the authenticity of
supernatural visitations. Although Gerson's nominalist argument provided, in Fernando
Cervantes' words, “the Franciscan rejection of Aristotelian naturalism" and “the growing
acceptance of a moral system based on the Decalogue,'’2 ' one of the cases considered in
this chapter which cites Gerson, the case of Sister Geronima, suggests a Thomist
sympathy, i.e. the recognition of an innate wisdom within society. When scholarly
handbooks and mystical narratives failed them, the calificadores parsed the prophesy
24
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according to the corporate grammar of traditional Christianity. Did the vision under
question reintorce. what John Bossy calls the
-social miracle,” the enhancement of social
relations within a Christian, and hence, charitable community?1* Or did it disturb the
natural order of things?
I he smallest unit of that natural ordering was the vertical relationship between the
visionary and her confessor. Many of the female defendants were members of religious
orders and the calificadores were most interested in the nun's daily practices: in how well
she submitted to her superior’s demands, and how often she went to confession. In 1624,
a well-regarded nun in Lima was held to be an ilusa, i.e. one suffering from illusions
instead ol illuminations, because she "did not share her visions with her confessor, nor
with any other persons who might have guided her.” The reason Sister Geronima de San
I rancisco gave lor not revealing her revelations was that she did not want to appear
special or gifted by God. “In truth,” writes the califtcador, her reluctance to confess
made her suspiciously like an ilusa del demonio. By responding to her inner shame,
the calificador determined that she was being controlled by the devil.
Not only did Sister Geronima err by not fully disclosing her spiritual experience to
her confessor, but the content ol her visions was destructive of social bonds. In reviewing
her journal, the calificador found numerous instances where the visions undennined the
teachings of the hierarchical Church. She claimed that she was told by Christ himself that
he died from love and not from pain, that the Jews did not kill him and that he rose to
heaven on the same day he died. Even more troubling, however, was the statement that
26
Bossy, 57-75.
7 AHN Inq. Leg. 4467/1 1, “Calificaciones a unos papeles que dicen son de Hieronima de
San. Francisco vicaria del convento de las descal^as desta ciudad de los Reyes fecha por
los padres.” (Lima: 1 May 1624), 4 verso.
137
Jesus told her to “find her own remedy” (Busca lu Remedio)? The calificador Andres
Hernandez heavily censured the nun for suggesting that God would ever counsel one to
find their own remedy, concluding that a "good spirit” would not “give the penitent
occasion to divert, with disdain, from her primary confessor, as given by the words, “find
your own remedy." Those words, according to Hernandez, are “distant, self-assured, and
disdainful (despegada y desenbuella despreciadora), and “the authorship of such spirit
may well be the devil .”29
That “self-assured” sits in that unholy trinity illustrates the corporate nature of
Spanish society. Renaissance humanism may have revived an interest in man's faculties
but, in Catholic Spain, that interest rarely extended to his autonomy. As Hernandez's
rhetoric makes clear, autonomy implied both a distance from and disdain for social
relations. Not only was the self-assured considered anti-social but, like the stray sheep,
she was greatly at risk. Without the benefit of her peers and particularly her confessor,
the selt-assured and ashamed nun, looking for her own remedy, was operating under the
machinations ot the devil. Indeed, the rhetoric of the self was the prime deceit of the devil
Instead, the authentic prophet was highly critical of the self while at the same time
believing in her spiritual gifts.
The Selfless Standard
A good visionary was one who understood her role as instrument of the Church,
who understood that the vision she received was for the good of the entire Christian
community. In early modern Spain, the paragon female mystic was Teresa of Avila (also
known as Teresa ot Jesus). Both obedient and devout, expectant and compliant, Teresa
28
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modeled the appropriate mystical experience, of looking within without being entrapped
by the ashamed self.
In her letter to the Jesuit inquisitor of Seville, Teresa of Avila explained that “she
no more thinks of herself or of her own gain than if she did not exist, insofar as she and
her confessors understand concerning herself.”30 (So complete was her denial of self that,
in this account, she forswore the first person.) Written after a disgruntled and dismissed
nun reported Teresa and her fellow Carmelites to the Inquisition of Seville as illuminists.
1 eresa's narrative models the proper experience of a woman given to visions. 31 Of the
twenty paragraphs, eight refer to actual consultations with male authorities, including
Bartolome de Medina, a Dominican jurist and member of the Salamanca School.
When not enumerating the many authorities she consulted for advice on her
visions, Teresa describes the intensity of her fears that the visions were not from God.
She writes of unbearable interior torments and a disturbing inner fear about whether the
devil was deceiving her.” 32 The “learned men” helped her trust her internal experience but.
she writes, it was her vision that helped her the most: “[Wjhile in this indescribable state
of affliction, merely by hearing the word within, Tt is I, do not be afraid,' the soul was
left so quiet and courageous and confident that it couldn't understand where such a great
blessing came from. She concludes that “neither her confessor nor many learned men
with many words sufficed to give her that peace and quiet that were given with these
St. Teresa, Spiritual Testimonies No. 58. 424.
See Alison Weber, Teresa of Avila and Rhetoric of Feminity (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1996) for a look at Teresa's rhetorical skills at being both female and
instructive at a time when women were considered good receivers but not good
transmitters of knowledge.
32
Ibid., 422.
33
Ibid, 423.
139
words; nor did these learned men suffice at others times, until she was strengthened by
some vision.” 34
Teresa was able successfully to position her prophetic experience as superior to
the advice of learned men without committing the error of individualism. She
accomplished this remarkable feat by situating her will beneath that of the Catholic faith.
She ever was and ever is subject to all that the holy Catholic faith
holds, and all her prayer and the prayer in the houses she has founded is
tor the increase in the faith. She used to say that if any of her experiences
were to induce her to turn against the Catholic faith or the law ofGod, she
would have no need to go in search of proof, for then she would see it was
the devil. 35
I eresa exemplified the strange blend of knowing and not knowing that the
hierarchical faith required. She recognized the truth of her inner vision and she knew not
to trust herself. She recognized the authority of inquisitors and theologians and she knew
the limits on their abilities. She understood that her vision should be shared with the
world only after she had submitted “to the correction of the Catholic faith and of the
Church.” 30 Her obedience was so great that she “never did anything based on what she
understood in prayer. Rather, if her confessors told her to do the contrary, she did it
immediately, and always informed them about everything.” 37
We might understand her submission through a Foucaultian framework, in which
case we see the creation ofjust one more disciplined subject. The Thoniist framework,
however, would understand Teresa's submissive rhetoric as part of the process of
perfection, of becoming part of the larger whole. She understood herself as the spiritual
34
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eyes of the Catholic community, not as agent intellect. In talking about her reticence to
discuss her visions, 'tor fear that these things would be attributed to women's fancy,"
I eresa describes both her and her assessors' dilemma. On the one hand, she did not want
the authorities "to give definite condemnation of the experiences simply because they
didn't see any reason for them.” On the other hand, she didn't want them "to act as
though everything were from God, for she understood very well that there could be some
deception.'" 1 As an instrument of the Church, Teresa not only respected her own power
vis-a-vis the Church, but also the powers assigned to other offices. Respect for these
various coordinated offices, whether confessor or confessant, interrogator or accused,
helped maintain Christian sociability.
Teresa’s account not only exonerated her of all charges of illuminism, but it
provided the calificadores with an important reference guide. Approved by the Jesuit
inquisitor, her delense provided a standard by which to judge other cases and the
calificadores referred to her often. The frequent citations to her writings reminded the
inquisitors that prophesy was both a legitimate form of Christian doctrine and an
unsettling experience. A reference to Teresa reminded the interrogators that even saints
feel suspect. That the defendant before them felt ashamed should not be an indication of
trickery, as I eresa herself felt ashamed. Nor should an accusation serve as an indictment.
Teresa was often accused of receiving false or invented spiritual gifts.
What Teresa’s account did make certain was an insistence on repeated and
exhaustive confessions. One seventeenth century handbook for judges on how to examine
“revelations, visions, lights, interior pictures and external apparitions, raptures, ecstasies,
and internal and external movements” insists that, when it comes to supernatural
communications and sayings, the recipient should “observe with total rigor and
18
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timeliness" the duty "not to hide the littlest thing of her soul from her confessor and
spiritual father, as teaches Santa Teresa.’’39
This policy, however, brought its own difficulty as the relationship between
priests and female supplicants came under closer scrutiny. Although medieval
Christianity declared that a priest who had polluted his office was a priest incapable of
celebrating mass, sexual infractions were generally overlooked as the parishioners realized
that they themselves would be paying the penalty. 40 In the early modern era, the
traditional demand of charity, of being open to one’s neighbor, was finding itself at cross-
purposes with the reformed demand of civility, what Bossy called the moral values of the
Decalogue, of behaving oneself with one’s neighbor. This was particularly true in the
matter ot sexual relations. 41 As the virtue of chastity took on greater importance than the
virtue ot charity, the benefits of keeping men and women apart began to outweigh the
cost to social ties.
The Body of Belief
At first, the Jesuits offered a structure strong enough to contain sexual impulses
and still open enough to allow for the free flow of spirituality. The daily practice of
repentance and purification was understood to cleanse the body of impure desires.
Indeed, the practice of the Spiritual Exercises was considered so effective that the order
admitted a number ofwomen as members in the early years. The metaphor of the pilgrim
AHN Inq. Libro 1226: 787-812; 794 recto. “Interrogators Judicial para el examen de
revelaciones, visions, luces, e ilustraciones interiores y appariciones exteriores; Raptos,
extasis, mociones intemas, y extemas.”
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also helped to defuse the intensity of the confessional relationship by reinforcing a
relationship ot equals focused on something further on down the road.
The egalitarian nature of the exercises, along with a refusal to accept fees for their
services, made Loyola's disciples the preferred confessors of women throughout early
modern Christendom. Their popularity among the female sex, however, did not improve
their political standing. O'Malley recounts a story of a concerned aristocrat of Venice
who tried to stop the Jesuits from hearing women's confessions because of the danger to
their reputation in the Venetian Senate. The Jesuit rector refused to issue such a ban
claiming that the practice was “so essential and proper to our Institute.”42 As far as the
Institute was concerned, the concerns of the well-meaning Venetian were misguided in as
much as they were conventional. A true pilgrim passed through the local conventions,
following the higher, more universal and inclusive norms.
The Spanish Inquisition, on the other hand, recognized the benefits of Loyola's
approach to women. The manual for assessing various internal movements, cited above,
refers to the Great Patriarch, St. Ignacio de Loyola" when describing the proper
relationship between a confessor and a female supplicant. “The confessor or spiritual
father should always treat women with complete gravity and religiosity, always modest,
always circumspect" (dehe el confessory padre espiritual tratar siempre con ellas con
toda gravedad y religion, siempre modestos, siempre circumspectos.) The manual goes
on to remind its judicial audience of “the laws of nature, the native propensity of both
sexes," urging them to remember the teachings of Loyola so that “monstrosities will not
John O'Malley, The First Jesuits (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 19%),
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be able to prevail" (monstruosidades no podran sucedcr) from frequent and affectionate
contact.”43
A random survey of cases involving calificadores against female visionaries does
not reflect any great concerns for impropriety between the confessor and the female
visionary. Rather the calificadores held the female defendant to Teresa's standard of
frequent and exhaustive confessions. Indeed, if what Bossy suggests is correct - i.e. the
Inquisition maintained the traditional, ie. sociable, aspect of Christianity into the early
modern era - then defendants before the Holy Office would be corrected far more for
errors ot individualism, i.e. for withdrawing from society, than for errors of private
conduct, i.e. for inappropriate connections. As long as the smitten nun followed the
hierarchical Church, i.e. as long as she constantly confessed, she might participate in
spiritual mysteries that more civil people, i.e. “those who proceed with great
circumspection" would fear.
Yet civility's demands were not completely off the Spanish radar. The
circumspect person, whom Teresa condemned, might be a Lutheran theologian who was
commanding larger and more influential audiences in countries to the North. The Church,
therefore, was becoming increasingly worried about inappropriate confessional
relationships. It was one thing tor Teresa to condemn circumspect people and another
thing entirely for the Church to sanction uncircumspect relations between priests and
female supplicants. One way of responding to these attacks was to reinvent Loyola as a
circumspect preacher, as was the case in the undated manual cited above. Another way of
responding to Protestant allegations was to align inappropriate expressions of piety with
Protestant dogma.
An edict against alumbrados, published in 1623 by order of the Holy Office,
4
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begins by describing the many persons, both male and female, “of depraved soul" (con
ammo depravado) who are teaching and propagating such propositions and doctrine that
appear to be diverting them from our blessed Catholic faith,”4
- In order to guarantee that
its audience recognized a false doctrine from a true one, the author/inquisitor listed 76
examples of false doctrines, each one constituting a perversion of the faith. Participating
in any of these activities caused grave danger to the “Christian republic,” (rrepublica
Christiana) and threatened "the unity of our blessed catholic faith and the Roman
Church.”45
The items ranged from entertaining theories of predestination to engaging in
communal sex. Some of the false doctrines were clearly against Church dogma, as in
"saying bad words against the sacrament of marriage”(Item 6), while others promoted
individualism: that one may tollow one's own inner movement and inspiration in order
to do or not do whatever thing " (hazer o dejar de hazer cualquiera cosa) (Item 12).
Many confused matters of sexuality with matters of spirituality: “carnal movements are
caused by the spirit working in nature” (Item 52). The inquisitors' preoccupation with
kisses and the placing of hands in women’s “dark places” (a cierta parte oculta de ana
muger) (49) should not suggest some Calvinist distancing of the body from the spiritual
experience as the body was very much involved. Not only was it wrong to bless a
"daughter ot confession" (hija de confesion) with a kiss on the mouth (32) but it was
equally wrong to believe that a mental prayer is as valid as a vocal prayer (3). From the
beginning, the inquisitors make it clear that those who thought that "the corporeal
exercises" (ejercicios corporales), of making visible and vocal the teachings of the faith,
“were not a necessary part of serving God,” were apostates(4). Justification of faith by
44 AHN Inq. Libro 1231/648 -653, “Edicto contra aluinbrados”
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works insisted that the eatho.ie ideas of the mass were embodied in each supplicant; a
position consistent with the principles of Aquinas’ theory of natural law. A mental
prayer, for instance, was wrong because it did not engage the body which was naturally
disposed to the good. A mental prayer was also wrong because it did not promote
sociability; it could not be heard. As far as the Holy Office was concerned, both
Lutherans and alumbrados had destroyed the right relationship of spirit to body. The
Lutherans destroyed it by removing the body’s participation, i.e. the works. The
alumbrado destroyed it by destroying the social bonds in favor of personal desire.
By tying Lutheran beliefs to sexual perversion, the inquisitors not only vilified the
enemy but they also made clear what happens when the body is left out of the spiritual
equation: without the benefit of the corporeal exercises, the unoccupied hand will wander
into dangerous and dark places. The Holy Office, maintaining the Thomist principle that
nature was perlected by grace and that perfection was always social, continued to demand
the primacy ol the body in spiritual matters. The trials against alumbrados conform to
the Thomist critique against Protestant governments. James I’s error was, at root, an
error of relying too much on his own lights and not recognizing his place in the larger
cosmological order.
The Substance is Social and Sentient
Teresa's inner voice said, “It is I, do not be afraid." The passage is striking as it is
the only time in the account when Teresa uses the first person. What the paragon of
instruments discovered when she looked deep within was something that spoke in the
first person. Yet that message, that inner movement, did not inspire the purported
arrogance of the alumbrados. She did not take her spiritual gifts as a sign that she could
“do or not do whatever thing" she chose. Indeed, Teresa's ability to be both self assertive
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and conciliatory to the exisiting authorities has caused some confusion for feminist
scholars. In her treatment of Teresa's “rhetoric of femininity,” Alison Weber concludes
that this rhetoric “served her own needs of self-assertion so successfully” while at the
same time it ''paradoxically sanctioned the paternalistic authority of the Church over its
daughters and reinlorced the ideology of women’s intellectual and spiritual
subordination.”" A more fitting framework for understanding this paradox might be
1 homist naturalism: she recognized something inherently good inside of her that might be
perfected through the “social miracle’' of the Catholic Church.
feminists are not the only thinkers to reframe, and thereby distort, a historical
phenomenon using modem parlance. According to Marxist theorists, the hierarchy
established between Teresa and her confessors brought power and influence to them and
alienated her from her own experience, or, in Marxist terms, her mode of spiritual
production. And yet this useful modem criticism does not fully encompass the corporate
truth of Teresa's internal and external relationships. First of all, alienation is a modern
condition, dependent on both the Cartesian division of the world into mind and matter
and the carving out of individual consciousness in the Protestant Reformation. Second, the
calm and comfort she describes is understood as the experience of participating in the
Chain of Being, of moving up the innate light into celestial wattage, an intense internal
experience that, for the good of society, must be confessed to others.
The confessional relationship, the constituent unit of the Thomist order was
predicated on confronting and transforming a person’s shame into a deeper social bond.
By the very act of confessing, individual shame was dislodged by the first wedge of
sociability, the listening priest. Confession was the practice that kept the various
members on track. It reminded the confessant of her dependence on her spiritual director
46
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and it brought the confessor into close proximity with the inner movements of others,
some of which might be divine. This last point refines the distorted picture of the
Inquisition painted by its Protestant critics. Rather than a static and power-driven
hierarchy, the Thomists understood the hierarchical relationship as a social vessel for one
member's supernatural insights. The grace bestowed upon one could not end in one's
personal gain but in its actualization within the entire community.
Considered in this corporatist context, Tully's observation about the radical
distinction between the Thomists and the Protestants - the self in substance versus the
sell in consciousness — might be amended to include John Bossy's insights about
traditional and reformed Christianity. In many ways, the constituent unit within the
Catholic framework was not a self at all but a social relation. The self alone was an
incomplete substance. Even a self infused with supernatural grace was not fully
developed.
This commitment to the corporate explains how supernatural matters, derided in
Protestant countries, could survive in early modern Spain. Rather than fear divine
interventions as a challenge to the existing political order, as was the case with the peasant
interpretation of Luther's doctrine of sola scriptur
a
,
the inquisitors were able to
recognize, even anticipate, divine interventions because those interventions, like Suarez's
facultas moralis, were only divine in as much as they enhanced social connections. The
final cause was to participate in divine reason. The formal cause that permitted this
possibility was a hierarchically-arranged society. The substantial cause that fostered that
possibility was human nature. The efficient cause was confession.
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CHAPTER VII
SOME FINAL THOUGHTS
A confession has to be
part ofyour new life.
Ludwig Wittgenstein'
1 hat the Inquisition used coercive means is not unique to Spanish ecclesiastical
jurisprudence. What is unique to the Catholic inquisitorial system is its emphasis on
sociability over the protection of individual rights. The values of the inquisitorial system
were corporate, corporeal, cosmological, confessional, and hierarchical. The emphasis was
on moving up the Chain of Being, away from being a mere individual to functioning as a
member of a larger, more perfect society. The method for that movement was the
embodiment of faith in a social context, i.e. the practice of confession.
The social justice of the inquisitorial framework - i.e. its essential belief in
redemption, its emphasis on social rather than individual rights - is largely discounted in
the English speaking world. Some of the reasons for this oversight are historical, bound in
the centuries old antagonism between England and Spain. Some of the reasons are
religious, based on the Protestant need to distinguish itself from its parent religion. And
some of the reasons are connected to the United State’s deeply-held belief in its own
exceptionalism. Were the effect of all this antipathy merely studied neglect, then the
Inquisition should have disappeared from our national consciousness. Yet that is hardly
the case. I he Inquisition continues to play the convenient role of the jurisprudential
"other;” the system of justice that destroys true justice by its very operation/ This
1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value
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dichotomy is useful since liberalism identifies with a completely different set of values -
atomistic, voluntary, rational, autonomous, and equal - than those of traditional
Christianity. As long as the traditional values are associated with the Inquisition,
liberalism can reign supreme.
Despite the tact that the last auto de fe took place over one hundred years ago, the
specter ot the Inquisition continues to haunt liberal proceedings. Kenneth Starr, for
instance, was referred to as "Torquemada in wire-rim glasses” 1 and Chief Justice Earl
Warren famously described police interrogation in the Miranda decision in much the same
language as H.C. Lea depicted the ruthless inquisitors. Lea was not suprised that the
inquisitor, “eager to destroy the foxes which ravaged the vineyard of the Lord.” “speedily
emancipated himself from the trammels of recognized judicial procedure.”4 Warren plays
on the same anxiety:
To obtain a confession, the interrogator must “patiently maneuver himself
or his quarry into a position from which the desired object may be
obtained." When normal procedures fail to produce the needed result, the
police may resort to deceptive stratagems such as giving false legal advice,
it is important to keep the subject off balance, for example, by trading on
his insecurity about himself or his surroundings. The police then persuade,
trick, or cajole him out of exercising his constitutional rights. 1
Interestingly enough, the dissent in the Miranda decision accused the Court of “a strained
Jeffrey Toobin, “Starr can't help it,” The New Yorker (May 18, 1998), 32-38.
4 H. C. Lea, A History ofthe Inquisition ofthe Middle Ages (New York: Macmillan, 1888),
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reading of history. To insist on a standard of complete voluntariness, wrote Justice
Harlan, is utopian or "voluntariness with a vengeance.”7
The anti-Catholic element contained in the Court's stand against the use of
confession was stated most clearly in a 1954 article on the Fifth Amendment, when soon-
to-be Justice Abe Fortas declared that
Mea culpa belongs to a man and his God. It is a plea that cannot be exacted
rom tree men by human authority. To require it is to insist that the state
is the superior ot the individuals who compose it, instead of their
instrument. 8
Fortas is taking an absolute position in favor of protecting an individual's autonomy, yet
even his more moderate colleague on the bench, Felix Frankfurter, engaged in similar
rhetoric. In Culombe v. Connecticut, a 1961 Supreme Court case. Frankfurter considered
the competing needs ot the state and the individual in extracting a confession and
concluded that if the suspect’s "will has been overborne and his capacity for self-
determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process.”9 When it
comes to contession. Frankfurter agrees with Fortas, the state is the instrument of the
individual.
In his extended reflection on the use of confession, Peter Brooks invokes Catholic
jurisprudence generally, and the Spanish Inquisition specifically, as a prop in his critique.
Reflecting on the value we attach to the spoken confession of sin, crime,
and error, we may become aware of how close we still are to the year
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1215, when the Roman Catholic Church, in the Fourth Lateran Council,
made annual confession obligatory for all the faithful. 10
A jurisprudence that demands full confessions is a backward jurisprudence, argues
Brooks. A progressive jurisprudence, on the other hand, is one that distrusts the very idea
ol confession, whether or not coercion is a factor.
It is not only that the coerced confession may be untrustworthy (a false
confession) but also that the means of production of a confession - even of
the truth - may violate our sense that individuals before the law, even as
criminal suspects, must be conceived as autonomous human subjects."
The sense that is being violated in Brooks’ passage is a liberal sense, a sense that
holds the autonomous human subject as supreme. Yet that framework is not necessarily
progressive. In as much as the protection against self-incrimination prevents us from
moving beyond an unacknowledged past, these liberal protections may keep us in a form
ol social purgatory. Had we never heard the full confession of Sean Penn’s character in
the film Dead Man Walking, we would never have had a sense of his humanity. From a
legal point ol view, the confession ol an inmate on death row was immaterial: the state
had presented enough conclusive evidence to have him convicted. From a social point of
view, however, his confession was central. Sean Penn’s character walked to his death
having finally connected with his audience. Perhaps in an inquisitorial court, where the
goal was confession not conviction, he would have been reconciled.
from a 1 homist perspective, confession is not a crime against the individual will
but the possibility of starting afresh. “We ask that you fully confess,” repeated the
inquisitors to the young Leonor de C'aceres, “so that you will make room for mercy.” The
inquisitorial approach not only assumes that bearing witness against oneself is helpful to
10
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the common good but to the contestant as well. Like the Catechism, the words of a full
confession are both the efficient and formal cause of a new and reintegrated life. Progress,
then, earned dif ferent identifying marks than those espoused by liberalism. To submit to
another's superior will was progress. To understand one's contribution to the world in
terms of social benefit, not individual merit, was also progress. These values, however,
did not disappear with the seventeenth century. In Southern Europe and Latin America,
these corporate, corporeal, and hierarchical values continue to inform indigenous efforts
towards social justice.
In her ethnographic study of ecclesiastical base communities (CEBs) outside of
Sao Paulo, Brazil, Carol Ann Drogus discovered an understanding of social justice that the
inquisitors would have commended. One active member of a CEB explained how she
understood creating a community for social justice:
We can't form a community through politics, or even through the Bible,
not even the Bible can form a community. It has to be to pray the rosary
at home. The people like to pray the rosary! ... They don’t understand
the Bible either. 11 we pray the rosary, everybody likes it, everybody
knows it, see? So that helps.’ 2
This female CEB leader recognized that community, within this Catholic framework, is
best created through a social and corporeal expression of faith. Reflecting on Bible
passages does not transform an aggregate ot individuals into a corporate group; praying
the rosary does. Luther founded his community on sola scriptura. Aquinas demanded a
performative utterance: “The believer's act [of faith] does not terminate in the
propositions, but in the realities [which they express].” 13 In other words, the act of
" Carol Ann Drogus, Women, Religion, and Social Change in Brazil's Popular Church
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1997), 91.
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reciting a prayer while moving down the beads constitutes the reality of a community of
believers, a community constituted by confession. One female member of the CEB spoke
with pride ot getting up at “the crack of dawn to go to mass... we got up and walked three
hours, we went on foot, on the road, and in the middle of the brush, to go to mass and to
confess.” 14
Liberalism sees progress using entirely different markers. Within that framework,
the indicators of Thomist justice are indications of injustice. Hierarchies, in particular, are
highly problematic. Fortas decries a state that puts itself above its constituent members;
Franklurter worries about a will being overborne. This anti-hierarchical bias may appeal
to our democratic sense of equality, that every person is equal to every other person in
the manner ol Hobbes, but it denies the possibility ottered by the 1 homist alternative
which would argue that society has a higher standing than the individual, that different
groups serve different functions, and that the will is not the top of the mental chain.
Like the communal praying of the rosary, confession disrupts the primacy of the
will. Confession entails a hierarchy, the relationship of confessant and confessor; it
encourages the subordination of the will, and it emphasizes the social bond over psychic
integrity. It is, by nature, an anti-liberal activity but not necessarily an unjust activity.
The Thomist inquisitors demanded a level of intimacy from their subordinates that
offends liberal sensibilities. An individual’s will was often dominated - not for the thrill
of domination, as Foucault insinuates - but for the possibility of a culmination of the past
and a movement towards a better future.
Although modern-day Thomists, such as Jacques Maritain and Ralph Mclnerny,
have kept alive the discussion on the innate capacities of human beings, few Catholic
theorists have been willing to defend the traditional notion that confessional hierarchies
14
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may be useful for social justice. This absence of a coherent theory has not only hindered
Supreme Court justices from exploring society's need for confession, it has also hampered
political scientists doing research on liberation theology and the popular church in Latin
America. There is no contemporary theory to explain how a hierarchical and patriarchal
institution like the Roman Catholic Church can also be a vehicle for the empowerment of
poor people and women. 15
Fortunately, critics ot postmodernism have begun to re-examine some of the
deeply-held assumptions of liberalism, even the inherently repressive qualities ascribed to
the hierarchy. 1 '’ "One of the ugliest things there is,” writes social critic Frederick Turner
must be the claim that what is in fact a necessary and beautiful hierarchy,
containing and preserving differences and surprises without denaturing
them, is merely a cloak for power relations, when that claim comes either
trom the mere malignity of the insensitive or from the strategic rhetoric of
those who themselves seek coercive power. 17
I urner's critique of postmodern theorists does more than just reveal their own suspect
power relations. By tackling the anti-hierarchical assumptions of liberal and postmodern
thought, Turner has given 1 homist political theory a place in contemporary critical
theory. Rather than perpetuate the notion that democracy cannot abide a hierarchy,
I urner argues that democracy demands hierarchy.
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Varela, The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots ofHuman Understanding (Boston:
Shambhala, 1992); Francisco J. Varela, “The Reenchantment of the Concrete,” in
Incorporations
,
ed. by Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kwinter (New York: Zone, 1996),
320-339.
1
Frederick Turner, Beauty: The Value of Values (Charlottesville, VA: University of
Virginia Press, 1991), 11.
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Democracy is misconstrued as a way to get rid of hierarchy; instead it is an
attempt to create true hierarchy, a flexible and porous one in which the
relations of subordination and superordination are guaranteed by consent
rather than power. As the Framers of the United States Constitution
knew, when democracy turns into an attempt to destroy hierarchy, it
destroys autonomy, consent, and permitted difference, and instead of
democracy we get bureaucracy or the tyranny of the majority
.
18
Turner is able to consider the hierarchy as “necessary and beautiful” because his
thinking in many ways follows the assumptions of Thomism. In an essay on biology and
beauty, Turner explicates the “essential assumptions” of his thesis (the negation of
which, he asserts, are the assumptions of modern and postmodern thought);
( 1 ) There is a real human nature: (2) there is a real universal nature - partly
knowable by appropriate means - that includes us but is not completely
determined by our constructions of it; (3) There is an essence and meaning
in things; (4) There exist real hierarchical properties in the world, which
involve scaling, the organization of living and nonliving systems, and levels
ol reflexivity and sensitivity; (5) There is such a thing as real progress; and
(6) Any significant work in the present must include and be the
culmination of the past.” 19
The similarities between Turner’s framework and that of the Thomist inquisitors
are striking. Both assume something universal called human nature; both assume an
organizing hierarchy; both assume movement towards a better world; and both assume
that any progressive movement is born from an acceptance of both our bodies and our
shame. Rather than "deny our shame as the inheritors of crime and atrocity,” writes
Turner, we must
remove the obstacles to our recognition of our shame and restore to us the
most fundamental and most fertile shame of all, the conscious recognition
of ourselves as creatures of matter, animals that feel and think as we eat,
breed and die. 20
18
Turner, Beauty, 12.
" Turner, “Biology and Beauty/'in Incorporations
,
406-421, 407.
211
Turner, “Biology and Beauty,” 407.
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1 umer recommends tragic drama as the vehicle for this embodied and social confession
and yet that would require an audience
-that has some intellectual grasp of the necessary
irreconcilability of our moral and logical conflicts.- Turner comments that it would be
hard to And an audience who could tolerate such irreconcilable conflicts, a phenomenon
attributable to liberalism's pervasive hold. As far back as Hobbes, we see the conflation
of moral and logical. The business of spiritual infusion is immoral because it is illogical.
I homism resides in a Kingdom of Darkness because it is beyond reason.
By allowing the hierarchy back in, Turner’s universalism is of a far different
shade than that promoted by feminist theorists. While committed to a framework that
understands the difficulties faced by women because they are women, feminist theorists
such as Martha Nussbaum, Catharine Mackinnon, and Elaine McDonagh have faltered on
matters that involve larger units than the female body. 22 Although their critiques have
provided a useful framework for reconsidering the role of women as subjects rather than
objects of property, their frameworks are, at times, rigidly insistent on liberal values. For
instance, Martha Nussbaum insists on equality as a universal value, equating scholars
who recognize functional differences as converging “with the positions of reaction,
oppression, and sexism.” 23
Yet not all social problems can be addressed purely in terms of liberalism's values.
Family Court, for instance, requires a jurisprudence that acknowledges the social organism
21
Turner, Beauty
,
55.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987). Eileen L. McDonagh, Breaking the
Abortion Deadlock: From Choice to Consent (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
McDonagh's book is particularly atomistic, reframing the question of abortion in terms of
tort law on self-defense; the fetus as intruder theory.
:i
Martha Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 36.
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of the family. 1 ruth and Reconciliation Commissions require a jurisprudence that
recognizes the social organism of the recovering country. Because Family Court is
contained within an existing liberal system, as opposed to Truth and Reconciliation
Commissions which are often part of a new order, efforts to move toward reconciliation
are highly constrained. Rather than being encouraged to make a full and complete
confession, defendants are cautioned to remain silent. Any repentance revealed in Family
Court might result in criminal charges in District Court. To take stock of one's past
actions does not reincorporate the abuser back into the social fold; rather he is subject to
incarceration and on-line data banks.
My hope is that we can learn something from our jurisprudential "Other.” The
Spanish Inquisition reminds us that justice can exist outside of the liberal framework and
that equality and the autonomous will may not always be essential for social progress. Of
course to make such a claim is to immediately be branded a heretic of liberalism and to be
suspected of repressive tendencies. Yet in order for liberty of conscience to be able to
mean something real and not just something convenient, alternative frameworks need to be
considered and different sensibilities need to be cultivated. The values of liberalism are
many but they are not necessarily universal. 24 Whether we're trying to understand CEBs
or family courts, or any other activity beyond the radar of liberal theory, our efforts will
be more rewarding if we have some understanding of the historical, religious, and
philosophical principles guiding those extra-liberal practices.
24 See Michael Ignatieff, “We Are Not the World, The New Republic (August 13, 2001 ).
14-15 for a succinct critique of "universal jurisdiction" and the prosecution of heads ot
state.
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